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Abstract
This dissertation is part of the project “Expectations and Experiences: What governed in-
vestment in banking stocks (1897 – 1931)?” It belongs to the Priority Programme 1859 “Ex-
pectations and Experiences: Historical Foundations of Economic Behavior” (Schwerpunkt-
programm 1859 ”Erfahrung und Erwartung. Historische Grundlagen ökonomischen Han-
delns”), which is fundedby theGermanResearch Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemein-
schaft). The overall aim of the Priority Programme is to study the historical dimension of
economic expectations. Economic expectations are the keystone of economic behavior, but
their historical dimension has not been researched in depth so far. It studies experience and
expectation as interrelated cognitive processes pointing to the past and the future which en-
able economic actors to realize their decisions in the present.1
The central purpose of this dissertation is at studying investors’ characteristics, as well as
investment decisions on the different German stock exchanges in the period 1869 to 1955.
Furthermore, this thesis studies the influence of experience on investment decisions by look-
ing at the investment behavior of one single investor over time. Increasing our knowledge
of investors and how they built expectations therefore crucially improves our understanding
about the economic and political situation in Germany in the considered time period.
In chapter 1, I give a brief introduction and motivation why investors’ characteristics, in-
vestment behavior and investment decisions should be studied from a historical point of
view.
Thereafter, I offer three studies that reveal typical characteristics of investors and their in-
vestment behavior over time.
In chapter 2, I first of all present the investors database, I hand-collected from different
archival resources. This new and unique database provides the basis for the analyses in chap-
ter 3, chapter 4 and chapter 5.
The third chapter presents a study of investors’ characteristics and the ownership structure
of joint-stock firms for the period of 1869 to 1945. It is shown that after the hyperinflation
of 1923, when shares became cheaper, the ownership share among lower social classes rose
1For more details about the Priority Programme, visit the website of the Priority Programme 1859
”Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour”: https://www.experience-
expectation.de/.
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significantly. Moreover, with the rise of women rights after 1919, the number of shares owned
by women also increased significantly. However, despite these shifts, the majority of shares
remained in the hands of institutional investors and investors from the upper class.
The fourth chapter analyzes investors’ expectations and investment decisions in regional
stock exchanges in Germany from 1898 to 1934. The statistical analysis, which is based on
shareholder lists attending general meetings first indicates that local investment was clearly
important during this period. Then, challenging these findings and analyzing different sub-
samples, suggests that investors’ home bias is potentially overestimated using this kind of
source. In a supplementary exploration of so-called shareholder books, it is shown that the
home bias phenomenon was indeed present.
Chapter 5 shows, that the bias towards local investments can to a large extent be explained
by overall economic and political circumstances, the general performance of the market and
the level of activity of the investor. The examination of portfolio choices over the period
1923 to 1955 of the private banker Joseph Frisch, in Stuttgart, reveals that the preference for
local shares was highest in times of insecurity, low returns and reduced investment activity.
Furthermore, the analysis of diary entries of an investor from the late 19th century provides
insights into his investment behavior.
Lastly, chapter 6 gives a general conclusion and a brief outlook about future research.
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“WYSIATI - What you see is all there is.”
Daniel Kahneman, Nobel Prize in Economics 2002
1
Introduction
In 2015, DALBAR—a research firm on financial services— released the 21st Edition of Dal-
bar’s Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) (Dalbar 2015). Looking at monthly
investor returns of the last 30 years, it shows that investors underperformed the S&P 500.1
The greatest extent to which underperforming occurred was inOctober 2008, with a net un-
derperformance of 7.41 percentage points, and inMarch 2000, with a net underperformance
of 6.06 percentage points. Why does this occur? Dalbar attributes the results to bad invest-
ment decisions arising from a lack of preparedness of the investors.
A decision to buy and/or hold stocks is complex and takes place in most of cases under
1The S&P 500 is anAmerican stockmarket index. It compromises the shares of 500 of the largest listedUS
companies.
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uncertainty (Peterson 2009, p. 3). Economic actors try to build expectations about future
returns and risks to reduce this uncertainty. They acquire information on the future devel-
opment of certain firms, the overall economy and the political situation. Moreover, they
observe and interpret the investment behavior of other investors. Therefore, the available
set of information and investors’ ability to interpret these are important and influence their
expectations. The knowledge to interpret the given information is built on experience (see,
e.g., Greenwood andNagel 2009;Malmendier andNagel 2011, 2015; Cici et al. 2018) and their
socioeconomic profile (level of education, age, gender). Furthermore, the self-confidence of
investors to trust their own knowledge and follow other investors’ decisions plays an impor-
tant role.
From the perspective of financial research, the investigation of investment decisions on
stockmarkets is particularly interesting since oneobserves types of investmentbehavior,which
finance models have failed to predict so far. As Markowitz (1952) pointed out in the 1950s,
portfolio theory assumes that investors form expectations about return and risk of securi-
ties and select their portfolios according to their risk preference. As a consequence, rational
economic actors should diversify their portfolio. But instead, at least for modern periods, it
can be shown that investors take highly idiosyncratic risk, under-diversify their portfolios or
gamblewith stocks, which is possibly driven by overconfidence and herding behavior (Odean
1998, Chang et al. 2000, Bikhchandani andSharma2001,Glaser andWeber 2007,Goetzmann
and Kumar 2008, Calvet et al. 2007, Kumar 2009).
There is also evidence that they use complex investment strategies, which differ from the
puremean-variance optimization2 (Lewellen et al. 1977, Grinblatt andKeloharju 2000). Fur-
2Mean-variance optimizationmeans that investorsmake investment decisions according on howmuch risk
they are willing to take compared to different levels of return. They are weighting the risk, expressed as variance,
3
thermore, a vast amount of studies concludes that there is a strong preference of investors in-
vesting in shares of firms from their hometownor home country3 instead of diversifying their
portfolios with both domestic and foreign shares. This form of investment costs investors a
lot of money and is often also discussed by the press.4
Moreover, previous research has shown that socioeconomic characteristics of individual
investors influence their expectations and investment decisions (Jianakoplos and Bernasek
1998, Barber andOdean 2001, Dwyer et al. 2002, Goetzmann andKumar 2008, Kumar 2009,
Sapienza et al. 2009, Dohmen et al. 2011). Younger, low-income, less-educated and less-
sophisticated investors under-diversify their portfolio in a stronger way. Female investors
have different levels of risk-aversion than male investors. These findings suggest that the link
between changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of investors and stockmarket behavior
might be stronger than is currently believed.
As these studies show, there is quite some research on the investment behavior of share-
holders and their socioeconomic characteristics in modern periods, with regard to these dif-
ferent anomalies. However, there is still room for research because these anomalies are not
completely understood empirically. For example, studying investment behavior from a his-
torical perspective contributes to a better understanding of the home bias phenomenon be-
cause it enables us to have a long-run perspective and exploits the variation over time, such
as, for instance, different types of regimes. Furthermore, there is little information about in-
dividual investors and no analyses of investors’ characteristics and expectations in Germany
and comparing it against the expected return. Following this approach allows investors to find the biggest return
given a certain level of risk (see, e.g., Markowitz and Todd 2000).
3This so-called home bias is, at least for modern periods, highly researched. For a recent review, see Coeur-
dacier and Rey (2013). For an overview of the current literature of home bias in modern and historical financial
literature, see chapter 4 and chapter 5.
4See, e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 27 December 2016 and Die Welt 19 February 2018.
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in historical periods so far.
Therefore, this thesis seeks to gain insights about which factors mattered most for in-
vestors’ expectation and investment decisions on the stock market in the period 1869 to 1955.
To improve the interpretation of investors’ stock market behavior, it is therefore necessary
first to learnmore about investors and their characteristics andhowtheir characteristics changed
over time and influenced their investment behavior. In a second step, this thesis deals with
investment behavior in general. I study whether there was a home bias to the benefit of geo-
graphically close firms and whether this evaporated over time. Third, I study the reasons for
the investors’ home bias by analyzing the investment decisions of an investor over his lifetime.
Many papers aim to understand investors’ expectations in this period. For example, Kling
(2006) and Lübbers (2008) ask how firm mergers were anticipated. Lehmann-Hasemeyer
et al. (2014) investigate how investors react to suffrage extensions. Opitz (2017) studies how
investors anticipate riots, wars and revolutions. But all of thesepapersmakeonly assumptions
about who the investors were. However, one thing that is missing is a detailed description of
investors’ characteristics.
Regarding the historical research on investors’ characteristics, one can find lists of appli-
cants of shares, such as, for instance, the list of the first buyers of shares of Deutsche Bank
in 1870 (Pohl 1987). A pioneering study of historical investors in Germany is provided by
Franks et al. (2006). They investigate the ownership structure of 55 German companies. But
none of these include an analysis of investors’ characteristics or investment behavior. The
first obvious characteristic of all shareholders, which is discussed in historical research, is that
they were relatively rich since shares were increasingly expensive (Burhop 2011). Therefore, it
seems unlikely that workers or even middle-class employees held shares.
5
AngelaBol (2018a and2018b) examines theownershipofDeutscheBank,AllgemeineElektricitäts-
Gesellschaft (AEG), Siemens and Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft (BHG) between 1870 and
1930. She shows that the shares of Deutsche Bank were widely held whereas the BHG, AEG
and Siemens had a concentrated shareholder structure. The first qualitative and quantitative
studies of individual investor´s behavior in a historical context (not for investors inGermany,
but in the UK), were recently published by Chambers and co-authors. In a series of papers,
they explore the investment behavior of JohnMaynardKeynes between 1921 and 1946 (Cham-
bers andDimson 2013, Chambers et al. 2015, Accominotti andChambers 2016, Chambers and
Kabiri 2016). For the UK, there is also a study by Rutterford et al. (2017), who investigate a
historical home bias for London and non-London investors.5
Another contribution related to thehomebias is givenbyBurhopandLehmann-Hasemeyer
(2016). They explore listing decisions of firms on the different German stock exchanges in
1913. They find evidence that larger firms tend to list on the Berlin stock exchange, whereas
smaller firms listed their shares on regional stock exchanges. Beside asymmetric information
between the issuer and the investor, they explain their findings with an investor’s home bias.
In a contemporary study,Wormser (1919) shows that 30 percent of the financial wealthwas
concentrated in three cities. For example, for the Frankfurt stock exchange, wealthy citizens
were an important factor in attracting capital to the stock exchange.
Furthermore, the interwar period saw great changes in wealth distribution.6 Low growth
rates, repeated recessions and high inflation led many wealthy people to lose vast amounts
of their assets. The post-war inflation was a historical event that changed access to stocks. It
5For the UK, there is a lot of research on historical investors and corporate ownership. To name only a few
studies, see chapter 2 of this dissertation.
6See for instance Beer 1999, pp. 156-163.
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brought more opportunities for people from lower social classes, which means that at least
some shares may have become accessible to a larger audience with different experiences and
different socioeconomic backgrounds. In this case, it is not about regional preferences of the
people, but rather a behavioral shift of the people toward shares. The question iswhether this
is also reflected in the ownership structure of joint-stock companies. However, Aron (1927)
showed that although large amounts (about 53 percent) of capital of joint-stock companies
were shifted among groups of investors, firmsmade sure that most shares were traded among
large shareholders by granting them special conditions such as buying shares on account.
To close the gap about what we know of historical investors, chapter 2 introduces the in-
vestors’ database. I hand-collect a new and unique dataset that includes information of more
than 10,000 individual investors. The investors’ data are taken from archival resources con-
taining lists of shareholders who attended a firms’ general assembly. Moreover, I use so-called
shareholder books of different companies to get information about individual investors. Fur-
thermore, I examine portfolio choices over the lifetime of a single private banker. Last, I
evaluate a diary of a private investor. However, since the analysis is based on rare and frag-
mentary archival material and the material also has some shortcomings, I will only improve
our picture of the typical investors, rather than get a perfectly clear idea of his/her/its typical
characteristics and investment behavior.
Chapter 3 then reveals typical characteristics of investors in more detail by systematically
exploring the available informationbased on785 investor lists of general assemblymeetings of
276 firms. In a joint workwith Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer, I study the ownership structure
of joint-stock firms for the period of 1869 to 1945 based on this unique hand-collected dataset.
We show that after the hyperinflation of 1923, when shares became cheaper, the ownership
7
share among lower social classes rose significantly. Moreover, with the rise of women’s rights
after 1919, the number of shares owned by women also increased significantly. However, de-
spite these shifts, the majority of shares remained in the hands of institutional investors and
investors from the upper class, who mainly constituted and controlled the general meetings.
Thus, despite the increased participation of women and the lower social classes, a strong in-
equality of opportunities persisted.
As mentioned, a further gap between the prediction of theoretical finance models and the
observed individual investment behavior in reality is the so-called ‘homebias’. The homebias
literature indicates that instead of diversifying their portfolios and holding domestic as well
as foreign assets and shares, investors prefer assets and shares from their home country and
home region.
Chapter 4 provides a study on investors’ home bias from a historical point of view. It stud-
ies investors’ expectations and investment decisions in regional stock exchanges in Germany
from 1898 to 1934. I examine data on investors’ characteristics to understand local investment
biases using data from regional stock exchanges in Germany from 1898-1934. The statistical
analysis first indicates that local investment was clearly important and that the existence of a
historical home bias is present during this period. Since the analysis is based on attendance
lists of shareholders attending the general assembly of the company and there is no infor-
mation on investors who did not attend the assemblies, I challenge these findings in a next
step, by analyzing different sub-samples. The results suggest that investors’ home bias is po-
tentially overestimated. Previous studies, which found evidence of local investment biases in
Germany have presumably overestimated this effect. This is due to the fact that the probabil-
ity of investors to attend such assemblies is higher for those who live in the same resort than
8
the general assembly is taking place.
Analyzing the shareholder books of theMetallgesellschaft AG in 1919, theMetallbank and
Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG in 1925 as well as the Mittelschwäbische Überlandzentrale
Giengen AG in 1925 also contributes to investors’ home bias. The advantage of these sources
is that the analysis is nowunbiased in terms of investors, who attended the general assemblies,
that might have led to a home bias toward people that lived close to the meeting, but the
analysis is based on registers of shareholders at a given point in time. It shows that a regional
firm, like the Mittelschwäbische Überlandzentrale Giengen AG had a regional shareholder
structure and listed its shares on a regional stock exchange. Whereas, the Metallgesellschaft
AG, which was a diversified company with lots of branches and subsidiaries listed the shares
on more than one stock exchange. The shares were traded on important stock exchanges
like e.g. the Berlin stock exchange or the Frankfurt stock exchange to attract capital. Since I
also have information on the portfolio of the investors of theMetallbank undMetallurgische
Gesellschaft AG, I can show that the interest in local shares was high among the investors.
However, this study is not representative since it is only based on three specific companies.
Since the article in chapter 4 does not study the reasons for an investor’s home bias, chapter
5 investigates this more closely using portfolio choices over the lifetime of the private banker
Joseph Frisch in Stuttgart. Here, Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer and I show that the bias to-
ward local investments can to a large extent be explained by the overall political and economic
circumstances, the general performance of themarket and the level of activity of the investor.
We find that the preference for local shares was highest in times of insecurity, low returns and
reduced investment activity. With higher returns, a stable and growing economy and more
experience, the preference for local shares decreased.
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In addition, the diary of the investor Gustav Schlott provides interesting insights into the
investment behavior during the late 19th century. As a school inspector, Schlott belonged to
the upper class of the society. Also, his salary surpassed that of a factory worker by a multiple
mark. Consequently, the findings by previous research (Burhop 2011) that the investors were
a wealthy circle of customers also apply here.
Looking beyond these findings, the articles in this chapter close the gap on what we know
about investors in historical periods. To improve the interpretation of investors’ stockmarket
behavior, they provide a clearer picture of the different forms of investors’ homebias and how
it changed over time.
To summarize, basedonanewly constructeddataset, this thesis largely improves our know-
ledge about the socioeconomic characteristics of investors in general to a large extent by pro-
viding information on the ownership structure of joint-stock firms and the composition of
shareholders for the period from 1869 to 1945. This thesis also improves our picture about the
investment behavior of investors during that time. It first shows that investment in local firms
was probably overestimated because the underlying data on attendance lists of shareholders
attending the general assembly of the company have some shortcomings. Nevertheless, us-
ing other sources such as shareholder registers confirms that local investment was clearly im-
portant during that time. Furthermore, based on the portfolio of the private banker Joseph
Frisch, it additionally shows an investors’ home bias that seems to become more apparent
in times of insecurity and financial turmoil. This newly gained understanding of investors
helps future research. Having information about share ownership is especially important for
further studies of investment behavior or stock market behavior. It is also important to gain
insights about which factors mattered most for investors’ expectations.
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Who Invested in StockMarket Shares?
Investors’ Data and Descriptive Patterns
Until now, there have been no systematic data containing information about investors
in Germany in the period of 1869 to 1955.1 The reason is that most of the shares were bearer
1For the UK, the picture looks different. Here, historical corporate ownership data for the 19th and 20th
century are available. For example, under the 1856/1862 UK corporate law, firms were required to submit share-
holder registers to the Registrar of Companies (Acheson et al. 2015). Acheson et al. (2017) investigate the
Victorian equity market in the second half of the 19th century and analyzed the investment behavior of more
than 172,000 shareholders. In addition, they analyze the occupational composition of shareholders and also
find evidence that there was a growth in female investors over time. Female investors invested more in safe in-
vestments, whereas e.g. institutional investors speculated mostly in foreign firms. Acheson et al. (2018) study
female investors participating on the stockmarket. The results confirm that female shareholders acted indepen-
dently of men. It appeared that female investors invested solo andwere not influenced bymen. Also, post-1900
12
shares, which means that there are no systematic shareholder files of firms containing infor-
mation about individual investors, as there are, for example, in the UK (Burhop 2011). Com-
panies did not have to publish major shareholders with a specific shareholding. Shareholders
therefore remained anonymous.
The only somehow systematic available data on share ownership in the archives are share-
holder lists of general assemblies. Firms had to provide these lists to the stock exchange op-
erator of the respective stock exchanges if they wanted to list their shares at the respective
stock exchange. Thus, shareholders had to register their shares when they attended the gen-
eral meeting of a firm. This became law under the Stock Exchange Act in 1896 (Franks et
al. 2006). Searching for these shareholder lists in the economic archives is difficult and time-
data are available (see e.g. Foreman-Peck andHannah 2012). They especially explore the voting control of board
members of UK companies and show that they owned only 3.4 percent of the shares which indicates a lower
level of voting control. In addition, Rutterford et al. (2011, 2017) explore the ownership of shares as well as
investment behavior using a detailed sample of shareholder records of UK companies between 1870 and 1935.
Regarding data on individual investors in the UK, Chambers and co-authors examine the investment behavior
of JohnMaynard Keynes (Chambers andDimson 2013; Chambers et al. 2015; Accominotti and Chambers 2016;
Chambers and Kabiri 2016). The articles illuminate his investment behavior from 1921-1946 during his time as
the person in charge of the assets of King’s College in Cambridge. He was one of the first investors to invest
the majority of the foundation’s portfolio in equities, which asset class at that time was considered risky and
was avoided for that reason. The portfolio Keynes constructed contained equities from small and medium-
sized UK companies and switched between stocks with a high or low dividend yield, depending on the market
situation. In addition, he bundled his shares mainly in the two sectors, metal mining and industry and trade.
Initially, Keynes pursued an active top-down investment strategy. He used monetary and economic indicators
to identify and buy profitable stocks at the beginning of their appreciation in the market, while selling equities
that were not profitable. With this strategy, he achieved only sobering results, and therefore, he changed his
investment strategy towards the end of the 1920s. Keynes now followed a bottom-up, buy-and-hold approach
that analyzes the fundamentals of companies to identify undervalued stocks in the market. With this new in-
vestment strategy, he made notable profits, and his portfolio performance even outperformed the UK equity
market. Keynes also made investments in the US stock market on behalf of King’s College. In 1929, he began
to diversify the foundation portfolio, which previously was comprised of British equities, with US equities.
As with his British investments, he also valued a thoroughly and carefully conducted fundamental analysis. In
selecting stocks, he used research resources from American brokers and held meetings with policy-makers and
managers of some of his most significant investments. He concentrated his portfolio primarily in corporations,
industrial companies and public utilities and avoided the banking and railway sectors asmuch as possible. With
his investment strategy Keynes was far ahead of his time and very successful, so he serves as an example to in-
vestment giants like Warren Buffet even today.
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consuming. Often there are only a few shareholder lists of companies, so it is difficult to get
a full series of shareholder lists of a company over a longer period of time. Therefore, one
only can find a few studies dealing with investors or investors’ characteristics and investment
behavior from a historical perspective in Germany so far.
A first impression on the total number of the potential people who owned shares gives a
statistic published by theReichsbank in theGermanEmpire (Reichsbank 1876-1900, p. 408).
TheReichsbank provides data on the number of depositors and on nominal values of depots
of securities for the years 1886 to 1900. For example, in 1900, the number of depositors was
68,228. This was 0.12 percent of the total population in Germany. Calculating the average
depot size per depositor shows a depot size of 42,340 marks per depositor. This was about
32 times higher than the average annual wage of a German industrial worker in 1913 (1,300
marks, see Bry 1960). So the proportion of those who owned shares was probably very small
and mostly limited to people from higher social classes.
Pross (1965, pp. 61ff.) provides a short insight into the shareholders of the late 19th century
and early 20th century. They mostly came from different social classes of the bourgeoisie.
Among them there were people of highly educated classes, officials and academics. These
shareholders had in some cases also inside positions in the administrative boards of the com-
panies. For example, since 1870, the administrative board of the Darmstädter Bank für Han-
del und Industrie consisted of a principal, state councillor, ministerial councillor and a cabi-
net councillor. At the end of the 19th century also the aristocracy began to buy shares. They
started to invest their ground rents (”Grundrente”) as a profitable investment in shares. Oc-
casionally, people from the middle class owned shares.
Furthermore, Schäffle (1885, pp. 110f. and p. 236 cited by Pross 1965, p. 63) assumes that
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the shareholders of the late 19th century came from all social classes of the society. Women,
whowanted to invest their inheritance of their husbands, cooks, officers, merchants, rentiers,
postmen, farmers, washerwomen, bankers and also widows with low income and a lot of
children to bring up. However, the assumption that somany people from lower social classes
owned shares seems not appropriate, since the amount of the nominal value of a single share
was very high. Therefore, it is more appropriate that wealthier people invested their money
in shares and that e.g. farmers invested only in a few special cases.
The total number of the potential people holding shares in theWeimarRepublic can easily
be found in the ”Vermögenssteuerstatistik”. It reports all persons who were affected by the
property tax (StatistischesReichsamt 1931, p. 7). Thewealth tax affected all legal personswith
assets of more than 5,000 Reichsmark (RM) and all natural persons with assets of more than
10,000RMand an annual income of 3,000RM (Ibid., p. 26-28). In total, there were 759,642
peoplewhose capital assetswere taxed. This accounted for 1.2 percent of the total population,
which was also a very small proportion.2
The historian Franz J. Bauer gives a further impression of investors’ characteristics in his
habilitation thesis “Familienbiografische Untersuchungen zum deutschen Bürgertum im 19.
Jahrhundert” (Bauer 1991). Here, he provides insights into the social and financial ascent of
the familyDohrn from Stettin. The family drew their financial wealth for themost part from
thePomeranianProvincial SugarDairy (PommerscheProvinzial-Zuckersiederei), whichHein-
rich Dohrn, who also owned a successful trading company, founded in 1817 along with other
prestigious merchants. The company was one of Prussia’s first and most successful commer-
cial companies. This becomes clear from the fact that the capital employed by the first share-
2For the period of the Third Reich the number of people with taxable capital was even smaller and ac-
counted for only 0.76 percent of the total population (Statistisches Reichsamt 1938)
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holders increased eightfold within the first 30 years. From the beginning, the family was one
of themajor shareholders of the Pomeranian Provincial SugarDairy and achieved thereby be-
tween 1817 and 1909 a total income of 5.6 millionmarks. The sheer size of the family’s annual
income from sugar-making becomes clearer if it is compared to the income of other occupa-
tions and status groups at that time. The wealth of the family enabled the son Carl August a
life as aman of privatemeans. Moreover, the familyDohrnwas able tomove up to the upper
classes because of successful equity investments.
Pohl (1987) describes the first buyers of the Deutsche Bank AG in 1871, who provided the
necessary start-up capital. The founding committee consisted of six persons, all but one of
whom were private bankers. They all subscribed for shares of the Deutsche Bank and were
able to acquire many other important investors through their good networking. A total of
76 people and companies provided the necessary start-up capital of 5 million thalers. The
donors were mainly influential banks, bankers and entrepreneurs from the industrial sector.
However, Pohl’s work does not include any analyses of the investors’ characteristics.
Apioneering studyof historical investors inGermany that uses 156 shareholder lists from55
companies3 comes from Franks et al. (2006). They analyze the ownership structures of com-
panies from 1890 to 1950. They find evidence that ownership concentration has been high in
Germany and increased slightly over time. Furthermore, inside owners, like e.g. members of
the supervisory board, were more important compared to outside owners. Moreover, they
show that banks andother firmshadmore votingpower than individuals. Banksmostly acted
as intermediates and cast proxy votes for other investors (Franks et al. 2006, pp. 563f., 568,
576f.).
3The 55 companies were listed at the regional stock exchanges in Munich and Frankfurt/Main.
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Following the approach of Franks et al. (2006), Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016)
carried out a further empirical analysis of investors’ investment behavior in Imperial Ger-
many. They demonstrate the so-called home bias for the financial capital, Berlin, for a small
sample of 32 shareholder lists from 16 different companies. They show that for companies
based in Berlin, about 60 percent of shareholders representing about 60 percent of the cap-
ital also lived in Berlin, concluding that local investment was important and that something
like an investors’ home bias existed.
Angela Bol (2018a and 2018b) examines the ownership structure of Deutsche Bank AG,
AEG, Siemens and BHG between 1870 and 1930 by using a sample of 30 shareholder lists of
the general meetings. She shows that Deutsche Bank had more than 200 shareholders, that
were present at the general meetings. The bank had no single dominant shareholder and the
shares were widely held. Moreover, banks and inside shareholders dominated the general
meetings of Deutsche Bank. In comparison toDeutsche Bank, BHG, AEG and Siemens had
a concentrated shareholder structure with one or more major shareholders. However, the
concentration of share capital did not increase steadily in all companies. It declined slightly
during the inflation years of the 1920s. The number of inside shareholders was high in all
three companies. Large banks were important shareholders at AEG and BHG. The shares of
Siemens weremostly owned by individual family members. They had a qualified controlling
stake, which declined in favor of banks and other companies in the 1920s.
Burhop (2011) states that investors had to be relatively rich because shares were expensive.
The minimum face value of a share was 300 marks in the period of 1870 to 1884. Before
the IPO, only 40 percent had to be paid. With offerings below par being prohibited, the
minimum investment to buy one share was 120 marks. Stock market shares were therefore
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still well within reach of the middle classes. In 1884, and with the introduction of the new
corporate law, this changed, and theminimum face value of a share increased to 1,000marks,
and only fully paid shares were possible for an IPO. This was an extremely high minimum
investment. Comparing this to the average annualwage of 1,300marks of aGerman industrial
worker in 1913 suggests that it was unlikely that workers or even middle-class employees held
shares (calculations of the annual wage are based on Bry 1960).
All these studies use small sample sizes and provide only first impressions of investors’
characteristics and investors’ behavior in Germany in historical periods. Therefore, more de-
tailed and comprehensive data about individual investors are necessary for the study of more
specific questions about investors’ characteristics and investment behaviors.
The following chapter introduces a database on individual investors inGermany in the pe-
riod 1869 to 1955. Itwill help toprovide a better picture aboutwhatwe knowabout individual
investors on German stock exchanges. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first
broad, systematic attempt to create an investors’ database. The data on individual investors
were hand-collected from theHessian Economic Archive (HessischesWirtschaftsarchiv), the
Bavarian Economic Archive (Bayerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv) and the Baden-Wuerttemberg
Economic Archive (Baden-Württembergisches Wirtschaftsarchiv), as well as from the His-
torical Archive of Deutsche Bank AG, the Historical Archive of Commerzbank AG and the
German Archive for Diaries (Deutsches Tagebucharchiv).4 The data also provide an impres-
sion of the investment behavior (e.g. home bias) and how this changed over time (see chapter
4). Furthermore, it enables dealing with the investment behavior of a single investor (Joseph
Frisch) and explaining his behavior during his lifecycle (see chapter 5). At least to some ex-
4For an overview and a description of the data and the signature, see overall Appendix.
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tent, it relates to the question ofwhyGermany had such a decentralized financial systemwith
many stock exchanges and a banking system with many different branches (Klagge andMar-
tin 2005).
In what follows, I divide each section according to the different archival sources. Within
each section, I first give a general overview of the data. Thereby, the existing data in the re-
search will be expanded and new archival records will be presented. Second, the strengths
andweaknesses of the data will be discussed. In a third step, I show some descriptive patterns
and give a first overview of who investors on German stock exchanges were during that time.
2.1 Shareholder Lists of Attendance5
I systematically explored the available archival information, starting with shareholder lists of
attendance from different companies. Companies had to submit information about their
shareholders to the stock exchange operator of the stock exchange, including lists of share-
holders attending the general assembly. The information had to be provided, for example, if
the general assembly voted to increase or reduce equity or if the company listed new shares
at the stock exchange. This became law under the Stock Exchange Act of 1896. Furthermore,
companies disclosed their prospectuses, an extract of the register of commerce, the current
company status and annual management reports.6 After reviewing the archival material, I
can state that even before 1896, a few companies already submitted their reports and records
to the stock exchange operator. I have hand-collected data on individual investors from firms
in the period from 1869 to 1945. Altogether, I collected 785 shareholder lists from 276 compa-
nies covering basic information on 10,017 individual investors (19,952 observation points in
5For a detailed analysis of the shareholder lists of attendance, see chapter 3 of this dissertation.
6Franks et al. (2006, pp. 539ff.) provide a reviewabout themain legislative changes that occurred inGerman
corporate law.
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total). The information includes gender (male or female investor) and whether the investor
was institutional (e.g. banks or industrial companies). I also extract information of the place
of residence. For 4,175 investors, there is information on occupation andwhether the investor
owned a title. Figure 2.1 shows an example page of such an attendance list of the general as-
sembly of the Rheinische Creditbank in 1927. This list is an example of a list that provides
detailed information on investors. Unfortunately, having such a detailed list is not always
the case (see the abstract of the shortcomings below). It states the names of the investors and
gives information about their titles, occupations and the places of residence. Furthermore, it
provides information about whether the investors were represented by e.g. a banker on the
general assembly. Last, it lists the share capital owned by each investor.
However, these hand-collected databases of shareholder informationhave some shortcom-
ings. First, the shareholder lists have different layouts and therefore are often incomplete.
This limits the number of usable information. Often there is no information on occupation
(as stated, in 4,175 cases, there is such information; in 5842 cases, there is no information) or
share capital of the shareholder and only the name and the residence is reported. Second,
the data cover only investors attending the meetings or general assemblies. Those investors
who did not attend the assemblies remain unknown. Many investors are represented in these
meetings by e.g. banks, or bank directors, so there is only information about the authorized
representative, but not about the represented investors (see, for instance, also Burhop 2006,
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Source. Historical Archive of Deutsche Bank AG, archive collections S4020.
Figure 2.1: AttendanceList of theRheinischeCreditbank (GeneralAssembly ofApril 9, 1927)
p. 14.). Data exist about how many votes are cast, but not about how the votes were ex-
ercised. Being aware of these shortcomings, I remove missing values from the dataset. How-
ever, since it observes the characteristics of investors who attended the general meeting, one
can observe those that possibly influenced the company’s fate. On average, 60 percent of the
share capital was present at these meetings (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 shows some sample characteristics of the collected data per period: the number of
companies, the number of general assemblies and the number of investors for six timeperiods
in which the general assembly took place. The years from 1869 to 1913 cover the period of the
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German Empire, 1914 to 1918 covers World War I, and 1919 to 1923 covers the first years of
theWeimar Republic, which resulted in the hyperinflation of 1923. The period from 1924 to
1928 covers the prosperous period of theWeimar Republic, which then endedwith theGreat
Depression of 1929 to 1933. The last period reflects upon the dictatorship of AdolfHitler and
World War II. Since trading became restricted under the Nazi regime, World War II is not
treated separately.
Table 2.1: Distribution of Shareholders per Period
Panel: Distribution by period
Decade Number ofcompanies
Number of general
assemblies (GAs)
Number of
investors
Average share of
present capital
1869–1913 44 112 1,858 36.51
1914–1918 16 27 340 53.03
1919–1923 139 277 3,127 51.15
1924–1928 103 152 3,360 70.76
1929–1933 85 144 1,958 71.03
1934–1945 39 73 804 64.85
Total 276 785 10,017 59.75
Source. Various; please see overall Appendix. See also chapter 3 for a more detailed description.
In the first period, there are 112 general assemblies of 44 firmswith 1,858 attending investors.
This number drops in the second period, rises in the period of the 1920s and then drops again
in the period of the Nazi party to 804 investors attending 73 general assemblies of 39 firms.
Since these are attendance lists, it is also important to know how much of the share capital
was present at suchmeetings. Altogether, about 60 percent of the share capital was present at
themeetings. These numbers also vary over the different periods, being lowest (36.51 percent)
in the period of the German Empire and highest (71.03 percent) from 1919 to 1933.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of male, female and institutional investors (defined by
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the names on the lists) for the different time periods. If the investor was a representative of
a community of heirs, that is summarized in the category ”unspecific.” The first descriptive
pattern is thatmost of the investors who attended themeetings weremen. In the first period,
the share ofmale investors was at 87.9 percent, rising to 90.2 percent in the period of the First
World War, but then falling to 67.9 percent in the period of the Nazi reign. The share of
women is 3.6 percent in the first period, dropping to 1.5 percent and rising then to about 9.8
percent in the period 1924 to 1928. The share of women then falls again to 4.2 percent in
the last period. Regarding the institutional investors who attended the meetings, one sees a
rise from 7.5 percent to 27.5 percent. Looking at them in more detail, institutional investors
came mainly from the banking sector (70.2 percent). About 7 percent of the institutional
investors came from heavy and light industry.7 The heavy industry category contains engi-
neering firms,metalworking and railway requirements, whereas, light industry includes firms
from the textile sector, paper industry, glass industry and rubber industry. About 25 percent
of the institutional investors were hotel companies, terrain companies and mortgage banks.
Figure 2.3 shows the classification of the investors into social classes depending on occu-
pation and academic title following Schüren (1989).8 The classification includes four social
classes: the upper class (1), the highermiddle class (2), the lowermiddle class (3) and thework-
ing class (4). The upper class contains landowners, largemanufacturers, academics and upper
senior officials. The higher class consists of full-time farmers, medium-sized entrepreneurs,
senior civil servants and top officials. Small farmers, merchants, masters and hosts, middle
civil servants and employees are categorized in the lower middle class.
7For the classification of the industrial sectors, see Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Opitz (2019, p. 79.). The
Appendix of chapter 3 provides an overview of the classification into different sectors.
8For a further description of the classification scheme of Schüren (1989), see chapter 3 of this dissertation.
It also provides an argument for why I choose this classification scheme.
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Source. Various; please see overall Appendix. See also chapter 3 for a more detailed description.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Male, Female and Institutional Investors
Finally, the working class includes skilled workers, craftsman, skilled industrial workers,
lower civil servants and employees. Figure 2.3 shows that at the end of the 19th century and
in the beginning of the 20th century, most shares were owned by the upper class, which ac-
counted for about 90 percent of the investors. This was especially the case in the period of
the German Empire, up to the First World War. This changed with the beginning of the
Golden Twenties in the Weimar Republic, when more people from the middle class and the
working class owned shares. The share of investors from the upper class dropped to under
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90 percent and constantly fell to about 88.4 percent in the last period. In comparison, the
share of investors from the middle class (higher and lower middle class) drops in the second
period (from 5.28 to 3.3 percent), but then rises to 11.55 in the sixth period.
Notes. 1: upper class, 2: higher middle class, 3: lower middle class, 4: working class.
Source. Various; please see overall Appendix. For the classification into social classes, see Schüren (1989). See also chapter 3 for a more
detailed description.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Investors per Social Classes
The share of theworking class is very low, and only in the third and fifth periods it is higher
than 0 (0.07 percent, and 0.22 percent).
Another interesting point that has not been considered yet is how many of the investors
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came from foreign countries. Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics. According to panel A,
in total, 219 investors from the hand-collected sample came from foreign countries, of which
64percentweremale, 7 percent female and 27 institutional investors. About 2 percent belong
to the unspecified category. Looking closer at themale investors, for 58 of them, data are avail-
able for occupation. Using again the classificationof Schüren (1989), it turns out that all of the
investors belonged to theupper class. For the female investors, there is no further information
onoccupationormarital status. Regarding the institutional investors, 50 percent belonged to
the banking sector and were mostly local banks, such as e.g. the Schweizerische Basler Han-
delsbank in Basel. Moreover, institutional investors were local companies from the heavy
and light industries and from the food processing and transportation sector. Panel B reports
the origin of the investors. Here, 37.4 percent of the investors came from Switzerland and
23.2 from Austria. About 10 percent of the investors came from the Netherlands. A smaller
share (from 3.6 to 5 percent) came fromGreat Britain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland and
France. About 25 percent of the investors were represented at the general meetings by repre-
sentatives. However, if one takes a closer look at the names of the investors, one will notice
that they mainly had German names. Comparing the foreign investors with foreign firms
listed at German stock exchanges, the fact that many of the investors came from Switzer-
land and Austria is not surprising. For example, in 1913, 32 firms from Austria-Hungary and
three firms fromSwitzerlandwere listed onGerman stock exchanges (Burhop andLehmann-
Hasemeyer 2016, p. 439). A further question that arises is in which companies the foreign
investors invested. Regarding this, they mostly invested in firms that were listed at the Berlin
stock exchange, but many were listed at several regional stock exchanges. A clear pattern can-
not be recognized. Moreover, one can affirm that about 15.6 percent of the foreign investors
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lived within 50 kilometers to the headquarters of the company. Using the 100 kilometer ra-
dius within the headquarters, about 17.4 percent of the foreign investors were located at the
companies’ headquarters. This indicates that these investors lived close to the German state
border. About 82.6 percent lived more than 100 kilometers from the companies.
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Table 2.2: Foreign Investors at German Stock Exchanges
Panel A: Investors in percent
Male 64
Female 7
Institutional 27
Unspecified 2
Total 100
Panel B: Origin of foreign investors
Country N In percent
Switzerland 82 37.44
Austria 51 23.29
Netherlands 21 9.59
Great Britain 11 5.02
Belgium 9 4.11
Czechoslova 9 4.11
Poland 8 3.65
France 8 3.65
U.S. 5 2.28
Luxembourg 4 1.83
Italy 4 1.83
Chile 2 0.91
Denmark 1 0.46
Serbia 1 0.46
Romania 1 0.46
Turkey 1 0.46
Free state Gdansk 1 0.46
Total 219 100
Source. Various; please see overall Appendix.
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2.2 Shareholder Books
Apart from the attendance lists of general assemblies, shareholder books of companies can be
used. The advantage of these shareholder books is that the information is now independent
of investors attending general assemblies, and there is no selection bias regarding this prob-
lem. However, searching for these shareholder books in the archives is difficult, since there
are not many of these shareholder books. Most of these registers have not been returned by
the companies. Those that can be found in the archives are in most cases incomplete and do
not contain the complete shareholder structure of the company. In all the cases, the name as
well as the place of residence of the shareholder is registered. In some cases, the share capital
and the value of the shares held are also provided, while in other books, the capital is miss-
ing completely and only the name of the shareholder is available. It is sometimes not clear
which exact date the shareholder book covers and when the individual shares were bought
or traded. The books also do not provide information on how long the shares were held.
Therefore, it seems that the books only give information for a specific point in time, not for
a certain period of time.
Nevertheless, the shareholder books are used despite possible shortcomings, since the in-
formation still largely contributes to our knowledge of who held shares in the observation
period.
Next, I describe the contents of three shareholder books: the shareholder book of the
Metallgesellschaft AG9 in 1919, the shareholder book of the Metallbank und Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG10 from 1919 to 1953 and the shareholder book of theMittelschwäbischeÜber-
9Source: Hessian Economic Archive (Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, HWA). Shareholder book of the Met-
allgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain, 1919. Archive collections HWA 119/392 (hereafter HWA 119/392).
10Source: Hessian Economic Archive (Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, HWA). Shareholder book of the Met-
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landzentrale Giengen AG11 in 1925.
This small sample of shareholder books is not representative since the books only cover
investors of three different firms.12 Furthermore, the three firms are very specific. The Met-
allgesellschaft AG and the Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG were heavily in-
volved in the international metal markets at the end of the 19th century and the first half of
the 20th century. They controlled a significant portion of the global metal market and had
numerous investment companies and subsidiaries in all major industrialized countries. In
contrast, theMittelschwäbische Überlandzentrale AGwas a regional company that supplied
the surrounding areas and communities with electricity.
2.2.1 Shareholder Book of theMetallgesellschaft AG in 1919
The shareholder book of the Metallgesellschaft AG (hereafter referred to as MG) covers the
year 1919, according to information of the archive. It includes data on 153 individual investors,
of which 71 percent aremale investors, 25 percent female investors and 4 percent institutional
investors (Figure 2.4).
The year of the shareholder book has to be challenged since there are some investors listed
who died in the early years of the first decade of the 20th century. For example, Leo Ellinger,
who was co-founder of theMG and started to work for theMG in 1869, had been a member
of the supervisory board of theMG since 1881. Later, he became amember of the supervisory
allbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG, Frankfurt am Main, 1925-1953. Archive collections HWA 119/393
(hereafter HWA 119/393).
11Source: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (Wirtschaftsarchiv Baden-Württemberg, WABW).
Shareholder book of the Überlandzentrale Giengen AG, Giengen an der Brenz, 1925. Archive collections
WABWB2007/649 (hereafter WABWB2007/649).
12In more detail, the books only cover two firms since the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG
belongs to the overall group of the Metallgesellschaft AG.
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board of the Metallurgische Gesellschaft and of the Metallbank. He died in 1916 (Däbritz
1931). Further examples are Dr. Carl Hamburger and Professor Curt Netto. Hamburger
was member of the supervisory board of the MG since 1881 and died in 1912 (Däbritz 1931
and Knetsch 1998). Netto was between 1897 and 1903 member of the board of the MG and
between 1903 and 1909 member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische Gesellschaft
AG, which also belonged to the group of theMG.He died in 1909 (Däbritz 1931 andKnetsch
1998).
In the book itself, one cannot find information about the year. However, it seems that the
book covers the years around 1900 and not 1919. Furthermore, it turns out that the share-
holder book is a register that also contains information on shares of affiliated companies,
subsidiaries or supporting banks of the MG.13 This is particularly obvious for the institu-
tional investors. They all come from the group of the MG itself, like e.g. the Schweizerische
Gesellschaft fürMetallwerte in Basel, theMetallbank in Frankfurt/Main that held also shares
of theMG or the private banksMetzler and Grunelius, which financed the businesses of the
MG (Knetsch 1998). It seems that the shareholder book also contains close friends of the
MG or locals from Frankfurt/Main. For example, the family “Mumm von Schwarzenstein”
in Frankfurt/Main owned shares, as did the family of “Ladenburg”—which Wilhelm Mer-
ton married into—owned shares. Also the members of the founding families (Merton and
Ellinger) owned shares. Moreover, the share register lists MG employees and their relatives
and members of the management board and the supervisory board. This might be a fitting
description since it has also to be noted that the MG issued until 1922 only registered shares
(Namensaktien), whichwere not tradedon the stockmarket. InMG’s early years,most shares
13The overall Appendix provides biographical information about the investors listed in the shareholder
book.
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(a) Origin of Investors (in Percent)
(b) Share of Male, Female and Institutional Investors (in Percent)
Source. Own calculations using HWA 119/392.
Figure 2.4: Origin of Investors (in Percent) and Share of Male, Female and Institutional In-
vestors (in Percent)
were in the hand of the founding family and in theMG group itself (Reichel 2008, p. 28).
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This changed in the years after the FirstWorldWar as more andmore registered shares began
to circulate on the stock market (Ibid., p. 55).
Moreover, Figure 2.4 shows the origin of the investors in percent. About 78 percent are
German investors. The second group with 9 percent comes from France. Furthermore, in-
vestors come from Great Britain, Switzerland, the U.S., Belgium, Spain and Austria. If one
looks at the origins of the shareholders, it is noticeable that the investors all come from regions
in which theMGwas doing business. This is not surprising, since the shareholder book lists
the members of the founding families, subsidiaries, industrial holdings, employees and close
relatives and financial supporters of the MG.14
In 23 cases, information is available about the occupation of the investors. All 23 investors
are academics and managers at the MG and therefore belong to the upper class.
2.2.2 ShareholderBookoftheMetallbankundMetallurgischeGesellschaft
AG From 1919 to 1953
The shareholder book of the Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG (hereafter re-
ferred to asMetallbank) is so far a unique source because it consists data of the investors listed
with his/her or its name, full address and investment portfolio. Figure 2.5 shows the sample
page of the shareholder book. It consists of two parts and covers the period from 1919 to 1953,
according to archive information. For the analysis, only the first part is used, since the second
part of the years around 1953 contains only the names of investors, without any information
on address and investment portfolio. However, the period starting in 1919 should be ques-
tioned. First, there is no indication of the date. The year 1919 does not seem right because
14For a detailed overview of subsidiaries and industrial holdings of the MG, see overall Appendix.
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one often finds stocks of the IG Farben AG in the portfolios. The IG Farben AG, based in
Frankfurt/Main, was founded at the end of 1925 as a result of the merger of eight German
companies in the chemical industry (see e.g. Bayer-Gefahren e.V. 1995). This indicates that
the shareholder book covers the years after 1925. But nevertheless, it is not clear, since there
are no annual dates and no information on share purchases or stock sales. It is not possible
to determine whether the book covers a period of time or only one point in time.
Source. Shareholder book of the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG, pages 110 and 111 (around 1925); HWA 119/393.
Figure 2.5: Sample Page of the Shareholder Book
The shareholder book includes portfolios of 55 male and 44 female individual investors.
Moreover, there is information about 27 portfolios of institutional investors. The informa-
tion on the portfolio consists of the name, title and occupation of every investor, his/her or
its city of residence, the value of the share and different types of the securities in the portfolio.
There is also information on the name of the stock. From this, I can deduce the name of the
company, the headquarters of the company, the share capital of the company, the size in the
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portfolio and the different stock exchanges on which the stocks were listed.
However, some issues need to be addressed. First, I need to clarify whether the persons in
the book are customers of theMetallbankor not, as itwas not a classical bank, where everyone
could open an account.
According to archive information, only employees of the group of theMG could open an
account. Therefore, it seems that this shareholder book mostly contains portfolio informa-
tion of the employees of the group of the MG. The possibility is also high that participating
companies and friends of employees could have owned an account. To confirm this hypoth-
esis, I look at further archival files like e.g. the register of employees of the MG.Many of the
names in the employees register and in the shareholder bookmatch. However, it remains un-
clear who opened the account and who bought the shares. The probability is high that the
Metallbank compensated its employees for their work with shares and therefore opened ac-
counts for them. A further analysis of the characteristics of the employees is discussed below
in more detail.15 The second question is what the exact statements of the value of the share
and the courses of the shares mean. I check the courses in the Handbuch der deutschen Ak-
tiengesellschaften and in the Berliner Börsenzeitung. Since I am not sure whether the courses
in the shareholder book are correct, I do not consider the possible course of the stock for fur-
ther analysis. Therefore, I only use the information about the residence of the investors, the
location of the headquarters and the information of the securities for the analysis.
Table 2.3 shows the regional distribution of the investors, fromwhom there are data on the
place of residence. In total, 85 investors come from Prussia. Table 2.3 also shows that most of
them come from Germany (104 in total). Some foreign investors also own shares. However,
15See also Appendix of chapter 2, which provides more biographical information on the investors.
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if one looks at the names, it seems that they have German origins. Looking at the foreign
places in more detail, it is obvious that they come from places where the MG has industrial
holdings and subsidiaries,16 for example, in Great Britain (British Metal Corporation), the
U.S. (AmericanMetal Company), Switzerland (SchweizerischeGesellschaft fürMetallwerte),
South Africa (AfricanMetal Company).
Table 2.3: Regional Distribution of the Investors
Place of residence Men Women Institutions Total
Prussia 32 31 22 85
Baden 3 1 0 4
Bavaria 2 2 0 4
Wuerttemberg 1 1 1 3
Bremen 0 0 2 2
Hamburg 1 1 1 3
Hesse 0 2 0 2
Thuringia 1 0 0 1
Germany 40 38 26 104
England 6 0 0 6
France 1 2 0 3
USA 2 0 0 2
Switzerland 1 1 0 2
Spain 1 0 0 1
South Africa 1 0 0 1
Netherlands 0 0 1 1
Luxembourg 0 1 0 1
Italy 1 0 0 1
Belgium 1 0 0 1
Australia 1 0 0 1
Foreigners 15 4 1 20
Source. Own illustration using HWA 119/393.
16For a detailed description of the industrial holdings and subsidiaries, see Appendix of chapter 4.
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This again refers to the fact that the investors are employees or industrial involvements/partners
as well as subsidiaries of the MG, so that the probability is higher that they are located near
to the respective headquarters.
Although the focus is on stocks, Table 2.4 highlights that the data are more complex than
that, since in total, I observe 1,017 securities that include stocks, obligations, bonds, covered
bonds, treasury bonds and debt securities.
Table 2.4: Portfolios of the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG in Numbers
Portfolio Men Women Institutions Total
Stocks 146 73 67 286
Obligations 52 54 85 191
Bonds 34 23 26 83
Covered Bonds 155 147 60 362
Treasury Bonds 17 16 24 57
Debt securities (of land banks) 18 7 13 38
Total 422 320 275 1,017
Source. Own illustration using HWA 119/393.
To get further confirmation of the hypothesis that mostly employees and subsidiaries of
theMGappear in the shareholder book, I look at every single entry of investors inmore detail
and try to acquire data on their biographies.
Figure 2.6 shows a sample portfolio of Dr. Ing. F. A. Oetken,17 which is taken from the
shareholder book. It contains obligations, stocks, bonds and treasuries. Looking at the bio-
graphical information, Dr. Ing. F. A.Oetken joined theMG in 1920, and from 1922 onwards,
hewas an authorized representative at theMetalllurgischeGesellschaft AG (hereafter referred
17For a further description, see HWA 119/1772 and Däbritz (1931).
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to as Lurgi), department “Heat.” Later, he was responsible for all Lurgi companies. From
1937, he was a deputy board member of the MG (see HWA 119/1772 and Däbritz 1931).
Source. Shareholder book of the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG, page 31 (around 1925), HWA 119/393.
Figure 2.6: More Portfolio Information (Dr. F. A. Oetken)
For further analysis of the investors in the shareholder book, see theAppendix of this chap-
ter. It shows that mostly employees owned an account at the MG, which clearly aligns with
the hypothesis that this shareholder book contains portfolio information about the employ-
ees and subsidiaries/industrial holdings of the group of the MG. The female investors were
in many cases the wives of the male employees since the last names of male and female in-
vestors are identical. In some cases, the notation “Herr” was used in front of the name of the
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female investor. For example, the wife of Alfred Petersen, who was an employee at the MG,
was noted as “Herr Rosemarie Petersen.” Behind some names in the book the annotations
“Lurgi” and “im Hause” appear, which also suggests that these persons are employees at the
group of the MG.
2.2.3 ShareholderBookoftheMittelschwäbischeÜberlandzentraleGien-
gen AG
The shareholder book18 of the Mittelschwäbische Überlandzentrale Giengen AG (hereafter
referred to asMÜAG) contains information about 1,319 individual investors, holding in total
2,500 shares at 100 Reichsmark (RM) and 3,500 shares at 20 RM, which means that overall
shares in the value of 320,000RMare noted. According to theHandbuch der deutschenAk-
tiengesellschaften (1925), the overall share capital of the firm was 1,280,000 RM, so the share-
holder book contains information about 25 percent of the shareholders. Nothing is known
about the other 75 percent of the shareholders of the firm. Furthermore, I extract the name
and the gender (male/female/institutional) of every single shareholder. In 529 cases, there is
also information about the title and the occupation of the investors. In addition, the city of
residence is known.
From the company data, I take the name of the company, the industrial sector, the location
of the headquarters and the stock exchanges on which the company’s shares were listed.
As Figure 2.7 shows, themajority of investors are within a very narrow radius of Giengen’s
head office of MÜAG. However, some investors are further away from Giengen. This part
represents a very small portion of investors. Only 7.7 percent of the investors are not within
18Source: WABWB2007/649.
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100 kilometers of the MÜAG.
Table 2.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the investors divided into gender and social
classes. In total, the sample contains 1,319 investors for which we have information about
gender. For 529 investors, there is also information on their occupation. Overall, we observe
108 female investors, 1,161 male investors and 50 institutional investors (Panel A).
Note. The map depicts the German Reich with the state borders of 1937.
Source. Own illustration, usingWABWB2007/649.
Figure 2.7: Regional Distribution of the Investors
Looking closer at the institutional investors, mostly the surrounding communities and the
regional industries were involved at the MÜAG. This is not surprising because the MÜAG
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supplied the surrounding communities with electricity and the supply network in the region
was constantly expanding (Überlandzentrale AG 1958).
Panel B shows the class affiliation of the individual shareholders. Above all, it can be seen
that the main component of the shareholders lies between the working class (31.2 percent)
and the higher middle class (24.4 percent). The largest share of shareholders came from the
lower middle class (33.6 percent). The upper class accounted for only 7.2 percent, only a
few shareholders. The most common occupations among shareholders are farmers, traders
and craftsmen. Scholars are few, but four people have a doctoral degree. One shareholder is
ennobled with a count’s title.
Table 2.5: Gender and Social Classes 1925—Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Totals and in percent (gender)
Women Men Institutional investors Total
108 1161 50 1,319
8,19 88,02 3,79 100
Panel B: Totals and in percent (social class)
Upper
class
Higher
middle class
Lower
middle class
Working
class
Not
assignable Total
38 129 178 165 19 529
7.2 24.4 33.6 31.2 3.6 100
Source. Own calculations usingWABWB2007/649.
Comparing the results with the numbers in Figure 2.3, it is somehow surprising since Fig-
ure 2.3 lists mostly shareholders from the upper class. Also, the shareholder structure of the
MG was completely different because the MG also had supra-regional shareholders located
in Europe or in the U.S. Nevertheless, this shows the regional character of the MÜAG, in
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which the middle class was starting to hold shares. TheMÜAG listed its shares on a regional
stock exchange and had also a regional shareholder structure. This shows that many of the
shareholders were locals and had middle-class jobs. Of course, one has to be careful with
interpretation, because only 25 percent of the shareholder structure are listed in the book.
Checking the names of the investors reveals that some of them were also employees of the
MÜAG, e.g. the “Betriebsleiter” Wilhelm Bosch or the “Elektromonteur” Berthold Klein.
The shares of both men were with 80 Reichsmark, only a fraction of the total share capital.
Since the MG and the MÜAG are only two companies and the information on investors
is not complete, a generalization of the findings is not possible. The question of whether
regional companies have a different investor structure compared to large companies is left
open for further research.
2.3 Individual Portfolio of a Private Banker19
Another source for studying investment behavior at that time is portfolio data from indi-
vidual investors. Intense archival research revealed that data of this type are very scarce. In
many cases, portfolio data are available only for certain years or months and not for longer
time periods. Furthermore, they are often incomplete and contain only selective informa-
tion about investments in equities. Therefore, it is difficult to make comparisons between
investors because often the period of observation does not match.
However, I hand-collected one unique dataset about historical investors from the Baden-
Wuerttemberg Economic Archive. This source describes the individual portfolio of the pri-
vate banker Joseph Frisch from Stuttgart. In the filings of the archive, the portfolio is de-
19For a detailed analysis of the portfolio, see chapter 5 of this dissertation.
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scribed asDepotbuch des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des Bankhauses Joseph FrischNach-
folger.20
The private banker Joseph Frisch was born in Gaggenau in Baden, in 1881. He married
Emma Frisch (born Offermann) and had two daughters (Hesselschwerdt 2015, pp. Iff.).
In 1922, Joseph Frisch founded the private bank Joseph Frisch in Stuttgart. (Hohmann
2009, pp. 312f.). It was one of many new private banks that were founded in the early 1920s
inWuerttemberg and was one of few private banks to survive over many years (Bergner 1993,
pp. 204ff.).
The bank profited very much from the liquidation of the Jewish banks and was ranked
22 in a list of important German private banks in 1938 (in 1933: rank 121) (Ziegler 2003, p.
44). Joseph Frisch died in April 1953, but the leadership of the bank remained in the hands of
his widow and his two daughters. In 1955, the Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft Zavelstein took
over the business activities and the name of the bank changed to Joseph Frisch Nachfolger.
The bank then was dissolved in 1966 (Hohmann 2009; Heselschwerdt 2015).
Figure 2.8 shows a sample page of theportfolio of JosephFrisch. The transactions are hand-
written and sorted by asset. The portfolio covers the period from 1923 to 1955 and contains
more than 6000 transactions of stocks, bonds, obligations and debt securities.
The portfolio lists the name of the stock, the nominal value, the price and sometimes the
profit and the amount that was paid for the shares. Most of the transactions were carried out
on behalf of Joseph Frisch, but there are some transactions for other parties, for example, the
partner Otto Essele. The transactions took place from 1923 until Frisch’s death in 1953. After
20Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (Wirtschaftsarchiv Baden-Württemberg, WABW). Depotbuch
des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch Nachfolger, 1923-1957. Archive collection
WABWB166/268 (hereafter WABW, B166/268).
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his death, there are some further transactions that are carried out by a successor named Frisch
Nachfolge. It remains unclear whether the portfolio is Joseph Frisch’s private portfolio or a
record of transactions by the bank, but since the bank and the person Joseph Frisch cannot
be separated, this fact is not relevant. For the analysis, the focus is only on the transactions,
because the prices and profits are not always available, which makes it difficult to calculate
profits and losses.
Notes. For a further detailed description, see also chapter 5.
Source. WABW, B166/268, page 46.
Figure 2.8: Sample Page of the Portfolio of Joseph Frisch
Frisch traded not only with stocks, which can be seen in Table 2.6, but also with obliga-
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tions, bonds and debt securities. Apart from stocks, these securities are only a small part of
the portfolio.
Table 2.6: Portfolio of Joseph Frisch in Numbers
Portfolio 1923–1955 Total Transactions
Stocks 4592
Obligations 156
Bonds 495
Covered bonds 71
Treasury bonds 44
Debt securities (of land banks) 2
Source. Own calculations usingWABW, B166/268.
2.4 Diary Entries of Investment Behavior of a Private Investor
Since portfolio data of investors for longer time periods are very scarce, finally, another op-
portunity to learn more about investors from the late 19th century is provided by a historical
record on Gustav Schlott, which his great-grandson made available to the German Archive
for Diaries (Deutsche Tagebucharchiv in Emmendingen).21 Schlott’s diary entries provide in-
teresting insights into the investment behavior of an investor from the late 19th century and
early 20th century. This dataset includes, among other things, three diaries inwhich he noted
his investments in different securities over time. The first diary begins in 1878,22 the second
covers the period from 1884 to 1892 and the third diary dates from 1892 to 1926.
Gustav Schlott was born on 4March 1852 in Hirschbach near Schleusingen and probably
21GermanArchive forDiaries (DeutschesTagebucharchivEmmendingen),DTA3768, 1, 2, 3 (hereafterDTA
3768; 1, 2, 3). The numbers 1, 2 and 3 stand for the three diaries.
22From the data, it can only be seen that the first diary begins in 1878. It is incomprehensible which period
of time it covers.
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died in Braunschweig in 1925/2623 (DTA 3768; 2). With his wife Johanne Schlott, he had four
children, Johannes, Ludwig, Gretchen and Gertrud (Ibid., p. 8). He began his professional
career in 1872 as an assistant teacher at the Weißenfelser Taubstummenanstalt with an initial
salary of 200 thaler24 and an apartment he received from theTaubstummenanstalt (Ibid. and
DTA 3768; 3, p. 32). Due to his successfully completed training, his salary increased gradually
to 1,800marks. In 1879, he accepted a job offer from the institution in Braunschweig, with an
annual salary of 2,700 marks. He successfully passed the Vorsteherprüfung für Taubstum-
menanstalten and was appointed in 1882 as the school inspector at the local institution. The
jobwas associated with an initial salary of 3,300marks, which was gradually raised until 1,900
to 4,800marks (DTA 3768; 2, p. 8 and 15). In addition, he gave students private lessons to in-
crease his income. As a school inspector, Schlott belonged to the upper class of society. This
is also illustrated by a diary entry in which he mentions that acquaintances from his home
village asked him for a loan (DTA 3768; 3, p. 17). Consequently, he has managed to grow
out of the poverty of his parents and his hometown (DTA 3768; 2, p. 6). He was member of
various clubs (Ibid.).25
In his diaries, Schlott noted his investments in varying degrees of detail. For example, in
the first diary, he describes only the family’s assets of July 1878, which includes cash reserves
23The diary records only mention that the third diary covers the period from 1892 to 1926. In addition, a
note “half a year before his death” is included. Therefore, I assume that he probably died around 1926. He
moved to Braunschweig in 1879 and reported only once about a move within Braunschweig. For this reason, I
assume that he also died there.
241 thaler equals 3marks. For the sake of comparability, all information from thaler tomarkwill be converted
and given below.
25He was a member of the board of the Church of St. Katharinen, the Beamten-Konsum-Verein and the
Brunonia Foundation. In addition, heworked in caring for the poor andwasmember of theHerbartkränzchen,
the Leopoldstiftung and the Beamten-Kollegium der Loge Carl zu gekrönten Säule. His honorary offices illus-
trate his social involvement and social position. In addition, he published essays in schoolbooks and published
the book “Illustrierte Biblische Geschichten,” which expresses his Christian education and way of life.
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and different types of securities. Hewrites inmore detail about his investments in the second
diary. In total, he made investments of 46,480 marks from 1884 to 1892. Half of the invest-
ments were in covered bonds, consols and private mortgages. From the last diary, which
covers the period from 1892 to 1926, Schlott noted investments of 1,728.40 marks in covered
bonds and consols, 800 marks in bank deposits and 53,000 marks in mortgages.
If one compares the investment activity of the different diaries, one notes that he invested
relatively evenly between covered bonds/consols andmortgages and then shifted significantly
in favor of mortgage lending. The capital used for mortgages was mainly given to small en-
trepreneurs. It is surprising that Schlott did not invest in any shares in the given time period.
Critically, not all entries were noted in detail. For example, the family received securities
from an inheritance, but no further details are given on how many and which titles they in-
clude. In 1894, Schlott notes that someof the income is invested, but here too the amount and
the titles invested in are missing. It is also unknown whether Schlott always wrote down all
his transactions. As a result, it is not possible to fully understand the composition of his total
portfolio over time. Furthermore, Schlott does not note his reasons for investing in different
securities, which also limits the analysis.
Compared to the portfolio of Joseph Frisch, the portfolio of Gustav Schlott is not that
detailed, and no statistical analysis could be performed, since only a small number of trans-
actions is known. However, since I know the names of the securities, it is possible to analyze
whether Schlott invested in regional securities or in those that were located further away.
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3
The Persistence of Ownership
Inequality-Investors on the German Stock
Exchanges, 1869-1945*
Rising inequality is one of the most recognized and debated issues of our times, and
*This chapter is co-authored with Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer (University of Hohenheim). The candi-
date’s individual contribution focused mainly on the hand-collection and processing of the data and the litera-
ture research. The empirical analyis and the writing was split equally between the authors. An earlier version
is published as working paper of the Priority Programme 1859 ”Experience and ExpectationHistorical Founda-
tions of Economic Behaviour” No. 8, October 2018 (Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Neumayer 2018a) and as Ho-
henheimDiscussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences No. 20-2018 (Lehmann-Hasemeyer and
Neumayer 2018b).
48
this debate tends to focus on income inequality (see, for instance, Piketty and Saez 2003
or Piketty 2015). Capital, however, was always more unequally distributed than labor in all
countries and periods for which data is available. Piketty (2014, p. 244) gives some idea of
the order of magnitude: The upper 10 percent of the labor income distribution generally
receives 25–30 percent of total labor income, whereas the top 10 percent of the capital income
distribution always owns more than 50 percent of all wealth, and in some societies, this is as
much as 90 percent. While the bottom 50 percent of the wage distribution always receives a
significant share of the labor income, the bottom 50percent of thewealth distributionmostly
owns nothing at all.
Yet, the interwar period saw great changes in wealth distribution: The capital/income ra-
tio and the share of private capital as a percentage of the national income were higher before
World War I than they are today (Piketty 2014, pp. 144–146). In the interwar period, both
rates declined severely, and capital worth nearly a year and a half of national income was de-
stroyed. The budgetary and political shocks of two wars proved far more destructive for cap-
ital than the actual combat. According to Piketty (2014, p. 148), the main factors explaining
the fall in the capital/income ratio were the collapse of foreign portfolios, low savings rates,
and the Great Depression, during which many stock- and bondholders were ruined as firm
after firm went bankrupt. Moreover, low growth, repeated recessions, and the high inflation
resulting in the hyperinflation of 1923 led many wealthy people to lose vast amounts of their
assets even before the Great Depression unfolded.
However, it also brought about new opportunities for people from lower social classes be-
cause shares became cheaper in the interwar period. The ubiquitous characteristic of share-
owners shortly before the outbreak of World War I was their wealth: Before 1884, the mini-
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mum face value of a share was 300 marks – only 40 percent of which had to be paid before
the IPO. With offerings below par being prohibited, the minimum investment to buy one
share was thus 120marks. Stockmarket shares were therefore still well within the reach of the
middle classes. After 1884, however, the corporate law increased the minimum face value of a
share to 1,000marks, and an IPOwas only possible for fully paid shares. Thus, theminimum
investment increased by a factor of eight (Burhop 2011, p. 16). This can be compared to the
average annual wage of a German industrial worker in 1913 of 1,300 marks (authors’ calcula-
tion based on Bry 1960). Thus, it is unlikely that workers or evenmiddle class employees held
shares in this period. However, the post-war inflation dramatically changed access to stocks.
The journalist Sebastian Haffner (2002, p. 56) describes in his memoirs that with hyperin-
flation and the fading away of savings, mortgages and other conservative investments, many
people started to buy shares on the stock market. He describes how shares seemed to be an
island of security able to maintain pace with inflation. He writes that low-level civil servants,
ordinary employees and even shift workers became shareholders. The whole population was
following the exchange reports. Stock market recommendations were exchanged in shops,
factories and schools. However, Aron (1927) shows that although about 53 percent of cap-
ital of joint-stock companies were shifted among groups of investors, firms made sure that
most shares were traded among large shareholders by granting them special conditions such
as buying shares on account.
Thus, motivated by research on wealth inequality, we aim at contributing to this liter-
ature by extending the term ‘inequality’ to ‘equality of opportunities’ by studying capital
ownership among different social groups in the period of 1869 to 1945. Therefore, we hand-
collected a new dataset, covering all shareholder lists from general meetings available at the
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archives ofDeutscheBank, Commerzbank, theHessianEconomicArchive, theBadenWuert-
temberg Economic Archive and the Bavarian Economic Archive. Altogether, we collected
785 shareholder lists from 276 companies, covering basic information for 10,017 individual
investors. Especially after 1913, usually more than 50 percent of capital was represented at the
meetings. Thus, although we only observe the characteristics of investors that attended the
general meetings, we observe a substantial part of all investors and especially those that influ-
enced the company’s fate. Thus, our research also contributes to the literature on corporate
governance.
Based on our unique dataset, we are able to show that while, in theGerman Empire, shares
of joint-stock companies were only available to a small group of rich investors, after the hy-
perinflation of 1923, shares became more widely available to the middle class. Lower social
classes, however, did not own shares in our observation period. Moreover, we are particu-
larly interested in the gender perspective. Women’s rights drastically improved in 1919. In the
constitution of the first German democracy, women officially received equal rights, which
is mostly reflected in the fact that they were now allowed to vote (Art. 109 Abs. 2 Weimar
Constitution (Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919)). However, the Na-
tional Socialists again restricted these rights. After 1933, women were confined to the roles
of mother and spouse and were excluded from all positions of responsibility, notably in the
political and academic spheres. These developments are also reflected in the ownership struc-
ture. During the Weimar Republic, women had a much stronger representation at general
meetings than before, but their overall ownership of shares remained low, and 98 percent
of female investors that we observe were engaged in only a single firm. Overall, despite our
observation of greater participation among women after 1919, their increased political power
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was clearly not equally accompanied by a rise in economic power. It is also possible that the
higher attendance of women at general meetings does not actually represent a larger share
of capital ownership but rather the fact that women started to use their power by attending
the meetings. This may be supported by our observation that, after 1919, we observe more
women holding smaller numbers of shares.
Toour knowledge, ourwork is the first that provides insights into investors’ characteristics,
such as their social class and gender, in the period of 1869 to 1945. While surveys provide good
information aboutwhoholds and trades shares nowadays, very little is knownabout investors
in earlier periods and how the composition of investors changed over time. Occasionally, we
find published lists of applicants for shares – such as, for instance, the list of the first buyers of
shares of Deutsche Bank (Pohl 1987 or Bol 2018b) or other selected samples (Fohlin 2007, pp.
120–124). Franks et al. (2006) provide the largest sample. They collected 156 lists of general
meetings during the same period we cover, but they focus on ownership concentration and
the share of founding-family ownerships. Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016) also pro-
vide some insights from lists of general meetings. They study the geography ofGerman stock
exchanges and show that there seemed to be a preference for local shares on regional stock ex-
changes. Neumayer (2018) also studies thehomebias basedon a selected sample, showing that
the home bias disappears if a general meeting did not take place close to the headquarters of
the firm. However, none of the research above studies investors’ social characteristics.
Learning more about the shareholders is important not just in terms of inequality and
social history, it is also interesting from a finance perspective. As Markowitz (1952) already
pointed out in the 1950s, portfolio theory assumes that investors form expectations about re-
turns and risks of securities, and they select portfolios according to their expectations and risk
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preferences. In consequence, rational economic actors should diversify portfolios and trade
very little. However, at least for modern periods, private investors have been shown to hold
under-diversified portfolios (Goetzmann andKumar 2008), to trade frequently (Odean 1998
or Barber and Odean 2000), to take on high idiosyncratic risk (Calvet et al. 2007), and to
gamble (Kumar 2009). Clearly, socioeconomic characteristics matter a great deal here. Goet-
zmann and Kumar (2008) show, for instance, that the level of under-diversification of port-
folios is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors.
Barber andOdeon (2011) show thatmen take higher risks thanwomen, and younger investors
takemore risks than older ones. Studies testing reactions to historical events on stockmarkets
can therefore only infer whose reactions they are actually testing.1
However, knowing who actually traded on the stock market, who influences decisions of
joint-stock firms and how the composition of investors changed over time is crucial for the
understanding of stock market development and determinants of the success and failure of
firms.
3.1 Overview of Sources and Shortcomings of the Data2
Information on share ownership of investors is, in large parts, unavailable, because most of
the shares were bearer shares (Burhop 2011, p. 15). Furthermore, there are also no complete
shareholder records of firms, whichwe could use for our analysis. Therefore, we take another
source of shareholder information into account using the fact that under the Stock Exchange
1To name a few, Lübbers (2008) and Kling (2006) study investor reaction to firm mergers in the 19th cen-
tury and the interwar period, Lehmann-Hasemeyer et al. (2014) study how suffrage extensions to the working
class affected stock market prices, and Opitz (2017) tests reactions to riots and wars.
2The following paragraph draws heavily on Neumayer (2018). For a detailed description and discussion of
the data see chapter 2 of this dissertation. Furthermore, chapter 2 presents a broader review of the literature on
historical investors in Germany.
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Act of 1896, companies were legally bound to submit information about their shareholder
structure to the respective stock exchange onwhich their shareswere listed (Franks et al. 2006,
pp. 542 and 554). Besides a company’s prospectus, extracts from the register of commerce, the
current company status and the annual management reports, lists of shareholders attending
the general assembly had to be provided to the stock exchange operator of the respective stock
exchange. For example, this was often the case if the general assembly voted to increase or
reduce equity.
The data on individual firms were collected from the Hessian Economic Archive (Hessis-
ches Wirtschaftsarchiv), the Bavarian Economic Archive (Bayerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv) and
the Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (Baden-WürttembergischesWirtschaftsarchiv),
as well as from theHistorical Archive of Deutsche Bank AG and from theHistorical Archive
of Commerzbank AG.3 The data includes filings of the Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Düssel-
dorf, Essen, Augsburg, Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart stock exchanges. We extract the
name of the company, the industrial sector, the location of the headquarters and the place
where the general assembly took place. Data on the share capital of a company and the stock
exchanges on which the company’s shares were listed is from the Handbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften only exists since
1896, but based on the included information, we are able to calculate the share capital for ear-
lier periods for general meetings that took place before 1896. The information of the share-
holder data includes gender or institution, name of every shareholder and his/her city of res-
idence. In the vast majority of cases, however, these hand-collected databases of shareholder
information are incomplete due to different protocols and layouts, which reduces the num-
3For an overview and a description of the data and the signature, see Appendix of chapter 3.
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ber of usable observations depending on the requested information. In many cases, only the
name and residence of the shareholders are reported, and furthermore, there is no informa-
tion on occupation or branches of shareholders. In some cases, the address was left blank. For
4,175 shareholders, we also have information on title and occupation. For those observations,
we classify the investors into social classes.4 Data on the number of shares, the share capital of
the investors and how many votes were cast are also taken from the shareholder attendance
lists. In addition, we calculate the distance between a company’s headquarters and the resi-
dences of every single shareholder to obtain a distance measure. Distances are calculated as
straight lines.
Another bias in the data is that the information only covers investors attending the meet-
ings or general assemblies. Those investors who did not attend the assemblies remain un-
known. In addition, many investors are represented in these meetings and assemblies by, for
example, banks or bank directors. Inmany cases, there is only information on the authorized
representative, but not on the represented investors. There is also no data on how sharehold-
ers exercised their voting rights, only information on how many votes are cast. We do not
use lists in which we observe too many outliers or missing values. Furthermore, the proba-
bility of investors attending such assemblies is higher for those who live in the same region
in which the general assembly took place (see Neumayer 2018). However, since we observe
the characteristics of investors that attended a general meeting, we observe those that actually
influenced a company’s fate.
Table 3.1 reports the number of companies, the number of general assemblies and the num-
ber of investors distributed into six time periods, where the economic conditions and/or the
4The classification into social classes follows Schüren (1989) and is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
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political system significantly changed. The period of 1869 to 1913 covers the meetings that
took place during the German Empire, 1914 to 1918 covers the meetings during World War
I, and 1919 to 1923 covers the meetings in the first years of the Weimar Republic, with high
levels of inflation resulting in the hyperinflation of 1923. The period of 1924 to 1928 covers
the meetings that took place during the middle period of the Weimar Republic, which was
characterized by relative economic and political stability but ended with the Great Depres-
sion in the subsequent years of 1929 to 1933. Our last period covers the dictatorship of Adolf
Hitler and World War II. We do not treat World War II separately, because trading became
very restricted during the Nazi regime until 1945.
Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics - Distribution by Period
Decade Number of
companies
Number of general
assemblies (GAs)
Number of
investors
Average share of
present capital
1869–1913 44 112 1,858 36.51
1914–1918 16 27 340 53.03
1919–1923 139 277 3,127 51.15
1924–1928 103 152 3,360 70.76
1929–1933 85 144 1,958 71.03
1934–1945 39 73 804 64.85
Total 276 785 10,017 59.75
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3.
Overall, our sample contains 276 companies with 10,017 investors attending 785 general
assemblies. The number of meetings in our dataset varies with periods. In the first period,
we observe 112 general assemblies of 44 firms with 1,858 investors. The number of general
meetings drops in the period ofWorldWar I and rises to 103 firms, with information on 3,360
investors attending 152 general assemblies, in the period of the Golden Twenties. This num-
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ber drops again after 1933 to 39 firms, with information on 804 investors and 73 general as-
semblies. Overall, about sixty percent of the share capital was represented at the meetings.
However, in the Empire years, the attendance was much lower than in the period of the
Weimar Republic. This fits the observations by Fohlin (2007, pp. 122–124) and Franks et al.
(2006). However, the attendance significantly increased during the Weimar Republic after
1923, when, on average, more than half of the capital was represented. Fohlin (2007, p. 124)
also cites Richard Passow (1922), a contemporary observer, who lists some explanations for
the low attendance rates at shareholder meetings. She summarizes his ideas as “rational apa-
thy” among small shareholders: cost of travelling to locations where themeetings took place,
insufficient time to attend, the sense that news coverage provided sufficient information for
the small shareholders, and the presumption among small shareholders that their influence
was limited. Passow (1922) alsomentioned that womenwould not attend themeetings, since
they were not believed to be able to handle them. Thus, the fact thatmore investors attended
the meetings during the Weimar Republic could be driven by a higher concentration and
therefore a lower share of smaller shareholders, cheaper transport costs, a greater desire for
first-hand information and an increasing acceptance of female capital owners.
Table 3.2 provides information about thebranches of the firms inour sample. Thebranches
are divided into 10 categories: banking, insurance, mining, heavy industry, light industry,
food processing, transportation, chemical industry, public utilities and diverse. Our sample
consists mainly of banks, firms from the heavy and light industries, and breweries. The high-
est number of firms comes from the light-industrial sector. This category includes textiles,
paper, glass and rubber.
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics - Distribution of General Meetings by Industry
Industry 1869–1913 1914–1918 1919–1923 1924–1928 1929–1933 1934–1945
Banking 47 8 19 19 8 5
Insurance 0 0 5 6 0 1
Mining 4 2 12 3 7 3
Heavy Industry 2 2 29 11 19 17
Light Industry 23 8 93 36 53 29
Food Processing 23 3 47 11 13 6
Transportation 1 1 6 12 8 6
Chemical Industry 3 0 3 4 1 0
Public Utility 5 0 18 23 13 3
Diverse 4 3 45 26 22 3
Total 112 27 277 151 144 73
Notes. Theheavy industry category contains: engineering firms,metalworking, and railway requirements. Light industry contains: textile sector,
paper industry, glass industry, and rubber industry. Food processing contains: breweries andmills. Public utility contains: electricity, and gas and
water. Diverse contains: hotel companies, terrain companies, and mortgage banks.
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3.
Furthermore, there is a high number of hotel companies, terrain companies andmortgage
banks in the sample.
Table 3.3 reports some further descriptive characteristics about the number ofmeetings we
observe per firm. Overall, we observe, on average, 2.84meetings per company over an average
period of 4.19 years.
Table 3.3: Sample Characteristics - Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Median Min Max
Number of general meetings per
company
2.84 3.31 2 1 24
Duration for which firms are
included in the sample
4.19 6.42 1 0 35.06
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3.
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To see whether our sample is representative or not, we compare it to the actual number of
the listed firms per sector listed on the Berlin stock exchange in 1913, 1925 and 1938, as docu-
mented by the Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, a stock market manual and
Opitz (2018) (see Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). We calculate t-tests for the different
firm characteristics (age, share capital, distance to the stock exchange) by industry and by time
periods if we have more than 10 firms in our sample for the given time period and industry.
If the mean difference between the pairwise variables for the respective panels (A1, A2, B1,
B2 and C1, C2) is statistically significantly different from zero on one percent, we mark the
column with a brighter grey shading. If the mean difference between the pairwise variables
for the respective panels is statistically significantly different from zero on five percent, we
mark the colum with a darker grey shading.
Starting with the period 1913 the table reveals that our sample is overall not representative
for the firm characteristics firm age and distance to stock exchange. However, the total share
capital of both samples are not statistically different. The t-tests of panel B reveal also that our
sample is not representative in terms of share capital and distance to the stock exchange. The
higher share capital in our sample is due to the hyperinflation in 1923. Leaving out the year
1923 still shows a higher share capital which is not representative compared to the sample of
1925. The t-test of panel C shows that our sample is representative for the firm characteristic
share capital, but not for firm age and distance to the stock exchange. However, since we
observe most of the important greater-sized companies our sample is valide and suitable to
analyze.
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Table3.4:Firm
CharacteristicsbySectorandPeriod(1913vs.1869-1918)
PanelA1:Firm
characteristicsbysector1913
PanelA2:Firm
characteristicsbysector1869-1918
Industry
Firm
age
in
years
Jointstock
capitalin
m
illion
M
/R
M
D
istanceto
Berlin
in
km
N
um
ber
offirm
s
Firm
age
in
years
Jointstock
capitalin
m
illion
M
/R
M
D
istanceto
closeststock
exchangein
km
N
um
ber
offirm
s
Banking
31.8
42
259
63
25.21
66
2
12
Insurance
53.5
6.3
207
49
0
0
0
0
M
ining
32.5
17.8
321
103
18.36
4.4
0
4
H
eavyIndustry
20.9
5.1
252
178
23.42
9.1
79
3
LightIndustry
24
3.5
267
123
23.08
3.7
78
11
FoodProcessing
25.2
2.8
255
86
17.62
1.7
74
10
Transportation
25.2
13
216
70
5.5
2.1
206
2
Chem
icalIndustry
25.7
9.3
258
36
36.67
4.5
31
3
PublicU
tility
21.2
30.1
206
34
20.93
20
140
4
D
iverse
22.7
6.9
185
133
10.81
5.7
0
6
Total
29.8
13.68
242
875
18.16
12.83
61
55
N
otes.Thedistanceofthecom
panieswhich
werealsolistedin
Berlin
ison
average403km
.
Source.H
andbuch
derD
eutschen
Aktiengesellschaften,O
pitz(2018)andvarious,pleaseseeAppendixofchapter3.
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Table3.6:Firm
CharacteristicsbySectorandPeriod(1938vs.1933-1945)
PanelC1:Firm
characteristicsbysector1938
PanelC2:Firm
characteristicsbysector1933-1945
Industry
Firm
age
in
years
Jointstock
capitalin
m
illion
M
/R
M
D
istanceto
Berlin
in
km
N
um
ber
offirm
s
Firm
age
in
years
Jointstock
capitalin
m
illion
M
/R
M
D
istanceto
closeststock
exchangein
km
N
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ber
offirm
s
Banking
58.94
24
265
50
47.25
51
106.14
2
Insurance
72.43
3.8
243
37
102
2
40.84
1
M
ining
46.57
58
258
37
49.17
110
26.36
6
H
eavyIndustry
40.11
6.9
286
79
24
17
47.51
7
LightIndustry
44.07
12
225
94
35.73
6.7
73.05
17
FoodProcessing
47.72
5.4
294
65
46.87
6.5
45.9
6
Transportation
52.32
32
238
50
39.95
13
55.65
6
Chem
icalIndustry
43.06
333
191
31
0
0
0
0
PublicU
tility
40.77
37
264
26
38.33
23
0
4
D
iverse
40
6.5
153
52
30.65
12
59.74
5
Total
48.6
21.86
242
521
41.4
24.12
45.52
54
N
otes.Thedistanceofthecom
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werealsolistedin
Berlin
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average335km
.
Source.H
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pitz(2018)andvarious,pleaseseeAppendixofchapter3.
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3.2 Concentration
In this section, we examine the concentration of ownership. There are only few studies on
ownership and control in historical perspective. For Germany, the pioneering study is from
Franks et al. (2006), which analyzes the ownership structure of 55 companies based on 156
shareholder lists and finds that ownership concentration was quite high and even increased
slightly over time. Their findings are in strong contrast to the UK. Acheson et al. (2015)
analyze corporate ownership in their comprehensive historical study for the second half of
the 19th century in the UK, and they find evidence that, first, ownership tends to disperse
over time and that firms headquartered in London and with shares listed at multiple stock
exchanges had more widely dispersed ownerships. Second, generally, ownership concentra-
tion was lower in the Victorian Britain of 1900 than in modern Britain. Foreman-Peck and
Hannah (2012) study the divorce of ownership and control in pre-WorldWar I Britain. They
look at the ownership structure of 337 listed companies and found evidence of a divorce of
ownership and control. Manager-owners and board members controlled little capital and
few votes.5
Table 3.7 shows the descriptive statistics of our sample. In contrast to Franks et al. (2006),
our values do seem particularly stable over time. Before 1913, the mean number of sharehold-
ers was 26.6. This falls to 18.3 for the meetings duringWorldWar I, rising again in the period
after the hyperinflation and before the Great Depression, before dropping to about 18 under
the Nazi reign. However, the median do not change much over time, remaining between
5Further studies by Franks et al. (2009) and Hannah (2007) also deal with the development of the own-
ership structure of British companies over time. For US corporations, there is still debate regarding the extent
to which ownership and control were separated (for a review, see Cheffins and Banks 2009). Moreover, several
studies analyze ownership and control for the US in more detail (see, for instance, Hilt 2008 or Holderness et
al. 1999).
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10 and 20 over the whole period, which is equal to Franks et al.’s (2006) calculations. Simi-
lar to Franks et al. (2006), the maximum number of investors is mostly above 100, showing
that themethod is perfectly capable of identifying large numbers of shareholders. The largest
number of shareholders appears at the 1932 general meeting ofMannesmannröhren-Werke, a
large steel producer headquartered in Berlin andwith a share capital of 6millionReichsmark.
At this meeting, 582 investors were present, representing 46 percent of the company’s share
capital.
Table 3.7: Number of Shareholders Attending the Meetings
Decade Mean Median Min Max Percent of
capital present
Number of
general meetings
1869–1913 26.6 20 2 248 36.51 112
1914–1917 18.3 13 2 153 53.03 27
1918–1922 17.3 12 2 249 51.15 277
1923–1928 29.3 13 2 582 70.76 152
1929–1933 20.3 10 2 282 71.03 144
1934–1945 17.9 10 2 97 64.85 73
Total 21.6 13 2 582 59.75 785
Note. This table reports the number of shareholders in the sample.
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3.
In Table 3.8, we report different measures of ownership concentration. We use the same
measures as Franks et al. (2006) in their seminal article. These are C1, C3, and C5 – the com-
bined votes of the largest, the three largest, and the five largest shareholders, respectively.
Cthreshold is defined as the minimum number of shareholders necessary to cast 25 percent
of the present votes, and Herfindahl is the overall distribution of represented capital/votes
cast. For a better comparison with the findings of Franks et al. (2006), we include their cal-
culations (Panel C) and our calculations grouped into the similar periods (Panel B). Similar
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to Franks et al. (2006), we find no reduction of concentration over time. Indeed, if anything,
concentration seems to slightly increase. On average, the largest shareholder held about 47
percent of shares, which means that, in most cases, this investor alone could provide more
than 25 percent of the votes. The Herfindahl index also increases from 32 to 35 during the
Weimar Republic. Overall, however, we find amuch lower rise than Franks et al. (2006), but
higher overall values. The average Herfindahl calculated by Franks et al. (2006) ranges be-
tween 23 and 29 in the period 1900–1920, whereas we measure average levels of 33.5 percent.
Given that the median number of investors is fairly stable, the fact that more capital was
represented at the shareholder meetings rather reflects the rising concentration in the form
of rising shares of the attending investors, not a rise in the number of smaller shareholders
attending the meetings.
Table 3.9 shows the percentage of shareholdings of inside shareholders. Inside sharehold-
ers are classified as members of themanagement board (Vorstand) and the supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat) as well as members of founding families. We calculate the share capital of in-
side shareholders in relation to the total share capital (in percent), which was present at the
general meetings. The numbers vary between the six different time periods. The share capi-
tal of management shareholders was highest during the period ofWorldWar I (31.14 percent)
and in the period after the hyperinflation (19.73 percent). After 1913, the share capital of the
supervisory board did not changemuch over time, remaining between 10 and 12 percent over
the whole period. In total, family founders accounted for the most of the share capital of
inside shareholders at the general meetings. On average, about 40 percent of the share capital
was held by inside shareholders at the general meetings over time. We then calculate the share
capital in relation to the total share capital of the companies (in percent). In total, about 17.1
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Table 3.8: Ownership Concentration Over Time
C1 C3 C5 Cthreshold Herfindahl Number of
general meetings
Panel A: Periods according to historical structural breaks
1869–1913 0.45 0.66 0.75 1.4 0.32 112
1914–1917 0.46 0.6 0.72 1.04 0.31 27
1918–1922 0.47 0.7 0.81 1.18 0.34 277
1923–1928 0.48 0.69 0.8 1.12 0.35 152
1929–1933 0.48 0.7 0.78 1.27 0.35 144
1934–1945 0.46 0.71 0.82 1.28 0.32 73
1869–1945 0.47 0.69 0.79 1.22 0.34 785
Panel B: Periods in decades according to Franks et al. (2006)
1870 0.28 0.65 0.79 1.5 0.18 2
1890 0.46 0.79 0.89 1.17 0.34 6
1900 0.42 0.66 0.76 1.55 0.31 45
1910 0.46 0.64 0.73 1.26 0.32 68
1920 0.47 0.7 0.81 1.17 0.35 353
1930 0.47 0.69 0.78 1.23 0.34 280
1940 0.49 0.76 0.86 1.23 0.35 30
all 0.28 0.65 0.79 1.5 0.18 785
Panel C: Calculations from Franks et al. (2006, p. 564)
1890 0.33 0.6 0.71 1.88 0.18 8
1900 0.42 0.7 0.8 1.32 0.23 19
1910 0.46 0.73 0.83 1.21 0.27 29
1920 0.47 0.75 0.86 1.32 0.29 41
1930 0.44 0.75 0.86 1.22 0.23 36
1940 0.58 0.82 0.9 1 0.37 17
1950 0.51 0.76 0.86 1 0.31 6
all 0.46 0.74 0.84 1.26 0.27 156
Note. Panel B: Firm observations are allocated to the nearest corresponding decade.
Source. See Appendix of chapter 3, authors’ own calculations.
percent of the share capital was held by inside shareholders. Family founders accounted
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for the most of the total share capital of the companies (8.19 percent), whereas members of
the management board held on average 5.21 percent of the total share capital and members
of the supervisory board held on average 3.89 percent of the total share capital. Taking the
shareholdings of the members of the management board, then from 1929 onwards there is a
separation between executive power and partnership in shares.
Table 3.9: Share Capital of Inside Shareholders
Share capital in relation to the share capital
at the General Meeting (in percent)
Share capital in relation to total share
capital (in percent)
Decade Management Supervisoryboard
Family
founder Management
Supervisory
board
Family
founder
1869–1913 5.87 4.62 22.8 0.94 0.6 9.07
1914–1918 31.14 10.97 14.26 8.2 1.51 5
1919–1923 9.47 10.05 17.59 3.17 3.2 4.89
1924–1928 19.73 9.02 26.21 9.55 4.06 20.82
1929–1933 9.96 12.99 17.21 5.63 7.23 8.19
1934–1945 7.87 12.84 2.57 3.77 6.72 1.14
Total 14.01 10.08 16.77 5.21 3.89 8.19
Source. See Appendix of chapter 3, authors’ own calculations.
In contrast to Franks et al. (2006), our values are lower. For example, Franks et al. find
that in 1890, members of the supervisory board exercised about 50 percent of the votes at the
general meetings (see Franks et al. 2006, pp. 565-568.). In total, the values show a decline of
the vote shares of inside shareholders from 62 percent in 1890 to 29 percent in 1940.
Bol (2018b) also finds lower values of inside shareholders of the Deutsche Bank for the pe-
riod from 1870 to 1930. In total 8 percent of the share capital (in relation to the total share
capital) was held by inside shareholders. Moreover, about 25 percent of the inside sharehold-
ers represented the share capital which was present at the general meetings. About 5 percent
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of the share capital was held by members of the supervisory board. Members of the manage-
ment board held a lower proportion of the share capital (about 2 percent).
3.3 Gender, SocialClassesandInstitutional Investors–DescriptiveStatis-
tics
In this section, we provide information about how many men, women and institutional
investors were present at general assemblies and how this composition changed within the
nearly 50 years of our observation period. Further, we analyze the distribution of investors
categorized into social classes over time. This is the first study that investigates social classes
and gender distribution of investors on German stock exchanges before 1945. Despite rare
studies on individual investors, such as those by JohnMaynardKeynes (Chambers et al. 2013,
2015, 2016) and Joseph Frisch (see Lehmann-Hasemeyer andNeumayer 2019 and chapter 5 of
this dissertation), the only comparable studies covering our observation period were for Eng-
land (Rutterford et al. 2017 or Sotiropoulos and Rutterford 2018).
We define gender and whether it was a private or institutional investor primarily named
on the list. Following this procedure, we observe a total of 647 female investors, of which
24 were classified as widows. Furthermore, we observe 8,334 male investors and 992 institu-
tional investors (see Table 3.10). In four cases, married couples were mentioned as investors.
We assign these cases to female investors, assuming that the women had a say if they were
mentioned. In 44 other cases, we only have information that a representative of a group of
heirs or communities acted as investors. These are summarized in the category ‘unspecific’.
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Table 3.10: Gender – Descriptive Statistics
Women Men Institutional
Investors
Unspecific Total
Panel A: Totals
1869–1913 68 1,634 139 17 1,858
1914–1918 5 307 27 1 340
1919–1923 155 2,694 276 6 3,131
1924–1928 330 2,598 424 10 3,362
1929–1933 80 1,602 269 8 1,959
1934–1945 34 548 222 2 806
Total 647 8,334 992 44 10,017
Panel B: In percent
1869–1913 3.66 87.94 7.48 0.91 100
1914–1918 1.47 90.29 7.94 0.29 100
1919–1923 4.95 86.04 8.82 0.19 100
1924–1928 9.82 77.28 12.61 0.3 100
1929–1933 4.08 81.78 13.73 0.41 100
1934–1945 4.22 67.99 27.54 0.25 100
Total 6.46 83.2 9.9 0.44 100
Panel C: Average share of votes per person
1869–1913 5.79 2.92 9.48 0.94
1914–1918 5.2 3.78 11.19 59.87
1919–1923 3.94 4.51 11.06 1.52
1924–1928 0.77 2.55 7.85 0.13
1929–1933 3.4 4.01 9.3 2.04
1934–1945 6.91 5.71 5.12 10.28
Total 10.85 58.06 45.25 6.69
Panel D: Average share of the whole group at general meeting (0 vote if nobody from the group present)
1869–1913 4.6 63.95 25.83 0.14
1914–1918 1.73 52.64 28.59 2.22
1919–1923 2.51 58.86 29.31 0.05
1924–1928 1.66 48.69 41.76 0.01
1929–1933 2.43 52.21 36.31 0.08
1934–1945 4.17 54.27 36.47 0.42
Total 2.76 55.77 33.14 0.17
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3. Authors’ own calculations.
These total numbers certainly underestimate the impact of institutional investors, since
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whilemost other investors only appearedonce or twice, some institutional investors appeared
every year for more than one firm and held larger shares. This is better reflected in the shares
per period (Panel B). The share of male investors fell from 87.9 percent to about 67.9 percent
under the Nazi reign. In comparison, the share of women drops from the first to the second
period (3.7 percent to 1.5 percent), rising then to 9.8 percent in the period after the hyperinfla-
tion, but then falling again to about 4.2 percent in the period under the reign of theNational
Socialists. Regarding the institutional investors attending themeetings, we obtain a constant
rise from 7.5 to 27.5 percent. Panel C shows the average share of votes for the different groups.
In most cases, we have the number of votes for each investor. If we do not have the vote, we
assume that the share of capital equals the share of votes. The share of female votes seems
to have been lowest for all groups. The average share of men was the largest. However, this
distribution is highly skewed. Panel D shows the average impact of women, if we include
the meetings in which no woman was present with a zero vote. Thus, it reflects the actual
average impact of women per period. As one can see, the share is very low and never reaches
more than 5 percent. It is interesting that especially in the period 1924–1928, where we ob-
servemost women, the share declines. More women attended themeetings, but with smaller
shares, whereas in the Empire years, only women with large shares attend. Any hesitations
about attending a meeting seem to have declined, although the individual impact was low.
Panel A reveals another interesting feature: While men obviously appear in more than
one period, the women seem to have appeared in one or two periods only, since the sum of
individual investors per period nearly adds up to 647. However, this could be driven by a
financial engagement in just one firm over a number of years, and thus we further investigate
not just the number ofmeetings at which investors appear, but also the number of firmswith
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which investors were engaged (see Table 3.11).
Table 3.11: Degree of Involvement by Gender
Number of firms
in which investors
invested
Women Men Institutional Investors Unspecific Total
Panel A: Totals
1 639 7,588 797 43 9,067
2 8 559 102 1 670
3 0 115 25 0 140
4 0 38 12 0 50
5 0 15 13 0 28
More than 5 0 19 43 0 62
Totals 647 8,334 992 44 10,017
Panel B: In percent
1 98.76 91.05 80.34 97.73 90.52
2 1.24 6.71 10.28 2.27 6.69
3 0 1.38 2.52 0 1.4
4 0 0.46 1.21 0 0.5
5 0 0.18 1.31 0 0.28
More than 5 0 0.23 4.33 0 0.62
Panel C: Average engagement in years
Mean 0.31 0.58 0.92 0.62
Median 0 0 0 0
Max. 22.04 35.06 26.06 35.06
Source. Various, please see Appendix of chapter 3. Authors’ own calculations.
Clearly, most of our investors invested in just one firm over time. However, while we ob-
serve that about 9 percent of the male investors and about 20 percent of the institutional
investors invested in more than one company, almost all of the women invested in a single
firm, and only eight held shares of two different firms.
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Furthermore, we take a closer look at the female investors to understand why they held
shares of the particular companies. However, due to the lack of information, we can only
study few cases. It seems, however that the female investorswere oftenmembers of the found-
ing family. Anna Langheinrich, for instance, held shares of Graphitwerke Kropfmühl AG in
1925. In this year shewas also the official director of this company and therefore one of the few
female entrepreneurs of the time (seeHandbuch derDeutschenAktiengesellschaften 1925, p.
549). Two further, caseswere the female shareholders of the PapierfabrikAugustKoehlerAG
inOberkirch and the PapierfabrikWilhelm Euler in Bensheim. With AnnaMaria Goetz and
Wilhelmine Rettner, it happened that two women of the founding family were members
of the supervisory board of both companies, since both companies held holdings together
(Krämer 2007).
To get a better idea of who the institutional investors are, we look at them in more de-
tail in Table 3.12. Here, we divide the investors into different industrial branches following
Lehmann-Hasemeyer andOpitz (2019). The branches are divided into 11 categories: banking,
insurance, mining, heavy industry, light industry, food processing, transportation, chemical
industry, public utilities, diverse, and not assignable if we could not assign the investors to
a certain category. The highest percentage (70.26) of institutional investors comes from the
banking sector. This does not necessarily mean that banks were the owners of the shares,
as before WWI, banks held only a few major, long-term direct stakes in non-financial firms
(Fohlin 2007, p. 120). However, they held substantial control over joint-stock firms through
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proxy voting. In the pre-war era, proxy voting was established in two ways. The first is
irrelevant to our study: a shareholder could transfer his/her voting rights to a bank (”Stimm-
rechtsermächtigung”), allowing the bank to cast votes in the shareholder’s name. In these
cases, the shareholders had to reveal their identity, and these details are available in the lists
of the general meetings. The second way, which was more important in practice, was the so-
called ”Bankenstimmrecht” or ”Depotstimmrecht”. This is much trickier and explains the
large share of banks as institutional investors in our sample. According to Fohlin (2007, p.
122), many banks required their customers to transfer their votes automatically upon opening
securities accounts, granting the banks a widespread ability to control rights of equity stakes
they did not own. Banks could domore or less whatever they wished with these voting rights
(see Fohlin 2007, pp. 122–124). As one can see, the influence of large banks was indeed high
with on average more than 50 percent.6
We then classify the investors into social classes depending on occupation and academic
title. Thereby, we follow the existing classification of Schüren (1989).7
Schüren analyzes the history of social mobility in Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries,
using a broad data set of thousands of occupational details. His work represents one of the
largest andmost comprehensive investigations of the socio-economic ascent and descent pos-
sibilities in two centuries of German social history. His classification is intertemporal valid
and has consensus among social historians such as Hartmut Kaelble or Jürgen Kocka (see
Schüren 1989, pp. 313ff.). Since we have information about the occupations of the investors,
we can easily follow the existing classification of Schüren and classify our occupational in-
vestors’ data into these social classes. Table 3.13 reports the classification scheme used by
6In the context of the ”Depotstimmrecht”, see also Planitz (1922, pp. 10-21).
7For the whole text of Schüren’s classification scheme, see Schüren (1989, pp. 313ff.).
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Schüren. He distinguishes the working class, the lower middle class, the higher middle class
and the upper class based on occupations. The working class contains skilled workers, crafts-
man, skilled industrial workers, and lower civil servants and employees. The lower middle
class contains small farmers, merchants, masters/hosts andmiddle civil servants and employ-
ees. The higher middle class contains full-time farmers, medium-sized entrepreneurs and se-
nior civil servants and top officials. The upper class containsmostly landowners, largemanu-
facturers, academics and upper senior officials.
We are aware of the fact that during our period of interest, political changes, wars and
financial depressions, for example, led to changes in the social structure and occupational
system of society. Therefore, occupations may have to be assigned to different social classes
for different times. This is also already covered in the classification of Schüren. In instances
where we only have information about the title of an investor (e.g., Prof., Dr., Ing.), we try
to classify their occupation based on the title. For most cases, this was relatively easy, because
most of the titles are academic titles that we can easily assign to the group of academics and
the upper class. We also assign investors with a title of nobility (e.g., Exzellenz, Graf, Freiherr
von) to the upper class, even if there was no indication of their profession in our data. Some
of the investors owned an honorary title such as, for example, Geheimer Kommerzienrat,
Geheimer Regierungsrat or Geheimer Medizinalrat. These investors were also assigned to
the upper class, since these titles were awarded only to high-level personalities in the economy
and after significant achievements for the common good of society.
Table 3.14 shows thedescriptive statistics of the investors divided into social classes. In total,
the sample contains 4,175 investors for which we have information on their occupation. The
75
majority come from the upper class (89.99 percent).8
Table 3.13: Social Classes – Classification Scheme
Social classes
I. Working Class
1. Skilled Workers
2. Craftsman
3. Skilled Industrial Workers
4. Lower Civil Servants and Employees
II. Lower Middle Class
1. Small Farmers
2. Merchants
3. Masters and Hosts (Master Craftsmen, Innkeepers, Shopkeepers, etc.)
4. Middle Civil Servants and Employees (Foremen, Assistants, etc.)
III. Higher Middle Class
1. Full-time Farmers
2. Medium-sized Entrepreneurs (incl. Men of Private Means, Wholesalers)
3. Senior Civil Servants and Top Officials (Engineers, Inspectors, Authorized signatories)
IV. Upper Class
1. Landowners, Large Manufacturers, Academics, Upper Senior Officials
Notes. Originally, Schüren distinguished six social classes. We have omitted the subdivision of the working class into the lower, middle
and higher working class, because there are few observations of the working class.
Source. Schüren (1989, p. 35).
About 7.16 percent come from the highermiddle class, 2.78 percent from the lowermiddle
class, and only 0.07 percent from the working class. Looking at the changes over time, in the
8This observationmay also be due to the fact that shareholders from lower social classes did not have the fi-
nancialmeans, free time, and, given smaller share packages, probably simply a lack ofmotivation to attend these
shareholder meetings. Looking at those investors who had their residence at a place different than the general
assembly (more than 100 kilometer away), it is striking that about 93 percent of the shareholders attending the
meeting came from the upper class. Only 7 percent came from lower social classes. This could be an indication
that shareholders from lower social classes had no funding, or did not have the time to attend the assembly.
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first period, we find 94.72 percent of investors from the upper class. In the second period,
this rises to 96.70 percent, but then it continuously falls to 88.45 percent in the last period.
In comparison, the share of the investors from the higher middle class drops from the first
to the second period (3.57 percent to 2.75 percent), before rising to 8.81 percent in the last
period. We obtain a similar picture for the share of the lower middle class, where we see a rise
from 0.55 percent from the second period to 3.25 percent in the fifth period, but then falling
to 2.74 percent in the sixth period. The proportion of the working class is very low, and only
in the third and fifth periods is it slightly higher than 0 (0.07 percent, and 0.22 percent). The
table reveals that in the 19th century, most shares were in the hands of the men of the upper
class. However, this slightly changes in the 1920s, when ownership became more and more
available to lower social classes, which is also reflected in the higher shares of investors from
the middle and working classes.
Altogether, risingdemocracy andprice disturbances after theperiodofhyperinflation seem
to be accompanied by a rising share of female investors and a rising share of investors from
lower social classes. However, the shares of female investors and lower social classes remain
relatively low, and we observe a rise in concentration at the same time. Thus, while these
observations confirmourhypothesis, they also show that the joint-stock firmswere still firmly
in the hands of few investors from the upper class and institutional investors, which were
mostly banks.
In the following section, we analyze the investors from the upper class in more detail. For
a better overview, we classify the occupations of the investors into different categories. As
a basis for the categorization, we follow the classification scheme of occupations according
to Mathew (1978, p. 280). He distinguishes between different occupational classes (admin-
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istration, military, church, trade and industry, lawyers, medicine, teaching, aristocracy and
property and forestry). In addition to Mathew (1978), there will be an adjustment of the
occupational classes. The existing categories have been expanded to include categories of aca-
demics, banking, directors, honorary title as well as agriculture and forestry. The group of
academics includes all persons with a doctor and/or professor title who could not be further
specified. The new category of directors has been included, as this has often been noted in
the data as an occupational description, but usually is not specified inwhich type of company
the director was active. Banking includes all shareholders who are employed in the banking
sector (also bank directors). The group of honorary titles include persons of which we only
have information of the title: Kommerzienrat, geheimer Kommerzienrat, or Ritter.
Table 3.15 shows the results. The professional class of the directors are represented themost
with on average 20.37 percent. Academics are represented with 18.52 percent and bankers
with 13.94 percent, followed by categories of administration and lawyers with 11.64 percent
and 10.43 percent. All other occupational categories are rather underrepresented in the sam-
ple. Female investors were mostly from the aristocracy or had a honorary title. In three cases
the female investors were the official directors of the company. Table 3.16 shows the percent-
age of shareholders by occupational groups and by industry. The percentage of bankers or
bank directors who invested in the banking sector was relatively high compared to the other
occupational groups, who invested in the banking sector (21.61 percent). The percentage of
directors was highest in the heavy industry and the transportation sector (35.25 percent and
29.33 percent) and was in all other sectors also very high. Companies from the chemistry sec-
tor had a high percentage of shareholders from the occupational class of the academics. The
percentage of shareholders from the aristocracy was large for the insurance sector.
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Table3.15:N
um
berandPercentageofShareholdersbyEach
O
ccupationalG
roup,byPeriod.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
O
ccupationalG
roups
1869–1913
1914–1918
1919–1923
1924–1928
1929–1933
1934–1945
AristocracyandProperty
72
10.84
10
5.68
85
6.57
118
9.97
50
6.31
16
5.5
Academ
ics
116
17.47
22
12.5
261
20.17
240
20.27
173
21.82
55
18.9
Banking
148
22.29
40
22.73
104
8.04
89
7.52
93
11.73
33
11.34
D
irectors
89
13.4
25
14.2
316
24.42
264
22.3
170
21.44
77
26.46
H
onoraryTitle
91
13.7
20
11.36
134
10.36
89
7.52
41
5.17
15
5.15
TradeandIndustry
13
1.96
5
2.84
62
4.79
47
3.97
60
7.57
18
6.19
Lawyers
51
7.68
24
13.64
105
8.11
93
7.85
92
11.6
40
13.75
Church
2
0.3
1
0.57
3
0.23
7
0.59
3
0.38
1
0.34
AgricultureandForestry
0
0
0
0
3
0.23
6
0.51
1
0.13
2
0.69
Teaching
0
0
0
0
1
0.08
3
0.25
1
0.13
1
0.34
M
edicine
4
0.6
2
1.14
17
1.31
25
2.11
11
1.39
5
1.72
M
ilitaryandM
arine
8
1.2
4
2.27
23
1.78
24
2.03
12
1.51
1
0.34
Adm
inistration
68
10.24
22
12.5
165
12.75
177
14.95
83
10.47
26
8.93
D
iverse
2
0.3
1
0.57
15
1.16
2
0.17
3
0.38
1
0.34
Total
664
100
176
100
1,294
100
1,184
100
793
100
291
100
N
otes.Theclassification
schem
eisfrom
M
athew
(1978,p.280).Thecategoryaristocracyand
propertyincludespeoplefrom
thearistocracyand
landowners.Academ
ics
includesallpersonswith
adoctorand/orprofessortitle,who
could
notbefurtherspecified.Thecategoryofdirectorscontainsdirectors,who
could
notbefurtherspeci-
fied.Bankingcontainsem
ployersand
em
ployeesin
thebankingsector(also
bankdirectors).H
onorarytitlescontainspersonsentitled
with:e.g.Kom
m
erzienrat,geheim
er
Kom
m
erzienrat,orR
itter.Industryand
com
m
ercecontainsm
erchants,em
ployersand
em
ployeesin
thisarea,businessownersaswellasengineers.ThecategoriesLawyers
andChurch
contain
lawyersandpastors.Agricultureand
Forestrycontainstenantfarm
ersand
foresters.ThecategoryTeachingand
M
edicineincludesteachersand
m
edical
doctors.M
ilitaryandM
arinecontainshighrankingofficersandgenerals.Theadm
inistrationgroupincludesm
ayors,m
em
bersofparliam
entaswellasadm
inistrativeofficials.
ThecategoryD
iverseincludesreindeers,privateindividuals,authorizedsignatoriesandallnotclearlyassignableoccupationalclasses.
Source.Various,pleaseseeAppendixofchapter3.Authors’own
calculation.
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3.4 Correcting for Selection Bias
The descriptive statistics confirm our hypothesis that the rising democracy and the price dis-
turbances of hyperinflation go together with a rising share of other social classes as well as a
rising share of female investors. However, these descriptive statistics might be biased by selec-
tion of available information on general meetings. In some periods, we observe more general
meetings than in others, as well as different branches and different firm sizes. Thus, we aim
at establishing our observations from the descriptive statistics in a more elaborate way.
First, we construct a dataset at the level of investors and years. Few investors appear more
than once in the dataset. If, for instance, investor X attends a general meeting in 1900 and a
meeting of the same firm in 1905, we would observe her twice. However, since we are inter-
ested in the probability of certain characteristics over time and most investors do not appear
more than once, we stick with simple ordered logit and logit regressions and cluster the stan-
dard errors by investors. The dependent variables are social class rankings from 1 to 4 (regres-
sion 1 and 2), equal to one if the investor was a woman (regression 3 and 4) or an institution (5
and 6). Since we are mostly interested in how the probability of these characteristics changed
over time, and especially in the period between 1924 and 1933, we add dummy variables for
certain periods. We further control for the share of extraordinary meetings, because the in-
centive to attend these meetings might have been different. We also control for the average
distance between an investor’s residence and the location of the general meeting as a measure
of transport cost as well as the total number of investors per year to account for potential
selection bias. The results, shown in Table 3.17, clearly confirm our descriptive statistics. The
probability of coming from a lower social class declines during World War I, but increases
significantly after 1923 and 1933. The likelihood that women become investors also
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rises after 1923. The presence of institutional investors, however, seem to rise constantly
over the whole period of observation.
One might argue that a logit is not able to trace the actual impact, since vote shares might
have been very different. Thus we run OLS regressions in which the log of the vote share is
the dependent variable. We control for gender andwhether the investorwas institutional. We
also add dummies for the time periods and control for the share of extraordinary meetings,
distance and number of investors per year, as above. The results are shown in Table 3.18.
One can clearly see that the share of votes for men and women do not significantly differ.
However, unsurprisingly, institutional investors have significantly more votes than ordinary
investors. If we include the variable of social class, ranking from 1 (upper class) to 4 (lower
middle class), it seems that the vote share of the lower class decline significantly. However, if
we only add a dummy for investors from the middle class (the one that we used in the logit
regressions), the voting share is not significantly different.
In a second step, we aggregate the data at the level of general meetings. More precisely,
sincewe observe, on average, about six generalmeetings per firm,we construct an unbalanced
panel, where the IDvariable is the firmand the time variable is the date of the generalmeeting.
Here, we focus first on the measures of concentration from section 3.2 and show whether
they changed over time if we control for meeting specific characteristics and, additionally, for
time-invariant firm characteristics with firm fixed effects. The results confirm the findings
of the descriptive statistics and are shown in Table 3.19. Overall, the level of concentration
is remarkably stable. Only C1 seems to significantly increase in the period of 1923 to 1933.
However, the coefficients slightly increase over time. Thus, we re-estimate the regressions
including only one time dummy for the period of 1924–1933.
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Table3.19:Concentration
O
verTim
e,Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ependentvariables
ln(herfindahl)
ln(c1)
ln(c3)
ln(cthres)
ln(herfindahl)
ln(c1)
ln(c3)
ln(cthres)
pooled
FE
1914–1917
-0.00838
0.11
-0.0591
-0.354***
0.0998
0.444**
0.0717
-0.434***
(0.0833)
(0.23)
(0.0788)
(0.126)
(0.0881)
(0.223)
(0.0912)
(0.119)
1918–1922
-0.0439
-0.154
-0.00271
0.0831
-0.00139
0.126
0.0167
-0.0672
(0.07)
(0.22)
(0.0674)
(0.157)
(0.0721)
(0.236)
(0.0878)
(0.132)
1923–1928
-0.00332
0.0351
0.00577
-0.161
0.0973
0.359*
0.0688
-0.194*
(0.0715)
(0.218)
(0.0634)
(0.141)
(0.0618)
(0.189)
(0.0702)
(0.117)
1929–1933
0.00109
0.0353
0.0172
0.000305
0.0797
0.327
0.078
-0.165
(0.0683)
(0.213)
(0.0608)
(0.181)
(0.0676)
(0.209)
(0.0753)
(0.125)
1934–1945
-0.00511
0.0796
0.0372
-0.0673
0.0297
0.214
0.0445
-0.0414
(0.0687)
(0.223)
(0.068)
(0.151)
(0.0777)
(0.254)
(0.0891)
(0.146)
Extraordinary
m
eetings(=1)
-0.0186
-0.0477
-0.0574*
0.0753
0.00157
0.0375
5.79E-05
-0.0777
(0.0218)
(0.0691)
(0.031)
(0.102)
(0.0266)
(0.0764)
(0.021)
(0.0623)
O
verallshare
capitalperyear
0.00782
0.0253
0.00172
0.00233
-0.0169
-0.00999
0.00308
-0.00162
(0.00884)
(0.0348)
(0.0133)
(0.0241)
(0.0115)
(0.0356)
(0.0123)
(0.0316)
N
um
berofG
M
s
peryear
0.00074
0.00381
0.000846
-0.00505**
0.00193**
0.00304
0.0013
-0.00118
(0.000827)
(0.00269)
(0.00108)
(0.00219)
(0.000847)
(0.00288)
(0.00107)
(0.0022)
Firm
fixedeffects
n
n
n
n
y
y
y
y
O
bservations
721
721
760
720
710
710
749
709
R
-squared
0.012
0.019
0.016
0.032
0.033
0.037
0.029
0.045
N
um
beroffirm
s
257
257
272
257
257
257
272
257
N
otes.R
obuststandarderrorsin
parentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.Allregressionsincludedaconstantwhich
isnotreported.
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Table 3.20: Concentration Over Time, 1924–1933
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables ln(herfindahl) ln(c1) ln(c3) ln(cthres)
1924-1933 0.0716** 0.201** 0.0505 -0.115
(0.0305) (0.1) (0.0334) (0.0809)
Extraordinary meetings (=1) 0.000655 0.0331 -0.00189 -0.0763
(0.0258) (0.0716) (0.0205) (0.0606)
Overall share capital per year -0.0163 -0.0197 -0.000431 0.0019
(0.0123) (0.0348) (0.0105) (0.0307)
Number of GMs per year 0.00148* 0.0028 0.00128* -0.000837
(0.000815) (0.00236) (0.000699) (0.00198)
Firm fixed effects y y y y
Observations 710 710 749 709
R-squared 0.022 0.02 0.024 0.015
Number of firms 257 257 272 257
Notes. Robust standard errors inparentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, clustered at firm level. All regressions included a constant
which is not reported.
AsTable 3.20 reveals, this time dummy is significant for theHerfindahl index and the share
of the largest investors. Thus, concentration do rise significantly in the period after hyperin-
flation until the Nazis took over.
We then run the same model, using the share of women and the mean of social class as
dependent variables. The results are shown in Table 3.21. This regression reveals some inter-
esting new aspects. First, the share of lower social classes does not change significantly over
time; in fact, it seems to decline. Furthermore, the share of women rises after 1919, similar
to our previous findings, if we estimate the panel without firm fixed effects. If we include
firm fixed effects, the share of women falls significantly in our observation period. Since 98
percent of the women were only engaged in one firm, this reveals that some of these women
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Table3.21:Panel
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
D
ependentvariables
Socialclass
Shareofwom
en
Socialclass
Shareofwom
en
1914–1917
0.0227
0.0427
0.0064
-0.0133
(0.0917)
(0.0792)
(0.0166)
(0.0185)
1918–1922
-0.0189
0.00277
0.0368*
0.0195
(0.0429)
(0.0626)
(0.0188)
(0.0179)
1923–1928
-0.00445
-0.0149
0.0252
0.00077
(0.0315)
(0.0325)
(0.0163)
(0.0132)
1929–1933
0.00395
-0.00934
0.0269*
-0.00444
(0.0344)
(0.0385)
(0.0142)
(0.0121)
1934–1945
0.0274
0.00592
0.0298*
0.0151
(0.0404)
(0.0627)
(0.0157)
(0.0158)
1924–1933
0.000382
-0.0188
0.00487
-0.0135**
(0.0189)
(0.027)
(0.0132)
(0.00585)
Shareofextraordinary
m
eetings
0.00261
0.00574
-0.00715
-0.000375
0.000968
0.00516
-0.00726
-0.000207
(0.0205)
(0.0191)
(0.00921)
(0.00574)
(0.0209)
(0.0193)
(0.00944)
(0.00568)
N
um
berofG
M
s(year)
0.000471
-0.000207
-0.000397
-0.000229
9.80E-05
-0.00031
-4.24E-05
-4.81E-05
(0.000577)
(0.00092)
(0.000298)
(0.000202)
(0.000397)
(0.000549)
(0.000144)
(0.000142)
H
erfindahl
-0.051
0.0607
-0.0765***
-0.0415***
-0.0499
0.0651
-0.0774***
-0.0430***
(0.0571)
(0.0735)
(0.0193)
(0.0133)
(0.0571)
(0.082)
(0.0195)
(0.0147)
Firm
fixedeffects
n
y
n
y
n
y
n
y
O
bservations
674
663
721
710
674
663
721
710
R
-squared
0.007
0.013
0.058
0.068
0.004
0.01
0.048
0.053
N
um
beroffirm
s
244
244
257
257
244
244
257
257
N
otes.R
obuststandarderrorsin
parentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1,clusteredatfirm
level.Allregressionsincludedaconstantwhich
isnotreported.
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withdrew their engagement in this period.
3.5 Conclusion
We study the ownership structure of joint-stock firms for the period of 1869 to 1945 based on
a unique hand-collected dataset. The data covers a selection of 785 general meetings of 276
firms, covering the information of 10,017 individual investors over the period of 1869 to 1945.
We can show that after the hyperinflation of 1923, when shares became cheaper, ownership
among the lower social classes and women increased significantly. These results are robust to
different approaches that aim at controlling for a potential selection bias. However, the de-
spite the greater participation ofwomen and the lower social classes after 1923, there remained
a vast inequality of opportunities in terms of capital ownership and control. Thus, regard-
less of the political changes and new economic conditions, the control of the joint-stock firms
largely remained in the hands of investors from the upper class and large banks.
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There’s No Place Like Home: Investors’
Home Bias in Germany, 1898-1934*
The decision to buy and/or to hold stocks is complex and often takes place under con-
siderable uncertainty. To reduce this uncertainty, investors build expectations about future
returns and risks, using information on stock market projections, political forecasts and the
macro economy. Furthermore, they seek information about certain firms, and observe and
*The following chapter is single authored work. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte/Economic History Yearbook 2/2018, pp. 447-469, (Neumayer 2018).
URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jbwg.2018.59.issue-2/jbwg-2018-0015/jbwg-2018-0015.xml. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1515/jbwg-2018-0015. It is printed with kind permission of Walter de Gruyter GmbH,
Berlin/Boston.
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interpret other investors’ decisions. Their expectations therefore depend on the available set
of information and the knowledge and experience they bring to interpreting the information.
Thus, investors make decisions based on rational expectations, but not every investor has the
same information, knowledge and experience. Special knowledge about companies and re-
gional exchanges is often only available locally.1 Therefore, rational investors with different
amounts of information also make different investment decisions. Furthermore, investment
decisions are often influenced by psychological and sociological aspects2, so investment deci-
sions are a product of interactions between economic, psychological and sociological factors.
Experience and the socioeconomic profile including level of education, age, gender and fac-
tors such as self-confidence play an important role in investment decisions (Goetzmann and
Kumar 2008).
To improve interpretations of investor behavior over time, it is necessary to learn more
about how much investors trust their own knowledge and how past experiences influence
them. A well-documented behavior called home bias is the tendency for investors to overin-
vest in assets and shares from their home region (Coeurdacier and Rey 2013 or Wójcik 2011).
However, even home bias has not been documented extensively for historical periods. So
far there is little information about individual investors in Germany and there are only three
analyses, none of which are extensive, of investors’ home bias in the first half of the 20th
century (Wormser 1919, Franks et al. 2006 or Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer 2016). This
article looks for evidence of historical home bias, leaving the question of why such bias might
have existed for future research.3
1A broad literature deals with the information advantage of local investors compared to non-local ones.
For an overview see for example: Lindblom et al. (2017, pp. 143ff.).
2See for instance: Rabin (2002), De Bondt and Thaler (1995) or Shiller (1999).
3A broad literature exists on the reasons for home bias at least for modern periods. However, historical
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Existing studies use very small samples of localGerman investors’ data in the first half of the
20th century. Themajor problemwith these papers is that they presumably overestimate the
effect, due to selection bias: their analysis is based on shareholder attendance lists of general
assemblies. Within this data there might already be a bias towards people that live close to
the meeting. It seems likely that the probability of investors attending a general assembly of
a company based in e.g. Stuttgart is higher for those who reside in Stuttgart, compared to
investors residing elsewhere.
This paper evaluates the home bias for historical periods in more detail, by using a larger
dataset of 504 shareholder lists from 175 different companies between 1898 and 1934. These
shareholder lists are, as already explained, mostly attendance lists of shareholders attending
differentmeetings of the general assembly of the firms. To investigate local investment biases,
I calculate the distance between the firm’s headquarters and the investors’ residence. In a
second step, I then split the sample to separate those companies that organized their general
assembly in a place other than their headquarters. The idea is to get a better view of the home
bias and challenge the problem that these shareholder lists only show a particular selected
share of attendant investors which gives rise to selection bias.
The descriptive analysis first shows that local investors were clearly important. A very high
number of shareholders lived within 100 kilometers of company headquarters. Challenging
these findings in more detail leads to the conclusion that they might be biased because they
are mostly based on attendance lists. Analyzing different sub-samples shows a different pic-
ture. There is no home bias detected for companies that held their general assembly in a place
other than their headquarters. This reveals a different sort of home bias, which has not been
studies have so far dealt more with the description and determination of the home bias phenomenon.
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considered yet: a so-called “stock exchange home bias of investors”. It seems that it mattered
to investors which stock exchange the shares were listed on, and how far away from the in-
vestors’ place of residence the stock exchange was located.
4.1 Home Bias – The Current State of Research
According to standard portfolio theory, rational investors should hold diversified portfolios
of different listed assets (Markovitz 1952). Previous research has shown that this is not the
case, at least for modern periods (Merkle andWeber 2014). Instead of diversifying their port-
folios and holding domestic as well as foreign assets and shares, the home bias literature in-
dicates that investors prefer assets and shares from their home country and home region.4
Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) analyze portfolio holdings of investors in the U.S., Japan, and
Britain and find evidence of an overinvestment in domestic markets. They look at miscel-
laneous explanations like hedging motives, asset trade costs and informational and behavior
biases, whereas Wójcik gives a definition of different forms of home bias and in addition, a
review of the literature. The term home bias focuses on two related behaviors. First, it refers
to investors investing in firms located in the same city as their residence. Second, it refers
to investors investing in firms located in their home region.5 According to Wójcik (2011), a
limit of 100 kilometers is most commonly used for differentiating between home-bias and
supra-regional investments.
Using a sample of investors from the U.S., Japan and Britain, French and Poterba (1991)
find evidence that investors hold mostly assets from their domestic market. They also exam-
4A recent review of investors home bias can be found in: Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) or Wójcik (2011).
5This is also often called “local bias”; see for instance: Wójcik (2011, p. 69). To ensure a uniform procedure
only the term “home bias” is used in the rest of the article.
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ine the reasons for this preference, which they divide into two categories. On the one hand,
there may be institutional restrictions, e.g. taxes that favor a certain home bias. However,
they do not find significant evidence for these kinds of institutional differences. They do find
that individual expectations matter. In particular, unrealistically high expectations regarding
the domestic market returns create a home bias in portfolios. Coval and Moskowitz (1999)
investigate the same fact and come to the same results in the case of the strong preference for
locally headquartered firms of US investment managers.
Apart from institutional constraints and investor expectations, geographic distance plays a
major role in homebias. A small distance between investors’ homes and the investment seems
towork as a proxy for the local character of information, which then clearly influences the de-
cision to buy shares. Portes and Rey (2005), for instance, find evidence that the geographical
distance is an important component in international capital flows.6
For Germany, the home bias phenomenon has not been studied closely in a historical con-
text.7 There are two pioneering studies that focus on characteristics of investors by analyzing
6Other studies highlight also the importance of geographical distance and information asymmetries; see
for instance: Hau (2001), Lampe and Ploeckl (2014) or Grote et al. (2002).
7Information on share ownership is in large parts unavailable for this period, because most of the shares
were bearer shares (for the following text on share ownership see: Burhop 2011, pp. 15f.). Thus, there is little
information about individual investors. The only characteristic which all shareholders had in common is that
they were relatively rich, because the shares were increasingly expensive. Between 1870 and 1884, the minimum
face value of a share was 300 Marks. This was only 40 percent that had to be paid before the IPO. With of-
ferings below par being prohibited, the minimum investment to buy one share was 120 Marks. Stock market
shares were therefore still well within reach of the middle classes. But in 1884 the corporate law increased the
minimum face value of a share to 1,000 Marks and only fully paid shares were possible for an IPO. This was
an extremely high minimum investment. If you compare this to the average annual wage of 1,300 Marks of
a German industrial worker in 1913, it seems unlikely that workers or even middle-class employees held shares
(calculations of the annual wage are based on Bry (1960). Occasionally published lists of applicants for shares
exist, for instance the list of the first buyers of shares of Deutsche Bank in 1870 (see: Pohl (1987), or Bol (2018b),
who analyzes the ownership structure of Deutsche Bank over time). The study of Pohl is without an analysis
of investors’ characteristics. First qualitative and quantitative studies of individual investor´s behaviour in a
historical context, were recently published by Chambers et al. In a series of papers, they explore the investment
behaviour of JohnMaynard Keynes between 1921 and 1946 (see: Chambers andDimson (2013), Chambers et al.
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the lists of shareholders attending the shareholders’ meeting of different companies. The
first, by Franks et al. (2006) investigates the ownership structure of German corporations
from the 1880s to the 1950s, using 19 shareholder lists from 18 different companies listed on
the Frankfurt andMunich stock exchange. They find evidence that in the first decade of the
20th century on average, 31.5 shareholders attend the meeting, holding nearly 70 percent of
the capital of the firms (Franks et al. 2006, pp. 557, 563, 578). While they were the first to
use shareholder lists in an empirical analysis, they fail to investigate the home bias and do not
look at available information on, for example, the place of residence of the shareholders.
Following the approach of Franks et al., a second, empirical analysis of investors’ home
bias in Imperial Germanywas carried out by Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016). They
explore the geographyof stockmarket listings in ImperialGermany in 1913 anddistinguishbe-
tween two forms of home bias. First, they find evidence for a home bias of companies’ listing
decisions on certain stock exchanges. Aside from the Berlin stock exchange (the biggest stock
exchange inGermany at that time), regional stock exchanges like Augsburg, Stuttgart orMu-
nich also played a major role in listing decisions. Smaller firms tended to get listed at regional
stock exchanges, whereas larger firms with higher capital requirements tended to list at the
Berlin stock exchange. The distance from the companies’ headquarters to the stock exchanges
played a major role in these listing decisions. The closer the companies’ headquarters to a
stock exchange, the higher the probability of being listed at this stock exchange. They explain
their findings with asymmetric information between issuer and investor, and a home bias of
investors investingmore in well-known regional markets. In a second step, they demonstrate
the home bias for the financial capital, Berlin, for a small sample of 32 shareholder lists from
(2015), Accominotti and Chambers (2016) or Chambers and Kabiri (2016).
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16 different companies. They show that for companies based in Berlin, about 60 percent of
shareholders representing about 60 percent of the capital also lived in Berlin, concluding that
local investment was important and that something like an investors’ home bias existed. In
another study of the same period, Wormser (1919) shows that in Prussia, 30 percent of the
financial wealth was concentrated in three cities (Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne).
Rutterford et al. (2017) explore local investment bias in the UK from 1870 to 1935. Using a
representative and unbiased database of nearly 30,000 shareholders based on 197 sets of share
records, they present evidence of a strong local investment preference among investors. This
homebias remained strong forLondon investors anddeclined fornon-London investors over
time. They explain their findings of local investment preference of investors with relation
to the size and the age of the firm, and also with local informal trust networks between the
investors and the directors of the firm. To describe investors’ home bias in the first half of
the 20th century, I follow the pioneering work of Franks et. al. (2006) and Burhop and
Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016). I use a larger dataset with more observations to give a clearer
picture of investors’ home bias. I also analyze a sub-sample to avoid and to reflect on the
potential problems of a selection bias in the data towards people who live close to a meeting
location.
4.2 Data Sources on Investors andDescriptive Statistics8
My analysis is based on 504 shareholder lists of attendance from 175 different companies.
The investigation period starts in 1898 and ends in 1934. I collected data on individual firms
from the Hessian Economic Archive (Hessisches Wirtschaftsarchiv), the Bavarian Economic
8For a detailed description and discussion of the data see chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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Archive (BayerischesWirtschaftsarchiv) and theBaden-WuerttembergEconomicArchive (Baden-
WürttembergischesWirtschaftsarchiv), aswell as from theHistoricalArchive of theDeutsche
Bank AG and from the Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG. The data includes fil-
ings of the Frankfurt StockExchange, theMunich StockExchange and the Stuttgart StockEx-
change. The 175 observed companies are not exclusively listed at the above-mentioned three
stock exchanges. There are also listings at the Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen,
and Augsburg stock exchanges. The data is available because under the Stock Exchange Act
of 1896 companies were legally bound to submit shareholder information to their stock ex-
change operator. Companies also disclosed their prospectuses, an extract of the register of
commerce, current company status, annual management reports, and lists of shareholders
attending the general assembly. For example, if the general assembly voted to increase or re-
duce equity, this information had to be provided to the stock exchange operator.9 I extract
the name of the company, the industrial sector, the location of headquarters, the stock ex-
changes on which the company’s shares were listed and the place where the general assembly
took place. From the shareholder data, I take the name and title of every shareholder and his,
her or its city of residence. In addition, I calculate the distance between company headquar-
ters and the residence of every single shareholder, to obtain a distance measure allowing for
the identification of the home bias. For all shareholders the address was reported down to
city level, and those shareholders in the town center were located. The distances are as the
crow flies.
In the vast majority of cases, however, these hand-collected databases of shareholder in-
formation are incomplete due to different protocols and layouts, which strongly limits the
9For themain legislative changes that occurred in the regulation of German capital markets in the 19th and
20th century see for instance: Franks et al. (2006, pp. 542ff., 554f.).
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number of usable observations. In many cases, only the name and residence of the share-
holders were reported without moreover any information on occupation or branch of the
shareholder. In some cases, the address was left blank. Another bias in the data is that the
information only includes investors attending the meetings or general assemblies. Those in-
vestors who did not attend the assemblies remain unknown. In addition, many investors
were represented in these meetings and assemblies, for example by banks or bank directors.
Inmany cases, there is only information on the authorized representative, but not on the rep-
resented investors. There is also no data on how shareholders exercised their voting rights,
only information on how many votes were cast. Outliers and missing values have been re-
moved from the data set.
Table 4.1, panel (a), reflects the sectoral distributionof the listed firms inmy sample grouped
into three time periods: 1889-1911; 1912-1923 and 1924-1934. The branches are divided into
ten categories: banking, insurance, mining, heavy industry, light industry, food processing,
transportation, chemical industry, public utilities and diverse. A lot of bank shareholder in-
formation is contained in the sample, so the banking sector is well represented. The highest
percentage of firms comes from the light-industrial sector. This category includes textiles, pa-
per, glass and rubber. Furthermore, as category six (foodprocessing) illustrate, a large number
of breweries are represented in the sample. Mining andheavy industry are under-represented.
Table 4.1, panel (b), highlights the total number of shareholders per firm in an industry
based on the shareholder attendance lists in my sample. The total number of shareholders
per firm in an industry is 9,651.10 As already shown in panel (a), shareholders in the banking,
light industry and food processing sectors are highly represented. To see whether the sample
10This is not identical to the actual individual number of investors, as it happened that investors held shares
of different companies at the same time and therefore were present at several general meetings over time.
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of listed firms is representative or not, I compare it to the actual number of the listed firms per
sector listed on the Berlin stock exchange and the regional stock exchanges in 1913, as docu-
mented byBurhop andLehmann-Hasemeyer (2016). This reveales that the sample is not rep-
resentative. However, the analysis below still works, as having a representative sample is not
essential. With 9,651 observations, the dataset seems suitable for analyzing local investment
biases in more detail. Despite the possible shortcomings of the descriptive analysis, studying
the characteristics of individual investors in this period remains a good starting-point to un-
derstand investors’ decisions and the development of theGerman stock exchanges in general.
Table 4.1: Sectoral Distribution of Listed Firms and Shareholders, 1898 - 1934
Panel (a) Panel (b)
Number of firms in percent
(total number)
Total number of shareholders
per firm in an industry
Industry 1898 - 1911 1912 - 1923 1924 - 1934 1898 - 1911 1912 - 1923 1924 - 1934
Banking 21.0 (5) 4.0 (4) 11.0 (12) 303 315 802
Insurance - 3.0 (3) 4.0 (5) - 149 852
Mining 8.0 (2) 4.0 (4) 5.0 (6) 24 96 615
Heavy Industry - 8.0 (8) 6.0 (6) - 236 77
Light Industry 25.0 (6) 32.0 (34) 24.0 (26) 112 1,086 759
Food Processing 17.0 (4) 14.0 (15) 11.0 (12) 55 624 636
Transportation 4.0 (1) 3.0 (3) 4.0 (4) 90 37 145
Chemical Industry 4.0 (1) 2.0 (2) 2.0 (2) 19 14 95
Public Utility 8.0 (2) 9.0 (10) 15.0 (16) 30 281 706
Diverse 13.0 (3) 21.0 (23) 18.0 (20) 197 776 520
Total 100.0 (24) 100.0 (106) 100.0 (109) 830 3,614 5,207
Notes. The heavy industry category contains: engineering firms, metal working, railway requirements; light industry contains: textile sector, paper
industry, glass industry, rubber industry; food processing contains: breweries and mills; public utility contains: electricity, gas and water; diverse is
divided into hotel companies, terrain companies and land banks.
Source. Own calculations using data from Hessian, Bavarian, Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive, Historical Archive of the Deutsche Bank AG
and from the Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG, see also Appendix of chapter 4.
99
4.3 Descriptive Analysis of Investors Home Bias
Table 4.2 provides information regarding the distance between the residence of the investors
and the company headquarters in which they held shares. The findings reveal a home bias
over the whole period from 1898 to 1934. About 60 percent of the shareholders lived an av-
erage of 30 kilometers away from the company headquarters in question. About 65 percent
lived within 50 kilometers of the company and about 73 percent lived within 100 kilometers
of the company. This tendency also holds for the three sub-periods.
Table 4.2: The Regional Distribution of Investors 1898-1934 (Distance Between Company
Headquarters and Investors’ Place of Residence in km per Period)a
Share of investors, who reside
within 30, 50 and 100 kilometers
of the headquarters (in percent)
Share of investors, who reside >
100 kilometers from headquarters
(in percent)
Period Observation 30 km 50 km 100 km > 100 km
1898 - 1934 9,651 60.0 65.0 73.0 27.0
1898 - 1911 713 58.0 59.0 74.0 26.0
1912 - 1923 3,562 67.0 70.0 78.0 22.0
1924 - 1934 4,965 55.0 62.0 68.0 32.0
Source. Own calculations using data from Hessian, Bavarian, Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive, Historical Archive of the Deutsche Bank AG and
from the Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG, see also Appendix of chapter 4.
aRunning the analysis with the larger dataset leads to almost identical results. In order to save space, the
analysis of this data is reported in the supplementary material A to this chapter.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 display the regional distribution of shareholders of different com-
panies located in Berlin, Frankfurt (Main), Munich and Stuttgart. Companies located in
these four cities are those with the highest number of shareholders in my sample, which pro-
vides a better picture of the regional distribution of the investors.11 I calculate the distance
11The data provides 1,268 shareholders for companies from Berlin, 434 shareholders for companies from
100
between the investors’ place of residence and company headquarters. The latter are marked
with an arrow. The different places of residence of the shareholders are illustrated by grey
circles. The bigger the grey circles, the more shareholders residing in the respective city.
For companies with headquarters in Berlin, there is a wide distribution of the distance be-
tween investors’ place of residence and headquarters. About 42 percent of the investors had
their place of residence within 100 kilometers of the Berlin headquarters. A distance over
100 kilometers can be found in the case of about 68 percent of the investors. The result is not
surprising, because Berlinwas the financial center ofGermany in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury and the leading industrial city. This attracted many industrial companies, so that large,
national companies with stock market listings at different stock exchanges had their head-
quarters in Berlin and operations throughout Germany. This led to a high number of non-
regional investors, because the firms attracted share capital from across Germany (Lehmann-
Hasemeyer and Burhop 2014). The picture for Frankfurt, in Figure 4.1, is different. About
88 percent of the investors had their residencewithin 100 kilometers of companies with head-
quarters in Frankfurt, with 12 percent of investors livingmore than 100 kilometers away. The
results clearly reflect local investment behavior in the case of shareholders in Frankfurt. This
is surprising, because Frankfurt was considered a financial center for southwest Germany,
and foreign companies, especially from Austro-Hungary, were traded at the Frankfurt stock
exchange. Frankfurt was also seen as a market for many regional firms which were located
around Frankfurt, suggesting that there would be many regional shareholders. This is in-
deed suggested by the distributional graph. Munich and Stuttgart were considered regional
centers, hosting the share registries of regional firms. For example, many Bavarian firms such
Frankfurt (Main), 1,692 shareholders for companies from Munich and 444 shareholders for companies from
Stuttgart.
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as breweries listed their shares in Munich. In Stuttgart, the firms were mainly from Wuert-
temberg, which can be seen in Figure 4.2. About 82 percent of the investors inMunich-based
companies also resided inMunich or within 100 kilometers of Munich. About 18 percent of
the investors livedmore than 100 kilometers away. For Stuttgart about 75 percent of investors
lived within the 100-kilometer range, and 25 percent lived outside that range.
Table 4.3 can be read alongside Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. It shows the regional distribution
of investors of the four different cities, Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Stuttgart.
I distinguish between three types of shareholders. Local shareholders, residing in the same
place as company headquarters, regional shareholders, residingwithin 100 kilometers of com-
pany headquarters and non-regional shareholders, residing more than 100 kilometers from
company headquarters. For companies based in Berlin, about 37 percent of shareholders also
lived in Berlin. About 6 percent came from cities within 100 kilometers of Berlin and the
highest proportion, 57 percent, lived more than 100 kilometers away.
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(a) City of Berlin
(b) City of Frankfurt
Notes. Own illustration. The maps depict the German Empire with the state borders of 1914. These examples are for illustration purposes.
I’m aware that the border demarcations changed during my analytical period 1898-1934.
Source. Various, see Appendix of chapter 4.
Figure 4.1: Regional Distribution of the Number of Shareholders of Berlin and Frankfurt,
1898-1934 103
(a) City of Munich
(b) City of Stuttgart
Notes. Own illustration. The maps depict the German Empire with the state borders of 1914. These examples are for illustration purposes.
I’m aware that the border demarcations changed during my analytical period 1898-1934.
Source. Various, see Appendix of chapter 4.
Figure 4.2: Regional Distribution of the Number of Shareholders of Munich and Stuttgart,
1898-1934 104
Ta
bl
e4
.3:
Th
eR
eg
io
na
lD
ist
rib
ut
io
n
of
In
ve
sto
rs
18
98
-19
34
(C
om
pa
ni
es
fro
m
Be
rli
n,
Fr
an
kf
ur
t,
St
ut
tg
ar
t,
M
un
ich
)
Co
m
pa
ny
he
ad
qu
ar
ter
s
in
Be
rli
n
in
Fr
an
kf
ur
t
in
St
ut
tg
ar
t
in
M
un
ich
R
es
id
en
ce
at
th
eb
as
eo
ft
he
co
m
pa
ny
(lo
ca
lin
ve
sto
r)
37
.0
62
.0
46
.0
74
.0
Fr
om
ot
he
rp
lac
es
(<
10
0k
m
)
6.
0
26
.0
29
.0
7.0
Fr
om
ot
he
rp
lac
es
(>
10
0k
m
)
57
.0
12
.0
25
.0
19
.0
N
ote
.T
he
de
pi
cti
on
of
th
et
ab
le
is
fo
llo
wi
ng
Bu
rh
op
an
dL
eh
m
an
n-
H
as
em
ey
er
(2
01
6,
p.
43
4)
.
So
ur
ce.
O
wn
ca
lcu
lat
io
ns
us
in
gd
at
af
ro
m
H
es
sia
n,
Ba
va
ria
n,
Ba
de
n-
W
ue
rtt
em
be
rg
Ec
on
om
ic
Ar
ch
ive
,H
ist
or
ica
lA
rc
hi
ve
of
th
eD
eu
tsc
he
Ba
nk
AG
an
df
ro
m
th
e
H
ist
or
ica
lA
rc
hi
ve
of
th
eC
om
m
er
zb
an
kA
G
,s
ee
als
oA
pp
en
di
xo
fc
ha
pt
er
4.
105
What proportion of share capital was owned by shareholders living in the same city as the
headquarters of listed companies? This question is difficult to answer, because most share-
holder lists provide incomplete information on the capital represented in the meetings and
general assemblies. For companies based in Stuttgart, only eight shareholder attendance lists,
covering three firms, provide complete information on the share capital. For those com-
panies, I find that on average about 60 percent of the capital was represented at the meet-
ings. Moreover, about 75 percent of the shareholders who attended the meeting also lived in
Stuttgart. For companies based in Frankfurt, the picture looks similar. Only four attendance
lists of two different firms provide complete information about share capital. Using this in-
formation, I find that 80 percent of the shareholders representing about 45 percent of the
share capital at the meetings lived in Frankfurt. Using the same information for companies
from Munich, about 70 percent of the share capital was represented at the general assem-
blies, with about 68 percent of the shareholders coming from Munich. Using the available
information of seven attendance lists of four Berlin-based companies, about 69 percent of
the shareholders representing about 45 percent of the share capital also lived in Berlin. These
findings support the results of Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, showing an investors’
home bias for investors in companies based in Frankfurt, Stuttgart andMunich.
Table 4.4 shows the regional character of the Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich stock ex-
changes inmore detail by looking only at firms that were listed at those three stock exchanges.
Adistinction ismadebetween firmswithheadquarters in Frankfurt, Stuttgart orMunich and
those located outside these cities. In addition, a further distinction is made between share-
holders residing close to the company, shareholders residing in Frankfurt, Stuttgart or Mu-
nich and shareholders from other places. Shareholders from other places are separated into
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shareholders residing within 100 kilometers and shareholders residing more than 100 kilo-
meters away. For firms located in Frankfurt, I find that 68 percent of the shareholders also
lived in Frankfurt. About 21 percent lived within 100 kilometers of Frankfurt, and 11 percent
lived more than 100 kilometers away. For firms located outside Frankfurt, 37 percent lived
close to the company. Moreover, about 6 percent of the shareholders lived in Frankfurt. A
further 20 percent of the other shareholders resided within 100 kilometers and 37 percent of
the shareholders were non-regional. Regarding firms located in Stuttgart, only 19 percent of
the shareholders also lived in Stuttgart. About 81 percent lived within 100 kilometers, show-
ing clearly the regional character of the Stuttgart stock exchange. For firms located outside
Stuttgart, 23 percent lived close to the company and about 24 percent of the shareholders
lived in Stuttgart, 28 percent of the other shareholders resided within 100 kilometers and 25
percent of the shareholders were non-regional.
The picture for the Munich stock exchange is similar. Firms with headquarters in Mu-
nich had 75 percent of their shareholders also living in the city. About 7 percent lived within
100 kilometers of Munich and 18 percent lived more than 100 kilometers away. Firms with
headquarters outsideMunich had 48 percent of the shareholders living close to the company
and about 7 percent lived inMunich, 24 percent of the other shareholders resided within 100
kilometers and 21 percent of the shareholders were non-regional.
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Table4.4:TheR
egionalD
istributionofInvestors1898-1934(Com
paniesListedattheFrankfurt,StuttgartorM
unichStock
Exchanges)
Com
panyheadquarter
outsideFrankfurt
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Frankfurt
outsideStuttgart
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outsideM
unich
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M
unich
Proportion
ofshareholders
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pany(localinvestor)
37.0
68.0
23.0
19.0
48.0
75.0
From
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6.0
24.0
7.0
From
otherplaces(<100km
)
20.0
21.0
28.0
81.0
24.0
7.0
From
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)
37.0
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18.0
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Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, as well as Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, show that local investors were
important in Germany in the first half of the 20th century.
However, these findings have to be treated with caution as the analysis is based on atten-
dance lists which only include information on shareholders attending the meetings. Hence,
my results may be challenged as the findings might be biased. There is no information on
investors who did not attend the meetings, and investors living close to the meeting location
were more likely to attend meetings than those living further away. For this reason, I decide
to carry out a sub-sample analysis on companies that held their general assembly at a location
other than headquarters.
4.4 Sub-sampleAnalysis: LocationofHeadquartersDiffers fromLocation
of General Assembly
The idea behind this section is as follow: If the general assembly took place at or close to the
company headquarters, investors living close by were more likely to be those attending the
meeting. To be more precise, the presence of an investors’ home bias could be biased due to
this. Therefore, it is more accurate to look at companies that held their general assembly at a
place other than their headquarters. For example, if the firm’s headquarters was in Berlin and
the general assemblywas held in Frankfurt, an investors’ homebiaswould suggest thatmostly
investors fromBerlin and its surroundswould attend themeeting. Thus, I analyze only those
companies that held their general assembly somewhere other than their headquarters. The
results are in Table 4.5. The sample includes in total eight companies based in eight different
cities with 813 shareholders who were present at the general assembly. I calculate the distance
between theheadquarters and the locationof the general assembly anddistinguishedbetween
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companies with headquarters within 100 kilometers of the general assembly and companies
with headquarters more than 100 kilometers from the general assembly. The stock exchanges
onwhich the companies were listed at the time of the general assembly are also included. Fur-
thermore, the regional distribution of the investors is reflected by a calculation of the distance
between headquarters and investors’ place of residence. I distinguish between investors re-
siding within 30, 50, 100 and more than 100 kilometers of headquarters. The upper part of
Table 4.5 analyzes four companies which held their general assembly within 100 kilometers
of their headquarters: The Bleicherei, Färberei und Appreturanstalt (BFA) in Uhingen; the
VereinigteKapselfabrikenAG inNackenheim; theHanfwerkeFüssen-ImmenstadtAGbased
in Füssen and the Rheinische Stahlwerke based in Duisburg-Meiderich. The general assem-
bly of BFA Uhingen took place in Stuttgart, about 31 kilometers from its headquarters; the
general assembly of the Vereinigte Kapselwerke AG was held in Frankfurt, about 33 kilome-
ters from its headquarters; the general assembly of the Hanfwerke Füssen-Immenstadt AG
was held in Kaufbeuren, 35 kilometers from its headquarters and the general assembly of the
Rheinische Stahlwerke was held in Essen, 18 kilometers from its headquarters.
First of all, the analysis of the upper part shows that the investors’ homebias holds for these
four companies. Mostly regional investors residing within 100 kilometers of headquarters at-
tended the general assemblies. For example, in the case of the BFA Uhingen 79.2 percent of
the shareholders resided within 30 kilometers of headquarters (and 85.7 percent within 50
kilometers and 86 percent within 100 kilometers). Non-regional investors were the excep-
tion. Only 14 percent of the shareholders in BFA Uhingen lived more than 100 kilometers
away. The results are very similar for the other three firms, emphasizing the role of regional
investors.
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The picture differs for those companies holding their general assemblymore than 100 kilo-
meters from headquarters (see bottom part of Table 4.5). Here the regional distribution of
the shareholders of the following four companies is illustrated: Klöckner-Werke AG located
in Berlin, Mannesmannröhren-Werke based in Düsseldorf, and Zuckerfabrik Offstein and
Commerz- und Diskontobank in Plauen.
If headquarters weremore than 100 kilometers away, it seems that the investors’ home bias
vanishes. The results indicate that the majority of investors no longer come from the area
near headquarters and that the share of regional investors is smaller. Moreover, it seems that
in this case the investors resided near the location of the general assembly, which is indicative
of a high share of non-regional investors. For example, in the case of the Klöckner Works
about 72 percent of the shareholders came from places more than 100 kilometers away and
only 18 percent can be seen as regional investors. The same holds even more for Commerz-
und Diskontobank where only one percent of shareholders lived near the branch office in
Plauen and 99 percent resided near Hamburg, where the shares were also listed.
111
Table4.5:TheEightCom
paniesH
oldingTheirG
eneralAssem
bliesatLocationsO
therThan
H
eadquarters
Com
pany
H
eadquarter
Placeofthe
general
assem
bly
D
istance
headquarters
-general
assem
bly(in
kilom
eters)
N
um
berof
investors
Stockexchange
wherethefirm
s
werelisted
Shareofinvestors,who
residewithin
30,50and
100kilom
eterstothe
headquarters(in
percent)
Shareofinvestors,who
reside>
100kilom
eters
awayfrom
headquarters(in
percent)
30km
50km
100km
>
100km
H
eadquarterswithin
100km
Bleicherei,Färbereiund
Appreturanstalt
U
hingen
Stuttart
∼
31km
246
Stuttgart
79.2
85.7
86.0
14.0
VereinigteKapselfabriken
AG
N
ackenheim
Frankfurt
a.M
.
∼
33km
85
Frankfurta.M
.
38.8
97.6
99.0
1.0
H
anfwerke
Füssen-Im
m
enstadtAG
Füssen
Kaufbeuren
∼
35km
84
Augsburg,Frankfurta.M
.,
M
unich
13.1
66.6
95.0
5.0
R
heinische
Stahlwerke
D
uisburg
Essen
∼
18km
98
Frankfurta.M
.,
Berlin
64.2
72.4
83.0
17.0
H
eadquarters>
100km
Klöckner-W
erke
AG
Berlin
D
uisburg
∼
471km
97
Berlin,Essen,
H
am
burg,
Cologne,
D
üsseldorf,
Frankfurta.M
.
27.8
27.8
18.0
72.0
M
annesm
annröhren
W
erke
D
üsseldorf
Berlin
∼
478km
83
Berlin,Frankfurt
a.M
.,H
am
burg,
Cologne,
D
üsseldorf,Essen,
M
unich
24.0
39.7
42.0
58.0
ZuckerfabrikO
ffstein
O
ffstein
H
annover
∼
325km
65
M
unich,Berlin,
Frankfurta.M
.
24.6
33.8
42.0
58.0
Com
m
erz-und
D
iskontobank(office
Plauen)
Plauen
H
am
burg
∼
370km
55
Berlin,H
am
burg,
Frankfurta.M
.
1.0
1.0
1.0
99.0
Source.O
wn
calculationsusingdatafrom
H
essian,Bavarian,Baden-W
uerttem
bergEconom
icArchive,H
istoricalArchiveoftheD
eutscheBankAG
andfrom
theH
istoricalArchive
oftheCom
m
erzbankAG
,seealsoAppendixchapter4.
112
Now the question arises why the companies held their general assemblies at a place other
than headquarters. One reasonmight be the location of the stock exchangewhere the compa-
nies were listed. A firm located close to Stuttgart with listings at the Stuttgart stock exchange
might be more likely to hold the general assembly in or near Stuttgart. This approach ap-
plies to all eight companies. For example, Hanfwerke Füssen-Immenstadt AG had listed its
shares at theMunich,Augsburg andFrankfurt stock exchanges andheld its assemblynearer to
the Bavarian stock exchanges in Kaufbeuren. Similarly, Vereinigte Kapselfabriken AG from
Nackenheim held the general assembly in Frankfurt, because the shares were listed at the
Frankfurt stock exchange. The same holds for Mannesmannröhren Werke, which was lo-
cated in Düsseldorf but also listed at the Berlin stock exchange.
This result suggests a new form of home bias: a “stock exchange home bias of investors”.
It seems that it was not only important for an investor to be located near to company head-
quarters and thus get easier access to firm-specific information and the latest news, but also
to be located near the stock exchange where the shares were listed. Better access to, and un-
derstanding of, the local stock exchange seems to have influenced the investment decision.
There appears to be an information advantage to living near the stock exchange. Investors
may have benefitted from interaction and conversations with other traders, stockbrokers or
bankers and they may have had better access to information about the stock exchange.
Another important point is that companies had the important goal of attracting new cap-
ital by issuing new shares on other stock exchanges. Holding general assemblies in alternate
financial centers improved the prospects of attracting new capital (Burhop and Lehmann-
Hasemeyer 2016).
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4.5 Conclusions and Further Research
I provide data on shareholder information based on attendance lists of general assemblies in
order to study local investment biases. The descriptive analysis first shows that local investors
were clearly important. A very high number of shareholders lived within 100 kilometers of
the company headquarters in which they held shares. Inmany cases, shareholders lived in the
same city as company headquarters. However, these findings seemed biased because the lists
examined here were mostly attendance lists. It seems likely that the probability of attending
a meeting was higher for investors residing near to the location of the general assembly. For
example, the probability of attending a meeting in Stuttgart was higher for investors from
Stuttgart than for investors from Berlin. The analysis of different sub-samples then reveals
a different picture. The home bias does not hold for those companies that organized their
general assembly in a place other than headquarters. This might be because companies were
trying to attract new capital by issuing new shares on other stock exchanges. My analysis
reveals another form of home bias, which has not yet been considered. It seems that it was
no longer important where company headquarters were located. Moreover, it seems that the
location of the stock exchange mattered and whether the company in which the investors
held shares was listed in that location.
Looking beyond these findings, this article has made several contributions. First, it nar-
rows the gap in our knowledge of investors in historical periods, providing evidence for and
a description of a home bias. Second, it shows another form of investors’ home bias. The
location of the stock exchange affected the investment decision. Thus, the stock exchange on
which the shares were listed was important. Third, it can be presumed that previous studies
of local investors in Germany in the first half of the 20th century overestimated this effect.
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Further research has to deal with two issues. First, other sources, such as shareholder
books12 or portfolios of individual investors13 should be utilized. The advantage of these
sources is that the information on shareholder characteristics would be independent of the
shareholder attending the general assembly, whichwould eliminate the problem of investors’
attendance at meetings. It might be possible to get a clearer picture of investors’ home bias
using these kind of sources. Second, the reasons for an investors’ home bias should be inves-
tigated closely. According to Merton, one key variable in investing is the local character of
information: “Investors buy and hold only those securities aboutwhich they have enough in-
formation” (Wójcik 2011, p. 70). Before investing, the investor has to know something about
a company. Consequently, willingness to invest in the shares is higher among those investors
with more information about a firm. For instance, the probability is higher that investors
from Stuttgart have better knowledge giving them an informational advantage of the firm-
specific characteristics of a firm located in Stuttgart, than non-local investors. Local investors
can use different sources of information: they can talk to employees of the firm; they have
access to information from local newspapers; they possibly know the products and services
of the company better, and theymay benefit from the interactionwith other local investors.14
Given the communication and transport technology in the period examined, such infor-
mal, local knowledge would have been much more valuable than today. In this sense the
information advantage of local investors was even larger than it is today. However, it should
be noted that due to the introduction of the telegraph and telephone, information costs for
investors were also falling. In addition, financial papers like the Berliner Börsenzeitung were
12For the analysis of home bias using three shareholder books see supplementary material B and C to this
chapter.
13For the analysis of an individual portfolio see chapter 5 of this dissertation
14For a recent literature review, see Wójcik 2011, pp. 72ff. as well as Lindblom et al. 2017, pp. 143ff.
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founded, which also reduced information costs (Weigt 2005, p.20). Nevertheless, the infor-
mation advantage of local investors remained. So the presence of an investors’ home bias
might have been driven by asymmetric information between issuer and the investors. More-
over, it seems plausible that investors located nearer to the stock exchange had an advantage
regarding information on the stock exchange and their transactions processes. Anecdotal evi-
dence about the Amsterdam stock exchange provided by de la Vega relates that it was normal
practice for many investors to go to the stock exchange from day-to-day doing their business
(de La Vega 1994, pp. 136ff.). Of course, there was the possibility of being represented by
stockbrokers or bankers, but this was costly (Weigt 2005, pp. 17ff.). It made sense for in-
vestors to buy shares that were traded at their closest stock exchange, to avoid information
asymmetries and reduce information costs.
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4.6 SupplementaryMaterialA: Investors’HomeBiasUsingtheBroaderSam-
ple
As a supplementary material, I conduct the home bias analysis with a broader sample, since
I had collected additional lists of shareholders attending general assemblies.
Table 4.6provides the results, using about 7,000observationsmore thanbefore. I calculate
the distance between the residence of the investors and the company headquarters in which
they held shares for the different time periods. I first use the same six time periods as in section
4.3 of this chapter. Regarding the period from 1869 to 1945, on average, 55.78 percent lived
within 30 kilometers of the company headquarters. About 62 percent of the shareholders
lived an average of 50 kilometers away from the company, and about 68 percent lived within
100 kilometers of the company, whereas about 32 percent lived more than 100 kilometers
away.
This tendency alsoholdswhenusing the same four timeperiods (1898–1934/1889–1911/1912–
1923/1924–1934) as in section 4.3. The findings confirm the results of Table 4.2 and show a
home bias over the whole period from 1898 to 1934, as well as for the different sub-periods.
Compared to Table 4.2, the numbers are only slightly different. In Table 4.6, for the period
from 1898 to 1934, on average, 70 percent of the shareholders lived within 100 kilometers and
about 30 percent lived more than 100 kilometers away of the company’s headquarters. This
is slightly lower than in Table 4.2, but still reveals the investors’ home bias (in Table 4.2, 73
percent lived within 100 kilometers and 23 percent more than 100 kilometers away).
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Table 4.6: The Regional Distribution of Investors (Distance Between Company Headquar-
ters and Investors’ Place of Residence in km per Period)
Share of investors, who reside
within 30, 50 and 100 kilometers
of the headquarters (in percent)
Share of investors, who reside >
100 kilometers from headquarters
(in percent)
Period Observation 30 km 50 km 100 km > 100 km
1869 - 1945 16,356 55.78 61.41 61.41 31.18
1869 - 1913 2,801 59.69 67.01 76.58 23.42
1914 - 1923 5,025 64.82 68.70 76.60 23.40
1924 - 1928 4,377 52.11 55.20 60.13 39.87
1929 - 1933 2,865 47.61 58.43 66.21 33.79
1934 - 1945 1,288 42.55 48.45 56.99 43.01
1898 - 1934 15,426 56.83 62.33 69.64 30.36
1898 - 1911 2,378 59.88 66.06 75.53 24.47
1912 - 1923 5,328 64.94 69.20 77.05 22.95
1924 - 1934 7,720 50.30 56.44 62.71 37.29
Source. Own calculations using data from Hessian, Bavarian, Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive, Historical Archive of the Deutsche Bank AG and
from the Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG; see also Appendix of chapter 4.
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4.7 SupplementaryMaterialB: Investors’HomeBiasoftheMetallgesellschaft
AG and theMetallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG
In this section, I use the two shareholder books of the MG and the Metallbank to conduct
a further analysis of historical home bias. The advantage of these sources is that they are
unbiased in terms of travel cost that might lead to a home bias toward people who live close
to the meeting, as is probably the case when analyzing the shareholder lists of attendance
(see chapter 4, section 4). A brief classification of the company is to be carried out before
presenting the analysis of home bias.
On 1 January 1881, the Metallgesellschaft AG (hereafter referred to as MG) was founded
in Frankfurt/Main by Wilhelm Merton, Leo Ellinger and Wilhelm Merton’s father, Ralph
Merton.15 The purpose of the newly foundedMGwas the trading and production ofmetals.
WilhelmMerton was mainly responsible for all the business strategies, whereas Ellinger was
responsible for operations and the cousin of Merton, Zachary Hochschild, for marketing
activities. Thus, the key positions were in the hands of family members or long-time loyal
friends.
At the end of the 19th century, the MG became more and more involved in the interna-
tional metal markets, since Europe and Germany became more reliant on important metals.
Therefore,Merton’s intentionwas to put the existing trading activities on a broader basis and
to supplement them with other business fields to be able to also internationally trade metal.
For this reason, the Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG (hereafter referred to as Lurgi) was
founded in 1897. The aim was to bundle the industrial activities in a subsidiary of the MG.
15For the text of the history of the Metallgesellschaft AG and Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft
AG, see Däbritz (1931, pp. 61ff.); Knetsch (1998, pp. 23ff.); Weichel (2000, pp. 148ff.) and Reichel (2008, pp.
27-71).
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The purpose of the Lurgi was mainly mining and the extraction, the processing and the use
of metals. The MG and the Lurgi developed very well over time and expanded into foreign
companies and participations. Therefore, in 1906, the incorporate bank of the MG, the so-
called Berg und Metallbank AG, was founded by Wilhelm Merton, since these expansions
had to be financed and the expandingMG had high capital procurements. Merton intended
a division of labor with respect to trade (MG), industry (Lurgi) and finance (Berg- undMet-
allbank AG).
Due to its numerous investment companies and subsidiaries in all major industrialized
countries, the MG controlled a significant portion of the global metal trade. A first attempt
to graphically depict the organizational form of theMGwas carried out byRobert Liefmann
in 1913 (Liefmann 1913, p. 120.). Figure 4.3 shows the organizational form by Liefmann in a
handwritten organizational chart by Wladimir I. Lenin. Lenin came across the remarks on
the organizational chart of Liefmann and traced them by hand.16
Over the years and due to further growth of the MG, it has become clear that a complete
separation between industry (Lurgi) and finance (Berg- und Metallbank AG) was not prac-
tical anymore. Consequently, in 1910, there was a merger between the two companies to the
MetallbankundMetallurgischeGesellschaftAG(hereafter referred to asMetallbank) to avoid
duplication of work.
The First World War hit the MG and the Metallbank hard. Thereafter, it lost a large part
of its foreign participations. After the break-up of the foreign raw material base, the metal
company initially turned to the domestic processing sector.
16For detailed discussion of the organizational form of the Metallgesellschaft AG, see also Knetsch (1998,
pp. 227ff.).
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Source. Reichel (2008, p. 49). A printed organizational chart can also be found in Knetsch (1998, p. 233).
Figure 4.3: TheGroup of theMetallgesellschaft AG—HandwrittenOrganizational Chart by
Wladimir I. Lenin
In the mid-twenties of the 20th century, the business situation of the MG improved con-
siderably. In the international expansion, it reached a similar extent as it had before the First
WorldWar. Nonetheless, to streamline the organization, theMGand theMetallbankmerged
in 1928. From then on, the company traded as Metallgesellschaft AG. The leadership of the
company remained in the hands of the founding family. The sons of Wilhelm Merton, Al-
fred and Richard, hold the chair of the management as well as the supervisory board.
Regarding the first shareholder book of theMG in 1919, I measure home bias by again cal-
culating the distance between the corporate headquarters of theMG in Frankfurt/Main and
the investors’ residences since these are the main usable data. Figure 4.4 shows that about 83
percent of the investors lived within 100 kilometers of the companies headquarter, whereas
only 17 percent were located farther away than 100 kilometers. The analysis of the distance
clearly indicates a home bias. Nevertheless, this result has to be treated carefully because until
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1922, the MG issued only registered shares that could not be bought and traded on the stock
market (Reichel 2008, p. 28). Reichel (2008) states that until 1922, most of the shares lay in
the hands of the founding family, close friends of the founding family, within the MG con-
cern itself and in the hands of industrial participations (Ibid.). Thus, the probability is high
that many investors lived in close proximity to theMG because they were employees or close
friends of employees of theMG.Therefore, the results are not representative and an interpre-
tation of the investment behavior is difficult. This becomes evenmore clearer when checking
the entries and names in the shareholder book. First, the names belong to the founding fam-
ily, like the families of Merton, Hochschild and Ellinger. Second, many of the investors were
employed at theMG, like e.g. Eduard Zintgraff, Otto Fellner or Eduard Ladenburg.17 More-
over, the institutional investors in the book are all from theMG concern itself, e.g. industrial
participations like the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte. The result that 17 per-
cent of the investors lived further away than 100 kilometers of the headquarter of theMG in
Frankfurt/Main is driven due to the location of the foreign investors. Since the foreign in-
vestors lived in most cases near the foreign industrial holdings and participations of theMG,
it still indicates the importance of the MG on the metal markets even in foreign countries.
Therefore, to evaluate home bias in more detail, I concentrate on the second shareholder
book of the Metallbank because it also shows the portfolio of the investors. For a detailed
description of the shareholder book, see chapter 2.
As mentioned in chapter 2, it remains unclear who bought the shares and who opened
the accounts. However, to proceed, a crucial assumption has to be made. I am assuming
that the investors listed in the book opened their accounts on their own and also bought
17For a further overview, see Appendix.
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their shares on their own, whereas the Metallbank acted as an intermediary in the process of
buying the shares. To evaluate the home bias, first of all, the theory and the hypothesis have
to be provided.
Source. Own calculations, using HWA 119/392.
Figure 4.4: Distance Between Corporate Headquarters and Investors’ Residences (in Per-
cent)
For the theory, I followWójcik (2011, p. 71), who cites Merton (1987): “Investors buy and
hold only those securities aboutwhich they have enough information.” Thus, thewillingness
to invest in the shares is higher among those investors, who know the firm’s characteristic bet-
ter. Local investors can use different sources of information, like e.g. they can talk to employ-
ees of the firm; they have access to information from local newspapers; they possibly know
the products and services of the company better; and they may benefit from the interaction
with other local investors. Therefore, firms are more recognizable to local investors than to
non-local ones. The geographic distance as a proxy for the local character of information is a
very important variable that is highlighted in many papers (Hau 2001; Grinblatt, Mark, and
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Matti Keloharju 2001; Grote et al. 2002; Seasholes and Zhu 2010; Bernile et al. 2015). The
underlying hypothesis is that these information asymmetries increase with distance. Thus,
the home bias that investors tend to buy shares of local companies simply reflects these infor-
mation asymmetries.
As a starting point, I first calculate the distance between the headquarter of the Metall-
bank and the residents of the shareholders to get an impression of the regional distribution
of the investors. About 46 percent of the investors lived within a range from 0 to 10 kilo-
meters of the headquarters. About 19 percent lived within a radius of 10 to 50 kilometers of
the headquarters, and 3 percent lived within an area of 50 to 100 kilometers away from the
headquarters. About 30 percent of the shareholders were located more than 100 kilometers
away. What is striking is that many investors either lived close to the headquarters of the
Metallbank, resided in near proximity to the branches of the Metallbank or were domiciled
near to the industrial participations and holdings of the MG andMetallbank (especially the
foreign investors). Figure 4.5 highlights this for the German investors. The figure encom-
passes three parts. In the first part, the headquarters of the Metallbank is marked with a
black arrow. Second, most of the important German industrial holdings and branches of the
MG and the Metallbank are highlighted as diamonds. And third, the residents of the share-
holders are depicted as dots.18 In fact, the Metallbank did not just have regional investors,
but rather the non-regional or foreign investors were still all German, or at least, the names
sound German. For example, the foreign investors came from London, Melbourne, New
York, Mailand, Wien and Amsterdam. The probability is high that they lived in these cities
because the MG operated from there. Also, the firms that show up at
18A detailed list of the industrial holdings can be find in the Appendix.
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(a) Regional Distribution of the Investors of the Metallbank
(b) Firms that at least show up in one investor’s portfolio
Source. Own illustration, using HWA 119/393.
Figure 4.5: Regional Distribution of the Investors of the Metallbank
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least in one investor’s portfolio are not particularly regional. Moreover, they are closely
located to the Metallbank or to industrial holdings of the Metallbank, as shown in Figure
4.5.
The descriptive pattern indicates that the possibility is high that there is a home bias to the
headquarters of theMG in Frankfurt/Main and to the locations of the branches of theMG.
What is interesting is whether there is a home bias within the investors’ portfolios referring
to the fact that local investors also buy shares of local companies.
After showing the descriptive patterns, I conduct the home bias analysis by using different
empirical methods. The observational unit is at the level of every single investment i in the
portfolio of investor c of the Metallbank. For the analysis, I only consider the investment
in stocks. The first empirical approach (columns (1) to (4)) is estimating the following OLS
model:
Homebiasic = α + β
′Geographyic + γ
′InvestorsCharacteristicsc
+ δ′StockCharacteristicsic + λ
′Politicsic + µic
(4.1)
where two different dependent variablesHomebiasic are used. First, I calculate the value
of regional investments made by the investors. This means that the distance between the in-
vestor and the headquarters of firms that show up in the portfolio is less than 50 kilometers.19
The second dependent variable is the above average investment in stocksmade by every single
investor in the shareholder book.20
There are different sets of independent variables. Geographyic is a set of geographic char-
19A ratio that indicates the average investment in companies located within 50 kilometers to the investor.
20A ratio that indicates the above average investment. The variable has the mean of one.
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acteristics of investment i of investor c. It includes the distance between the firm’s headquar-
ters that shows up in the portfolio and the investor’s residence. Moreover, I use the informa-
tion about whether the investor lives within a radius of 50 kilometers to the headquarters of
the firms that shows up in the portfolio. InvestorsCharacteristicsc is a set of indepen-
dent variables that contains information about the characteristics of investor c. It includes
whether the investors have a doctorate or whether the investors are male, female or institu-
tional.
Third,StockCharacteristicsic is a set of indpendent variables that include information
about the number of stocks in investor’s portfolio and the number of stock exchanges on
which the stocks are traded. Last, some political indicatorsPoliticsic ,like whether there is a
state border between the firm’s headquarters and investors’ residences, are included as control
variables.
The second empirical approach (columns (5) and (6)) estimates the following logit model
F :
P (INV ESTMENTic = 1) = F (α + β
′Geographyic + γ
′InvestorsCharacteristicsc
+ δ′StockCharacteristicsic + λ
′Politicsic + µic)
(4.2)
where the dependent variable INV ESTMENTic of investor c is used. The dependent
variable takes the value 1 if the stock in the portfolio is listed on the closest stock exchange,
and 0 otherwise. For the control variables, I include the distance of the investor to the closest
stock exchange andwhether the stock exchange is locatedwithin 50 kilometers of an investor’s
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residence. The rest of the control variables are the same as in the first estimation procedure.
Table 4.7 shows the result of the OLS (model (1) to (4) and logit regression (5) and (6)),
where the observation is on the level of the investment and only the German-based investors
in the shareholder books are considered. It shows that there is a negatively significant rela-
tionship between the distance of the firm’s headquarters that shows up in the portfolio to
the investors and the value of investment in regional firms. The higher the distance between
the firm and the investors, the lower the regional investment (column (1)). If an investor
lives within 50 kilometers of the firm’s headquarters, the value to invest in regional firms is
significantly higher (column (2)).
If the distance between the headquarters of the firm in the portfolio and the investor is
higher, than the average investment of a single investor is significantly lower. If an investor
lives within 50 kilometers of the firm’s headquarters, the average investment of a single in-
vestor is significantly higher (columns (3) and (4)).
Column (5) and (6) refer to the fact that also the locationof the stock exchange couldmatter
for the investment decision. If the distance between the residence of the investors to the
closest stock exchange is higher, than the probability that this stock is listed at this respective
closest stock exchange is significantly lower. If the stock exchange is within 50 kilometers of
an investor, then the probability is higher that this stock is also listed at this respective stock
exchange (model (8)).
According to the results of Table 4.7, it seems that home bias decreases with the distance
of the investors to the headquarters of the firms. The more local the investors are, the higher
the interest in local shares. In some cases, the firms that show up in the portfolio were also
investors of the Metallbank itself, which makes it clear that there was an information
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advantage. Investors prefer shares of local companies because they have more relevant in-
formation about these companies. Moreover, the shares of local companies are traded on
local stock exchanges, about which local investors are better informed.
Also the fact that shares were often held by the founding family of the company, close
friends of the manager of the company, and employees might explain the observed home
bias of the shareholders of the Metallgesellschaft.21
As a further point, the question often arises of why such a decentralized system of finan-
cial centers existed in Germany with its multiple regional stock exchanges and large network
of banks with a large number of branches. There is already some contribution to that ques-
tion by Klagge and Martin (2005), who compare the decentralized German system of stock
exchanges and the centralized system in the UK in 1996 and 2001 and argue that regional
markets have an important information and network function between regional firms and
national markets and therefore are necessary in terms of efficiency. In addition, Arnold et
al. (1999, p. 1085) argue that regional stock exchanges were important for local firms because
they tended to list their new shares at regional stock exchanges. Lehmann (2014) argues that
large universal banks (D-banks) during this time often worked closely with smaller regional
private banks. For example, the smaller local banks often did not have the necessary size, mar-
ket power, connections or branches at the stock exchange and could thus not organize their
customers’ IPOs by themselves, so the large banks placed the shares for the local banks. The
regional banks thereby played an important intermediary role in the underwriting process be-
cause they had reliable information about local firms, which was also valuable for the larger
banks.
21This finding is also in line with the study of Rutterford et al. (2017). They find an increasing home bias
among those investors who have trust networks with the respective managers or company directors.
130
Related to this, financial theory suggests bundling stock trading in one place to increase
liquidity and prices. According to this, investors might have the incentive to centralize their
trading activities because this reduces information and transaction costs. But in reality, this
is not the case (Amihud andMendelson 1986).
This analysis might also contribute to the question of why such a decentralized system
of financial centers existed. This should not be highlighted too much because the analysis
comes with some crucial assumptions. One may argue that the Metallbank as a regional fi-
nancial center reduces information asymmetries for these local investors and thereby increases
liquidity of firms that tend to list on the stock exchange. This might also explain why many
firms listed on more than one stock exchange.
4.8 SupplementaryMaterialC: Investors’HomeBiasoftheMittelschwäbis-
che Überlandzentrale AG
This section analyzes the investment behavior of the shareholders of the Mittelschwäbische
Überlandzentrale AG (MÜAG) in more detail and evaluates whether there is a home bias
effect of investors. After providing a short history classification of the company, i will show
the results of the analysis.
TheMittelschwäbische Überlandzentrale Giengen AG22 (hereafter referred to as MÜAG)
was formed in 1920 by amerger of two electricity companies: the ElektrizitätswerkGenossen-
schaft für dieHeidenheimer undUlmer Alb fromHeuchlingen, which was founded in 1908,
and the Elektrizitätswerk für das Bach- und Egautal from Bachhagel founded in 1909. The
former name of theMÜAGwasÜberlandwerkeHeuchlingen-Bachhagel eGmbH and it was
22For the text of the history of the Überlandzentrale AG, see Überlandzentrale AG (1958, p. 10ff.).
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based in Giengen an der Brenz. The supply area was comprised of 19 Bavarian and 4Wuert-
temberg communities. As the supply network continued to grow, the companyneeded fund-
ing. Therefore, in 1923, the company finally went public and was converted into an AG. In
1924, the name was changed toMÜAG. The power supply was directed mainly to the city of
Stuttgart and the resident state water supply, as well as their area. For this purpose, the new
high-voltage transmission line fromNiederstotzingen-Untertürkheim was used. In 1919, the
power stations in Gerstetten, Giengen and Steinheim were taken over, and from the 1920s,
the electricity was purchased mainly from the interconnected grid. From 1932, water com-
panies were brought into the company to increase production capacity. The coverage at the
time of the Second World War was about 50 percent. After the war, the out-of-town plants
outside the utility were no longer economically viable. These were sold, and the electricity
was from 1973 about 98 percent of the Energieversorgungservice GmbH (EVS) and two per-
cent from private hydroelectric power plant. The EVSGmbHboughtmore andmore shares
of the MÜAG, so that they held, around the year 1998, 85.2 percent of the shares. In 1999,
the MÜAG was merged with the Überlandwerk Jagstkreis AG to form the present-day Ost-
württemberg Donau Ries AG and the Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW).
Because theMÜAGwas a regionally based company that supplied mostly the region with
electricity, the hypothesis is that the company had a mostly regional shareholder structure
with shareholders coming from the surrounding areas. To figure out whether there was an
investors’ home bias, I calculate the distance (as the crow flies) between the investors’ resi-
dences and the headquarters of the company. As mentioned in chapter 2, the analysis should
be treated with caution, because in total, only 25 percent of the shareholders are considered.
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.8 depict the regional distribution of the shareholders.
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Figure 4.6 supports thehypothesis andgraphically shows thatmany investors camedirectly
from the city of Giengen, where the headquarters was located. Moreover, many investors
came from the surrounding area of Giengen. They lived in Heuchlingen, Niederstotzingen,
Langenau and Altheim. In cities such as Ulm and Heidenheim, investors also had their resi-
dences, but much fewer than in the four cities mentioned above.
This is also in line when one looks at Table 4.8. Panel A shows that about 93 percent of the
investors lived within 100 kilometers of the headquarters in Giengen. Only 7 percent lived
more than 100 kilometers away. This is a strong positive correlation between the residence of
the investors and the proximity to the headquarters of the MÜAG. The smaller the distance
to the company, the higher the number of investors. It seems that most shareholders have
entered the company with their capital to support a regional company, since theMÜAGwas
well known among the people in the region.
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Source. Own illustration, WABWB2007/649.
Figure 4.6: Regional Distribution of the Shareholders of the MÜAG
Because the location of the stock exchange also mattered for investing, Panel B calculates
the distance between the residence of the investors and the Stuttgart stock exchange, where
the shares of theMÜAGwere all listed. Here also one finds a clear home bias with respect to
the Stuttgart stock exchange. About 90 percent of the investors lived within 100 kilometers
of the Stuttgart stock exchange.
To sum it up, and only looking at 25 percent of shareholders of theMÜAG, the data clearly
show thatmostly investors from the area in and nearGiengen bought shares. This is also con-
firmedby the fact that the shareswere only traded on the Stuttgart stock exchange. Regarding
theMÜAG, the probability is high that regional companies that listed their shares at regional
stock exchanges also have a regional shareholder structure. To provide a generalization of this
134
argument, further research needs to be done.
Table 4.8: RegionalDistributionof Investors of theMittelschwäbischeÜberlandzentraleAG
in 1925
Panel A: Distance between company’s headquarters and investors’ place of residence in km
Share of investors, who reside
within 30, 50 and 100 kilometers
of the headquarters (in percent)
Share of investors, who reside >
100 kilometers from headquarters
(in percent)
Observation 30 km 50 km 100 km > 100 km
1,319 79.23 87.49 92.57 7.43
Panel B: Distance between the Stuttgart stock exchange and investors’ place of residence in km
Share of investors, who reside
within 30, 50 and 100 kilometers
of the headquarters (in percent)
Share of investors, who reside >
100 kilometers from headquarters
(in percent)
Observation 30 km 50 km 100 km > 100 km
1,319 79.23 87.49 92.57 7.43
Source. WABWB2007/649.
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Does the Preference for Investment in Local
Firms Rise in Turbulent Times? Evidence
From the Portfolio of Joseph Frisch, Private
Banker (1923-1955)*
*This chapter is co-authored with Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer (University of Hohenheim). The candi-
date’s individual contribution focused mainly on the hand-collection and processing of the data and the lit-
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andNeumayer 2019). URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/zug.2019.64.issue-1/zug-2018-0007/zug-2018-
0007.xml. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/zug-2018-0007. It is printedwith kindpermission ofWalter deGruyter
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The preference for local investments is well-known. The home bias literature shows
that investors prefer assets from their home country and home region to a diverse portfolio
of domestic and foreign assets. Although home bias has been documented in previous cen-
turies, (Burhop andLehmann-Hasemeyer 2016 orNeumayer 2018) factors that determine the
degree of the home bias were not studied before 1945. Explanations for modern economies
have drawn on individual psychological biases, different institutions and cost structures, and
information asymmetries.1 Nicolas Coeurdacier and Hélène Rey (2013, pp. 68ff.), for in-
stance, look at a number of explanations such as hedging motives, asset trade costs, and in-
formational and behavioral biases. Still, although part of the preference for local shares can
be attributed to psychological or sociological factors, another part can certainly be explained
by economics. The contribution of information asymmetries seemsparticularly compelling.2
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, it wasmuch easier to obtain information about firms that
were closer to investors. These information asymmetries may have had significant economic
consequences. News about a change in fortunes for a firm would reach neighbors sooner
than investors, who were further away and dependent on other sources of information. Lo-
cal investors had a clear advantage in being able to buy or sell shares ahead of a change in the
share price. The harder it was to get reliable, timely information, the greater the advantage of
local investors.
We have a new and unique source of data, the private portfolio of a Stuttgart private
banker, Joseph Frisch3 which enables us to study home bias in the years 1923 to 1955. Frisch
made his first documented transaction when he was 42 years old and the last one shortly be-
1For an overview of the literature, see Coeurdacier and Rey (2013) or Wójcik (2011).
2For anoverviewof recent studies regarding information asymmetries, seeLindblomet al. (2017, pp. 141ff.).
3Depotbuch des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch Nachfolger, 1923-1957,
Wirtschaftsarchiv Baden-Württemberg (hereafter WABW, B166/268).
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fore he died at the age of 72. We, therefore, study his investment decisions within this period.
To our knowledge, this is the longest time series of individual investment decisions that has
been analyzed with a focus on the preference for local shares. David Chambers et al. recently
published the first qualitative andquantitative study of an individual investor’s behaviorwith
an equally long sample period. They study the investment behavior of JohnMaynardKeynes
between 1921 and 1946; however, they do not analyze a particular preference for local shares
but rather focus on his overall investment strategy.4
Our analysis reveals that Frisch’s preference for local shares was correlated with the stock
market. His home bias appears to increase in years in which the overall stock market experi-
enced low returns orwas in recession, particularly during theGreatDepression. We also show
that the home bias was significantly lower during the Nazi regime during which Frisch bene-
fited greatly from the expulsion of his Jewish competitors frombusiness life inNaziGermany
and the territories it controlled. With this novel case study, we show that the preference for
local investments varies over time and is strongly correlated with economic circumstances. It
also seems to be influenced by politically driven action.
5.1 Joseph Frisch – A Private Banker
In 1881, Joseph Frischwas born inGaggenau in Baden. Hemarried Emma Frisch (bornOffer-
mann) and had two daughters, Hertha and Irmgard, and six grandchildren, Bettina and Ver-
enaMeeh, and Angelika, August, Franz Claudius and Joseph Alexander von Demblin. Both
Frisch daughters married into prosperous families. Hertha married director Walter Meeh,
and Irmgard married Dr. Ing. Count Karl von Demblin, becoming the Countess von Dem-
4Chambers and Dimson 2013, Chambers et al. 2015, Accominotti and Chambers 2016 or Chambers and
Kabiri 2016.
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blin (Hesselschwerdt 2015, pp. Iff.).
In 1922, JosephFrisch founded theprivatebank JosephFrisch inStuttgart, located inKönigs-
straße 19a. According to the entry in the commercial register, the merchants Eugen Zimmer-
mann and Otto Essele were granted procuration. Owners and authorized representatives
remained unchanged over 24 years, which was above average for this time (Hohmann 2009,
pp. 312f.).
JosephFrischwas one ofmany start-ups in the early 1920s. The fast devaluation overloaded
the credit apparatus, and more than 40 new private banks were founded in Wuerttemberg
between 1917 and 1925. Unsettled by inflation, more and more people sought advice from
private bankers. This and the increased demand for equities brought customers and spurred
economic growth for private banks. For most of the small private banks, however, the good
times were short-lived. Joseph Frisch was one of the few houses to survive the hyperinflation
and subsequent currency stabilization (Bergner 1993, pp. 204ff.).
The bankwas ranked 121 in a list of themost importantGermanprivate banks in 1933; how-
ever, when itsmain competitors – the Jewish banks –were liquidated, it rose to 22 on that list
within five years (Ziegler 2003, p. 44). In 1949,Otto Essele became a partner, and the bankbe-
came a general partnership (OffeneHandelsgesellschaft). After Joseph Frisch’s death in April
1953 at the age of 72, his widow and both daughters joined the company as limited partners,
so that leadership of the bank remained with the family. The limited partners resigned in
March 1955 and united their interests in the Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft Zavelstein. Also
in 1955, the name was changed to “Joseph Frisch Nachfolger”, and the limited partnerships
were replaced by the Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft Zavelstein. The business activities of the
bank ended in 1965, and the company was dissolved in 1966. The Kapitalverwaltungsak-
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tiengesellschaft Zavelstein, which in the meantime called itself Verwaltungsaktiengesellschaft
Stuttgart, was dissolved in April 1978 (Hohmann 2009 or Heselschwerdt 2015). Thus, the
bank founded in the early 1920s’ boom survived hyperinflation, currency stabilization, the
banking crisis in 1931, and the SecondWorldWar.
5.2 TheHome Bias Related Literature andHypotheses
Previous research has identified a large gap between what finance models predict for individ-
ual investment behavior and observed behavior (Merkle and Weber 2014, p. 372). As Harry
Markowitz (1952) pointed out in the 1950s, portfolio theory assumes that investors form ex-
pectations about return and risk securities and select portfolios according to their expecta-
tions and risk preferences (see also Merkle and Weber 2014, p. 372). Economically rational
actors should diversify portfolios and trade very little. However, at least in modern peri-
ods, private investors have held under-diversified portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008).
There is also evidence that investors trade too frequently (Odean 1998 or Barber and Odean
2000), take high idiosyncratic risks (Calvet et al. 2007), gamble, and speculate (Kumar 2009).
The ‘home bias’ phenomenon is a further contradiction between model predictions and
observed behavior. Kenneth R. French and James M. Poterba explain the over-weighting of
home securities in the portfolio by institutional factors such as income taxes that favor a cer-
tain home bias, which would raise the cost of investment abroad. However, they do not find
significant evidence for these kinds of institutional differences and emphasize the behavioral
aspect of investment decisions. Investors tend to be risk-averse towards foreign investments
because they believe they know the domesticmarket better (French andPoterba 1991). French
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and Poterba’s findings are consistent with other studies on the topic.5 Ted Lindblom et al.
(2017), for instance, also emphasize that home bias is a result of information advantages of
local investors over non-local ones6 and claim that investment decisions are somehow emo-
tionally rooted.
Choi et al. (2017) test international diversification and find evidence that in situations of
uncertainty, investors tend to hold a disproportionate share of familiar or well-known shares.
They argue that investors who are sufficiently uncertain about foreign securities prefer shares
with which they are familiar. The results confirm a higher profit for this strategy, which is
also justified by information asymmetries.
Altogether, previous research of modern markets reveals that the home bias is influenced
by the institutional setting, information costs that cause information asymmetries, and be-
liefs of investors that regional investments are less risky and, therefore, preferable in times of
economic and political turmoil.
There have not been many studies on home bias in earlier periods. For Germany, Burhop
and Lehmann-Hasemeyer (2016) analyze 32 shareholder lists from 16 different companies
based in Berlin and showed that shareholders, who also lived in Berlin, owned about 60 per-
cent of the share capital of these companies.7 They concluded that local investment was im-
portant and that there is evidence for an investors’ home bias. The authors further investigate
5For a comprehensive review, see Ian Cooper et al. (2013), who also focus on home bias.
6Coval andMoskowitz (1999) also call information asymmetries a significant factor in explaining domestic
investment, but they expanded the concept of distance. First understood only as a purely geographical term,
they introduce the term ”economic distance”. As an example, theymeasure the distance from Los Angeles to El
Paso (Texas) to New York. Of course, El Paso (Texas) is geographically closer to New York, but the ”economic
distance” is much lower from Los Angeles to New York (e.g. better transport and communications infrastruc-
tures, such as railways or air links, or other similarities between the two cities). This ”economic distance” is also
clearly reflected in investors’ portfolio decisions.
7Julian Franks et al. (2006) also analyze shareholder lists on a broader scale but do not study the home bias
in particular.
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home bias when it comes to listing decisions of companies at certain stock exchanges, finding
that smaller firmswere listed at regional stock exchangeswhereas larger firmswith higher cap-
ital requirements were listed at the Berlin stock exchange. They explain their findings with
asymmetric information between issuer and investors and with the home bias of investors
investing more in well-known regional markets.8
Neumayer (2018) studies the home bias based on a larger sample, showing that the home
bias vanishes if the general meeting did not take place close to the headquarters of the firm.
Moreover, it mattered to investors which stock exchange the shares were listed on.
For Britain, Janette Rutterford et al. (2017) explore local investment bias from 1870 to
1935. Using a representative database of nearly 30,000 shareholders based on 197 sets of share
records, they present evidence of a strong local investment preference. This home bias effect
remained strong for London investors and declined for non-London investors over time.
However, all the above-discussed historical studies deal with the description and determi-
nation of the home bias phenomenon with less focus on the reasons for home bias. This
study seeks explanations for home bias across time by looking at Joseph Frisch’s preference
for local shares under four different economic and political regimes: The Weimar Republic,
the Nazi regime, World War II, and the post-1945 recovery. We are interested in whether the
home bias was influenced by economic circumstances, market performance, or Frisch’s activ-
ity on the stock market. Moreover, we are also interested in whether and how the political
regimes influenced the degree of his home bias.
It is relatively easy to study whether general economic circumstances influenced Frisch’s
bias towards regional investments. We measure the overall market performance with a stock
8Wormser (1919), a contemporary observer, further states that in 1919 in Prussia, 30 percent of the financial
wealth was concentrated in three cities (Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne).
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market index and study the correlation between this index and Frisch’s home bias. Studying
the impact of the political circumstances is more difficult; thus, we compare the number of
transactions and the share of regional investments of all investments in four different periods
that probably influenced Frisch’s investment decisions differently.
The first period, between 1924 and 1928, was a rather stable economy; thus, we expect the
home bias to be relatively large at the beginning shortly after the hyperinflation and then to
decline over time. With the onset of the Great Depression banking crisis in 1929, the home
bias is likely to rise with a potential rise in information asymmetries and a preference for fa-
miliar firms in times of economic distress. In this period, we find that many private bankers
financially supported regional companies that were traditionally associated with them. A
well-documented case is the financial renovation of the Bamag-Meguin AG by the private
banks Sal. Oppenheim and A. Levy (Ulrich 1998, p. 201).
After 1933, when the National Socialists took power, the ‘Aryanization’ process of Jew-
ish private bankers offered extraordinary investment opportunities for ‘non-Jewish’ private
bankers like Frisch.9 The ‘Aryanization’ of the Salamander AG is a good example. Joseph
Frisch was one of the bankers who sold shares, which were in possession of the family of the
Jewish company founder Max Levi (James 2001, p. 86). Frisch was involved in many other
‘Aryanization’ transactions and was, in fact, considered a professional aryanizer (“gewerb-
smäßiger Ariseur”) (Finger et al. 2013, p. 244). Wixforth and Ziegler (1997, p. 219) further
point out that Frisch gained importance after 1931 because he specialized in providing stand-
still funds (“Stillhaltegelder”) to first-class industrial debtors. This resulted in 18 supervisory
board mandates, which Frisch held in 1938. Thus, we expect a dramatic rise of Frisch’s in-
9For a description of the ‚Aryanization’ process of Jewish private banks, see, e.g. Köhler (2005).
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vestment activities during the Nazi period, widening the regional range of activity (decrease
of home bias), which came along with the ‘Aryanization’ process of Jewish private bankers.
However, between 1933 and 1939, we expect the number of transactions to decline because
of the National Socialists’ policy to dry out capital markets. Overall, the relevance of stock
exchanges was dramatically reduced in this period,10 which can also be seen in revenue from
the stock exchange tax that fell from 72 million Reichsmark in 1913 to 16 million Reichsmark
in 1937/1938 (Henning 1992).
After World War II, the activities of banks were restricted, and until 1958, capital mobility
was limited. Thus, lower overall activity is likely, which might be accompanied by a higher
share of regional investments. On the other hand, the stability of the economy after 1945 and
the rising number of investment opportunities might have caused the home bias to decline.
Furthermore, we expect strong path dependence over the whole time period because we
assume that past experiences of investors have an impact on their investment behavior. In a
seminal paper, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find evidence that investors’ risk attitudes are
closely related to the returns experienced during their lifetime. Individuals who have experi-
enced low returns on the stockmarket over their lifecycle are lesswilling to take financial risks.
Formative experiences, such as the Great Depression, however, can still influence investment
behavior decades later.
Age certainly has an impact on investment decisions, although we have no expectations in
what way it influences the home bias. Malmendier and Nagel (2015) also investigate how
individuals’ subjective perceptions about future inflation rates are shaped. Their analysis
10In 1934, a law was passed that reorganized the structure of the German stock market. Overall, the num-
ber of stock exchanges was reduced from 21 to nine and firms were forced to de-list or list on the closest stock
exchange. The law also made it harder to list on a stock exchange. For an overview, see Lehmann-Hasemeyer
and Burhop (2014).
144
shows that experience of inflation over the course of a lifetime has a significant impact on
inflation expectations. The authors explain the heterogeneity in the inflation expectations
of the different age groups by using the experienced average inflation. Young people have
less life experience compared to older people, so their expectations are mainly based on re-
cent observations. Greenwood and Nagel examine the investment decisions of mutual fund
managers during the technology bubble in the late 1990s to find out whether inexperienced
investors contribute to bubble formation (Greenwood and Nagel 2009, pp. 239f.). Using
managers’ age as a proxy for their investment experience, they find that inexperienced man-
agers are constantly expanding their investments as the bubble develops, while more experi-
encedmanagers donot. Thus,more experience over timemight reduce the homebias because
information asymmetries decline. However, it is also possible that stable returns of regional
investments and a rising risk aversion cause a rise in regional investments over time.
5.3 The Portfolio Over Time
The portfolio is in the Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW B166/268) and is
described as Depotbuch des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch
Nachfolger (stock register).11 It contains transactions of stock, bonds, and obligations for
the period 1923-1955. The 190 pages of the book document more than 6,000 transactions, in-
cluding the name of the stock or asset, the nominal value, the price, and sometimes the profit
or the amount that was paid for the shares. Most transactions were carried out on behalf
of Joseph Frisch, but there are some transactions for other parties, for example, the partner
Otto Essele. The first recorded transaction took place a year after Joseph Frisch founded the
11WABW,B166/268. In the supplementarymaterial to this chapter, I analyze investments ofGustav Schlott,
who was an investor from the late 19th century.
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bank, at the age of 41, and they continued until his death. After 1953, there are some further
transactions carried out by a successor, («Frisch Nachfolge»). The transactions are sorted
by stock or asset and are handwritten. Figure 5.1 shows a page of the source. It remains un-
clear whether the portfolio is Joseph Frisch’s private portfolio or a record of transactions by
the bank. However, this is not relevant for our purposes, as the bank and the person, Joseph
Frisch, cannot be separated. As stated above, prices and profits are not always available and
are not always conclusive because different abbreviations were used for the units and curren-
cies. It is therefore difficult to calculate the profits and losses accurately. We, therefore, focus
only on the transactions and the relative volume of transactions and not on the profits or
losses.
Source. WABW, B166/268.
Figure 5.1: Sample Page of the Source
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Figure 5.2 shows all transactions, aggregated bymonth. It also provides the general perfor-
mance of stocks using Ulrich Ronge’s stock market index (Ronge 2002). The figure reveals
that Frischwas constantly buying and selling shares over his life cycle but was, as we expected,
more active in some periods than in others. His most active year was 1923 during the hyperin-
flation period when he made more than 800 transactions. He bought and sold shares within
days and made great profits but also great losses. He regularly neglected to report losses or
gains and often just gave rough (rounded) prices. In the 1920s, he traded very occasionally
and started trading more when Hitler and the National Socialists took over in 1933. How-
ever, shortly before the outbreak of World War II, he traded less, probably because of the
National Socialists’ policy to dry out capital markets. After the war, he again traded regularly
until his death in 1953. Transactions carried out by a successor continued until 1955.
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Source. Own calculations usingWABW, B166/268 and the stock market index by Ronge (2002).
Figure 5.2: Overview of Transactions Over Time, Aggregated byMonth
Overall, 42 percent of all investments were in firms within 100 km and about 33 percent
within 50 km of Stuttgart. These included investments in regional electricity firms such as
the Württembergische Elektrizitäts AG and in smaller firms such as the Wolldeckenfabrik
in Weil der Stadt, a manufacturer of wool blankets, or the Andreas Koch Harmonica fac-
tory in Trossingen, which made harmonicas. Frisch also invested in large regional firms such
as Daimler AG and Salamander AG. Many of the firms in his portfolio still exist and are
known to have a strong and important influence on development in the region (Kollmer
1979 and Kollmer-von Oheimb-Loup 2005). However, a significant share of Frisch’s invest-
ments was not regional, for example, he held shares in Mannesmann Röhrenwerke, IG Far-
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ben in Mannheim, and in many different railway companies. Figure 5.3 maps the distribu-
tion of all Frisch’s transactions from 1923 to 1955, showing his investments in and around
Stuttgart, throughout Germany, for example, in Berlin and the Ruhr area, and in firms from
the Netherlands, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Source. Own illustration usingWABW, B166/268.
Figure 5.3: Regional Distribution Transactions, 1923-1955
Figure 5.4 shows that Frisch’s home bias varied over time. At first glance, it seems to be
correlated to the overall stock market performance. In months in which the Ronge index
indicates substantial returns, the average distance of Frisch’s transactions also seems larger.
However, we will study this relationship more closely below.
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Source. Own calculations usingWABW, B166/268 and the stock market index by Ronge (2002).
Figure 5.4: Average Monthly Distance Between Headquarters of Firms in Which Frisch In-
vested and Stuttgart
5.4 Explaining the Preference for Local Shares
In order to perform a more elaborate analysis, we aggregate the time series to a half-year se-
ries, as there were no transactions in some months. We also omit the year 1923, as it was an
exceptional year that would bias our results, and we exclude the few transactions that oc-
curred after Joseph Frisch’s death. Additionally, the distance variable is adjusted to prevent
bias from transactions such as the 1928 purchase of shares in a Tennessee, USA based firm.
Therefore, a more comprehensive variable is used tomeasure regional preference that is most
commonly used in previous analyses (Wójcik 2011, p. 70). We calculate the share of invest-
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ments in firms within 100 km of Stuttgart (home bias 100) of all transactions per year and a
stronger home bias variable that only considers investments within 50 km of Stuttgart (home
bias 50) of all transactions per year. We then use exponential smoothing to achieve station-
arity. Exponential smoothing can be viewed either as an adaptive-forecasting algorithm or,
equivalently, as a geometrically weighted moving-average filter.12 The Dickey-Fuller test for
unit roots reveals that the home bias time series and the transaction and stock market indices
are stationary after the smoothing.
Figure 5.5 provides an overview of the transformed time series on the share of investments
within 100 km of Stuttgart as well as the overall number of transactions, which fits our ex-
pectations very well. First, the corrected time series clearly shows that the home bias varied
over time. It shows that the share of investments within 100 km of Stuttgart was relatively
stable in the early years of theWeimar Republic and increased as expected after 1929 with the
Great Depression. Frisch mainly bought shares of regional companies such as the Himmel-
werke AG inTübingen or the FriedrichHesserMaschinenfabrik in Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt,
but we do not know whether this is caused by a rise in risk aversion or because he wanted
to support his long-term clients. At the beginning of the Nazi regime, the regional bias di-
minished, and Frisch’s overall investment activity increased, which supports our argument
of ‘Aryanization’. However, the number of transactions declined as we expected due to the
Nazis’ dislike of the stock market, which caused an overall decline in trading volume. The
home bias also declined and remained stable during the war. After 1945, the overall number
of transactions increased again but was far from earlier activities during the Nazi period, as
most private banks were subject to strict property monitoring by the Allied administration
12Bowerman et al. (2005) provides an excellent introduction to single-exponential smoothing.
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in these years. The home bias also slightly declined, but overall one can see that the scope of
action was limited.
Source. Own calculations usingWABW, B166/268 and the stock market index by Ronge (2002).
Figure 5.5: Corrected Time Series
Since all variables are stationary, we can test the impact of the overall market performance
on the home bias variable with a simple OLS setting by estimating the following equation:
Homebiast = α + β0Homebiast−1 + β1Transactionst + β2Ronget
+ β3perioddummiest + ϵt
(5.1)
where home bias and transactions cover the variables described above. Ronge is the stock
market index calculated by Ulrich Ronge (2002). For the time variables, we use either period
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dummies that are supposed to show structural changes between the different regimes or we
use a time trend, since it seems that the homebias had a negative trend after 1933. ϵt is the error
term. We estimate this regression with ordinary least squares and robust standard errors.
The results are shown in Table 5.1. Overall, the regressions confirm our results. The first
interesting thing to note is that the home bias was slow to change. If the share of regional
investments was high in the previous six months, then it was also high in the following six
months. This results fit well our hypothesis that investment decisions are determined by
previous decisions (path dependence). Furthermore, the home bias declines over time, as
Frisch grew older and more experienced. This supports the arguments given byMalmendier
and Nagel (2011, 2015) and Greenwood and Nagel (2009).
Second, Frisch’s preference for regional shares was significantly lower in periods in which
the overall stock returns were higher and when he was active on the stock market. Thus, the
general economic circumstances strongly influenced Frisch’s bias towards local shares.
Third, there seems tobeno significant difference in regional investments during theWeimar
Republic, the Nazi regime, and World War II. The only significant difference is revealed for
the years after 1945. Here the home bias was significantly lower in the years after 1945 when
the economy recovered, and returns and growth were high. The lack of significance between
the regimes is probably due to the fact that we observe changes within the regimes.
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egression
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eBias
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
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IABLES
hom
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100km
ofStuttgartofalltransactionsper
year)
hom
ebias50
(shareoftransactionswithin
50km
of
Stuttgart
of
alltransactions
per
year)
H
om
ebias100lagged
0.809***
0.794***
0.590***
(0.103)
(0.137)
(0.167)
H
om
ebias100lagged(2periods)
0.220
(0.153)
H
om
ebias50lagged
0.876***
0.900***
0.704***
(0.0994)
(0.114)
(0.166)
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ebias50lagged(2periods)
0.230
(0.187)
N
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beroftransactions
-0.000242***
-0.000166**
-0.000198**
-0.000133*
(7.58e-05)
(7.50e-05)
(7.78e-05)
(7.76e-05)
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beroftransactions(lagged)
0.000107
0.000109
(9.58e-05)
(8.63e-05)
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ongestockm
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-1.05e-05**
-9.69e-06**
-1.02e-05**
-1.20e-05**
-1.19e-05**
-1.21e-05**
(4.31e-06)
(4.36e-06)
(4.06e-06)
(4.66e-06)
(4.48e-06)
(4.65e-06)
R
ongestockm
arketindex(lagged)
-1.15e-06
-9.33e-07
-1.39e-06
7.96e-07
1.49e-06
5.98e-07
(4.60e-06)
(4.91e-06)
(4.47e-06)
(4.29e-06)
(4.22e-06)
(4.38e-06)
N
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e(1933-1938)
-0.00193
0.00792
0.00509
0.00261
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0.00662
(0.0120)
(0.0135)
(0.0129)
(0.0117)
(0.0122)
(0.0127)
W
W
II(1939-1945)
0.00581
0.00469
0.00653
0.0187
0.0195
0.0243
(0.0156)
(0.0161)
(0.0154)
(0.0157)
(0.0160)
(0.0171)
after1945
-0.0470**
-0.0471*
-0.0490**
-0.0300
-0.0249
-0.0230
(0.0194)
(0.0239)
(0.0192)
(0.0194)
(0.0214)
(0.0196)
Constant
0.140**
0.150*
0.146**
0.0858*
0.0757
0.0654
(0.0623)
(0.0822)
(0.0635)
(0.0503)
(0.0576)
(0.0522)
O
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50
50
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50
50
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R
-squared
0.928
0.937
0.939
0.920
0.925
0.927
N
ote.R
obuststandarderrorsin
parentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
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5.5 Conclusion
The preference for local investments is a well-documented and time persistent phenomenon;
however, there is notmuch empirical research explaining this bias. With this uniquehistorical
source of portfolio choices over the lifetime of the private banker Joseph Frisch in Stuttgart,
we are able to show that the bias towards local investments can, to a large extent, be explained
by the overall economic circumstances, the general performance of the market, and the level
of activity of the investor. Frisch’s preference for local shares was highest in times of economic
distress, during theGreatDepression and the subsequent years inwhich the returnswere low
and he only made a few investments. The preference for local shares diminished in times of
high returns, when the economywas stable and growing andwhen Frischwas older andmore
experienced. Thus, at least in this particular case, it is by no means an obscure preference for
well-knownareas but represents a clear economicmotivation. Whether he benefited from the
home bias is a question we cannot yet answer, as doing so would require a time-consuming
process of constructing information on his gains and losses. Moreover, we would need to
examine other, similar portfolios to determine whether our results can be generalized. Both
questions, however, are a worthwhile focus for future research.
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5.6 SupplementaryMaterial: Investment Behavior of Gustav Schlott
In addition to the investment behavior of Joseph Frisch, the following section describes the
investment behavior of another investor namedGustav Schlott. Compared to Joseph Frisch,
he was an investor from the late 19th century. In what follows, I give a detailed overview of
his investment behavior based on his diary notes.
In the first diary, there is only a family fortune of July 1878 (for the following text, see DTA
3768, 1, p. 5). Hereafter, the family owned the following cash reserves: 800 marks in cash,
700marks in banknotes and 355marks in gold. To call securities, they owned “Norddeutsche
Grundpfandbriefe” (2,400 marks), diverse “Dividendenscheine” (3,600 marks), shares from
the “Stargard-Posener railway-company” (1,007 marks) and further obligations of railway
companies (1,500marks) and“WestpreußischePfandbriefe” (3,400marks). This corresponded
to a security share of 86.5 percent of total assets of 13,762 marks.
The second diary begins in 1885 with a preserved inheritance of 25,520 marks, of which
8,775markswere granted asmortgages to themaster smithSchneider and thewidowHanatsch
fromWeissenfels. The remainingmoneywas invested in government securities and governed
bonds, which were deposited at the Reichsbank in Berlin. He praised God for this: ”Gott sei
Dank auch für diese Gnade!” (DTA 3768, 2, p. 9). In February of the following year, Schlott
sold covered bonds, a loan from theWladikaswas Eisenbahngesellschaft and a change of Lon-
don and Brasilian Bankwith a total value of 4,000marks to subsequently buy covered bonds
from theMecklenburg-StrelitzscheHypothekenbankwith 4 percent of interest (Ibid., p. 10).
In a later entry from this year, he sold eight consols13 and covered bonds of various is-
13This refers to fixed-interest bonds without a maturity date (Delbaen 1993, p. 125).
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suers and showed the date of purchase, surplus14 and interest next to each item (Ibid., p.
11). For this Schlott recieved 30,700 marks from the Reichshauptbank in Berlin. In addition,
the repayment of the mortgage over 4,500 marks by Mrs. Hanatsch took place. Of these,
35,000 marks were granted as a mortgage to Bolze’s Fabrik and 500 marks to the local bank
as loans. With the rest of the money, various bills and debts are settled. Again, he praised
God: ”Der treue Gott schütze uns alle [...]”. For 1888, he noted the surname of 860 marks
for private lessons, which he immediately invested in covered bonds (Ibid., p. 15.). In addi-
tion, he redeemed a bill of 2,033 marks, investing 1,600 marks of it in covered bonds of the
Braunschweig-Hannoverschen Hypothekenbank and paying several bills: ”Auch dafür sei
Gott inniger Dank!” (Ibid.). He also signed a term life insurance policy with Konkordia so
that his family was covered in the event of his death (Ibid., p. 17). The next year, he gave the
shoemaker Evers 10,500 marks on a mortgage. For the year 1890, he noted only the receipt of
a change over 1,526 marks (Ibid., p. 17ff.).
In summary, it can be deduced from the seconddiary that Schlott invested a total of 46,480
marks in theperiod from1884 to 1892. He invested almost half of them in coveredbonds/consols
and private mortgages.
In the third diary, Schlott noted interest income of 2,300 marks for the year 1893 (DTA
3768, 3, p. 7). In the following year, he noted revenues from various sources in the amount
of 1,600 marks, which he partially invested. In 1895, he wrote down that the family was able
to save 1,000 marks in April, of which 300 marks were deposited to the local bank and the
remainderwas invested in covered bonds of the Braunschweig-HannoverschenHypotheken-
bank (Ibid., p. 15). He also invested a received interest payment of 720 marks of a mortgagee
14These are probably price gains.
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in covered bonds of the Braunschweig-Hannoverschen Hypothekenbank (Ibid., p. 17). The
following year, Schlott received the repayment of a granted mortgage from Beddingen, in-
creased it by 4,000 marks and lent the merchant Bokemüller in Königslutter thus a capital
of 40,000 marks (Ibid.). In 1897, the family enjoyed again an inheritance of 63 marks in cash
and 6,900 marks in securities (Ibid., p. 24). In the same year, they granted the baker Fischer
from Königslutter a fully secured mortgage in the amount of 6,500 marks, which he paid
back in 1898 (Ibid., p. 24 and 28). Schlott gave this capital back to the merchant Marheine
(Ibid.). In addition, he noted for December 1897 the renewal of interest rates for two bonds,
250marks investment at the credit institution, the redemption of a coupon and the purchase
of consols for 308.40 marks and a bank deposit of over 250 marks (Ibid., p. 25f.). The last
asset-related entry was made in May 1900. In that year, the family received an inheritance of
17,000 marks. From the last diary, which includes the period from 1892 to 1926, it can be de-
duced that Schlott invested 1,728.40 marks in covered bonds and consols, 800 marks in bank
deposits and 53,000 marks in mortgages.
If one compares his investment activity from both diaries with one another, one notes
that Schlott invested in the later period approximately 9,000 marks more than in the previ-
ous period. Also, the focus of investment, which was relatively balanced between covered
bonds/consols andmortgages, shifted significantly in favor of mortgage lending. The capital
used formortgageswasmainly given to small entrepreneurs who came fromWeißenfels, Bed-
dingen and Königslutter. The last two places are less than 30 kilometers away from his home
residence in Braunschweig and in Weißenfels, where he lived and worked before moving to
Braunschweig. This suggests a home bias effect on his mortgages because he only granted
mortgages to people from the surrounding areas near his hometown. It is also striking that
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according to the diary entries in the portfolio, the family did not hold any shares in the port-
folio. Although he did not note anything about his reason to invest, he often thanks God for
his successful investments, which clearly expresses his Christian way of life.
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General Conclusions
This thesis examines investors’ characteristics and investment behavior in Germany
in the period of 1869 to 1955. It thereby closes the gap on what we know about historical
investors in Germany in that period.
The dataset is hugely comprehensive, including information of more than 10,000 individ-
ual investors, using archival files such as shareholder lists of attendance of different general
meetings, shareholder books of three different companies, portfolio information of a single
investor from the 20th century and a diary entry that describes the investment strategy of an
investor from the late 19th century. In this way we can give—to our knowledge—the first
broader overview of historical investors in Germany during that period. Despite the short-
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comings of the data, this thesis provides new insights into what we know about investors.
The descriptive pattern of chapter 2 confirms the hypothesis in the historical literature by
showing that mostly men from the upper classes invested in shares during that time. More-
over, it shows that foreign investors from the neighboring countries of Germany were active
at the German stock exchanges. They invested not only on the Berlin stock exchange, but
also on regional German stock exchanges.
Chapter 3 brings in a new perspective in the concentration of ownership of German joint-
stock firms. The choice of the six different time periods from 1869 to 1945 allows to compare
different types of regimes and political events, like e.g. the hyperinflation of 1923, which was
a shock to the economy and the stockmarket. It is shown that in the 19th century, joint-stock
firms were in the hands of the men of the upper class and large banks. Ownership among
lower social classes and women, then increased significantly after the hyperinflation of 1923.
This probably came along with the fact that the shares became cheaper after the hyperin-
flation. However, the influence of investors from the upper class and large banks remained
strong even after 1923, which also meant the persistence of a vast inequality of opportunities
in terms of capital ownership and control.
Future research has to deal with the questions of whether different sized companies have
different shareholder structures. Do smaller companies have a more regional shareholder
structure compared to larger companies? Moreover, the particularities of shareholders could
be studied in more detail. Were some social classes more likely to invest in specific industries
than others?
Furthermore, the secondpart of this dissertationdealswith investment behavior over time.
Chapter 4 and chapter 5 study historical home bias in Germany over time.
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The descriptive analysis of chapter 4 first shows that local investors were clearly important
and that the existence of a home bias is present also in historical periods. Challenging these
findings shows that investors’ home bias is presumably overestimated. Moreover, it seems
that it not only matters where company headquarters were located, but also the location of
the stock exchange andwhether the company listed its shares at this respective stock exchange
were decisive facts for an investor to invest. However, the analysis of shareholder books of
investors shows that local investment was present in historical times. Local shareholders in-
vestedmostly in local companies. The study of this phenomenon is very important, not only
from a psychological perspective, but also for the economic perspective because it shows un-
der which circumstances economic decisions are taken. Studying human decision-making
will improve the understanding of human behavior. It not only contributes to the under-
standing of the decision-making process in general, but also to a better understanding of e.g.
investment decisions. It could givemajor improvements to financial economic decisionmod-
els in the future. With better financial models, the gap between financial economic theory
and the actual behavior of economic actors in reality could be closed to some extent.
Aworthwhile focus for future research is the question ofwhether the results for explaining
the home bias can be generalized. Therefore, other data such as investment portfolios over
time need to be collected, which is indeed very time-consuming.
Further questions for future research are whether the home bias was more present in his-
torical periods compared to today and what could have triggered home bias. For example,
in the years 1997 to 2005 home bias for the Eurozone was about 70 percent (Wójcik 2011, p.
68f.). This thesis shows that it was around 69 percent for historical Germany. Of course,
these questions are hard to answer, but it seems that in the past, the home bias was promoted
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by the fact that there were many transaction costs for the people who wanted to invest in
shares. Information about e.g. potential firms to invest was often only available in the lo-
cal newspapers. Locals might know the products and services of a firm better than non-local
investors. The opportunity of locals to talk to employees of the firmwas higher than for non-
locals. Also experiencing events like e.g. the Second World War or different financial crises
might have promoted the home bias of the people.
Today, it is highly likely that the regional identity of the people triggers home bias. When
people feel regionally connected, the probability is higher that they also support regional
companies and buy their shares on domestic stock exchanges. In this context, it is also worth-
while to examine present-day home bias in Germany with historical data on investment be-
havior. This analyses would go in the direction of a common regional identity as an explana-
tion for home bias (see e.g. Dehdari and Gehring 2018).
Chapter 4 is a first step toward getting better knowledge of the factors that triggered his-
torical home bias. However, it provides only a description of historical home bias. It fails to
study the reasons for it and to provide an explanation of why there was such a home bias.
Therefore, the study of chapter 5 highlights the empirical research in explaining the home
bias, using portfolio information over the lifetime of one private investor. The results show
that the overall political and economic circumstances affect the bias toward local investments.
Also, the general performance of the market and the level of activity of the investors explain
the home bias. Home bias was highest during economic recessions like e.g. theGreatDepres-
sion. In economically stable times and times of high returns on the stock market, home bias
diminished. Factors like experience seemed to play an important role for home bias as well
because it became less important with more experience on the stock market.
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Do we observe that people behaved irrationally in historical periods compared to today?
The results of our study about Joseph Frisch suggest that rational considerationswere behind
historical home bias. The home bias rose in times of crisis, which means that this behavior
had something rational. However, the study does not tell whether historical home bias was
also rational in normal times.
Presently, the home bias is mostly seen as an irrational behavior because the transaction
costs and information costs are way lower compared to historical times. The fact that hu-
mans behave irrationally is also interesting, especially from the finance perspective since this
irrational behavior on financial markets is costly. The study of Dalbar (2015) that was men-
tioned in the introduction shows this very well since in this study, investors underperformed
the stockmarket and because of this dispensedwith returns. Also, the phenomenon of home
bias shows this very clearly. For example, many investors forego returns because the bulk of
their money is not overseas. They are not big beneficiaries because of their homeland bias.
Studying this irrational behavior is important because it is possible to learn from it, which is
the best way to avoid such behavior in the future.
But there are also some rational explanations for present-day home bias. It can be argued
in the same direction as the rational explanation of historical home bias. The available in-
formation for investors is better for domestic shares than for foreign ones. Another rational
explanation for home bias comes from Sendi and Bellalah (2010), who argue that global un-
certainties about geopolitical events and emerging barriers to trade lead investors to protect
their portfolios against global risks and to focus more on investments in domestic assets.
Therefore, it seems especially important for future research to further investigate whether
irrationality or rationality is behind thehistorical and contemporaryhomebias phenomenon.
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Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Archive Sources and Signature
Table A.1: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW)
Signature Name
B 166/268 Depotbuch des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des
Bankhauses Joseph Frisch Nachfolger, 1923-1957
B 2007/649 Depotbuch der Mittelschwäbischen
Überlandzentrale AG in Giengen an der Brenz
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Table A.2: Hessian Economic Archive (HWA)
Signature Name
HWA 119/392 Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain
HWA 119/393 Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG,
Frankfurt amMain
HWA 119/1772 Metallgesellschaft AG – F. A. Oetken:
Personenbezogene Dokumentation
Table A.3: German Archive of Diaries (DTA)
Signature Name
DTA 3768 Bd. 1, 2, 3 Tagebuchaufzeichnung von Gustav Schlott
For the archive sources and signatures of the attendance lists of the general assemblies, see
Appendix to chapter 3 and 4.
A.2 Biographical informationofthe investorsoftheMetallgesellschaft
AG
The following list gives an excerpt from the shareholder book of the Metallgesellschaft AG
(MG). Only these investors are listed for which there was biographical information available.
The other investors are not included. The list shall give an impression, that the shareholder
book consistsmostlymembers of the groupof theMG, related industrial holdings/participations
and close friends of the MG.
Dr. Siegfried Auerbach. He started to work for the MG in 1904 and was a director of the
MG (Däbritz 1931, HWA 119/18431).
1Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1843, Metallgesellschaft AG – W. Bröhmer und S. Auerbach: Per-
sonenbezogene Dokumentation.
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Leo Ellinger. He started to work for the MG in 1869. He had been a member of the super-
visory board of the MG since 1881, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG since 1897, a member of the supervisory board of the Berg- undMetallbank
AG since 1906 and amember of the supervisory board of theMetallbank undMetallurgische
Gesellschaft AG. He died in 1916. (Däbritz 1931, Deutsche Biographie2).
Alexander Ellinger. He was the brother of Leo Ellinger (Ancestry.com3)
Arthur Ellinger. He was the son of Leo Ellinger and Emma Ellinger (Ancestry.com4).
Emma Ellinger (born Ruben). She was the wife of Leo Ellinger (Ancestry.com5).
Philipp Ellinger. He was the son of Leo Ellinger and Emma Ellinger (Geni.com6).
Rudolf Euler. He started to work for theMG in 1891. He had been amember of themanage-
ment board of the Metallurigsche Gesellschaft AG from 1903 to 1908, a deputy board mem-
ber of the MG from 1908 to 1912, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank und
Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG from 1916 to 1927, a member of the supervisory board of the
MG since 1927 and amember of the administrative board (”Verwaltungsrat”) of the Schweiz-
erische Gesellschaft fürMetallwerte since 1924 (HWA 119/928 Band 47, Däbritz 1931, Knetsch
1998).
Dr. Otto Fellner. He had been a member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG since 1897, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank and Met-
allurgische Gesellschaft AG and amember of the supervisory board of theMG (Däbritz 1931,
2Ellinger, Leo, Indexeintrag: Deutsche Biographie, URL: https://www.deutsche-
biographie.de/pnd137562993.html, last accessed 04.01.2019.
3Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 903_8844.
Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Geburtsregister 1851-1901 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/25211763/person/26079410807/facts, last accessed 04.01.2019.
4Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 903_9118.
Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Geburtsregister 1851-1901 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?viewrecord=1&r=5545&db=HessenBirths&indiv=try&h=177834, last accessed 04.01.2019.
5URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-tree/person/tree/25211763/person/26080476228/facts, last ac-
cessed 04.01.2019.
6URL: https://www.geni.com/people/Leo-Ellinger/6000000031631794448#, last accessed 04.01.2019.
7Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/928 Band 4, Metallgesellschaft AG – Rudolf Euler Nachlass.
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Knetsch 1998, Ancestry.com8).
Alice Fellner (born Merton). She was the wife of Otto Fellner (Ancestry.com9).
Kurt Fellner. He was the son of Otto Fellner (Ancestry.com10).
Hugo Fritsche. He worked for the MG from 1887 to 1928 (Däbritz 1931).
Heinrich Fuchs. He worked for the MG from 1881 to 1919 (Däbritz 1931).
Theodor von Guilleaume. He had been a member of the supervisory board of the Berg- und
Metallbank AG from 1906 to 1910. (Knetsch 1998).
Grunelius AG Bank. The banking house was a business partner of the MG (Knetsch 1998).
Max von Grunelius. He was a member of the banking house „Grunelius” (Ancestry.com11).
Dr. Carl Hamburger. He had been amember of the supervisory board of theMG since 1881.
He died in 1912 (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Ernst Hamburger. He was the son of Dr. Carl Hamburger (Ancestry.com12).
8Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903. Ances-
try.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Heiratsregister 1849-1930 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61118&h=664661&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw73&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
9Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 903_9187.
Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Geburtsregister 1851-1901 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61117&h=10078&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw71&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
10Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 903_9187.
Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Geburtsregister 1851-1901 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61117&h=10078&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw71&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
11Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903. Ances-
try.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Heiratsregister 1849-1930 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61118&h=799674&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw68&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
12Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Personenstandsregister Sterberegister; Be-
stand: 903; Signatur: 903_8847. Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Sterberegister, 1851-1901
[database on-line]. Lehi, UT,USA:Ancestry.comOperations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
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Ferdinand Heberlein. He had been a member of the management board of the Metallurgis-
che Gesellschaft AG since 1907, a member of the management board of the Metallbank und
Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG until 1915, a member of the supervisory board of the Metall-
bank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG from 1915 to 1925. He died in 1925 (Däbritz 1931).
J. Langeloth. He was a deputy board member of the MG from 1884 to 1887 (Däbritz 1931).
Ludwig Joseph. He worked for the MG from 1877 to 1930 (Däbritz 1931).
Adolf Knippschild. He started towork for theMG in 1888. Hewas an authorized representa-
tive of theMG in Vienna and a member of the management board of theMG. He had been
a deputy board member of the MG from 1903 to 1912 (Däbritz 1931).
August Ladenburg. He was a member of the banking family “Ladenburg”. The banking
house “Ladenburg” supported the MG. The banking house had a close relationship to the
MG. Ladenburg had been a member of the supervisory board of the Berg- und Metallbank
AG since 1906, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank and Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG, amember of the supervisory board of theMGuntil 1929 andmember of the
administrative board (”Verwaltungsrat”) of the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte
since 1910. He died in 1919 (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Paul Ladenburg. He was a member of the banking family “Ladenburg”. (Ancestry.com13).
Adolf Levi. He started to work for the MG in 1898. He had been a member of the deputy
board of MG since 1919 (Däbritz 1931).
Alfred Mayer. He started to work for the MG in 189. He had been a member of the deputy
board of the MG since 1919. He retired in 1931 (Däbritz 1931).
Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG. Belonged to the group of MG and was
shareholder (Knetsch 1998).
Metallgesellschaft AG.MG itself (Knetsch 1998).
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61117&h=300962&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw65&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
13Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Standesamt I (mit Bornheim): Geburtsregis-
ter (Eintraege 4200-4472) 07.12.1888-31.12.1888; Collection: Personenstandsregister Geburtsregister; Signatur:
903. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-tree/person/tree/60587312/person/360161696781/facts, last ac-
cessed 04.01.2019.
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Alfred Merton. He belonged to the founding family of the MG. He had been a member
of the supervisory board of the MG from 1907 to 1928, a chairman of the supervisory board
of the MG since 1917, a member of the supervisory board of the Berg- und Metallbank AG
from 1906 to 1909, a member of the management board of the Berg- und Metallbank AG
from 1907 to 1909, a member of the management board of the Metallbank undMetallurgis-
che Gesellschaft AG, a member of the board of the MG since 1927 and a member of the ad-
ministrative board „Verwaltungsrat“ of the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte 1910
(Däbritz 1931).
Amalie Betty Merton. She belonged to the founding family of the MG. She was the wife of
Rudolf de Neufville (see entry on the next page) (HWA 119/39214).
Richard Merton. He belonged to the founding family of the MG. He started to work for
the MG in 1902. He had been a member of the supervisory board from of the MG from
1907 to 1911, vice-chairman of the management board from 1911 to 1928, a member of the
supervisory board of theMetallbank undMetallurgischeGesellschaft AG since 1913 and head
of it since 1917. He was head of the supervisory board of the MG and had been a member
of the administrative board ”Verwaltungsrat” of Schweizerische Gesellschaft fürMetallwerte
since 1914, vice-President of it since 1929 (Däbritz 1931).
Walter Merton. He belonged to the founding family of the MG. He had been a member of
themanagement board of the Berg- undMetallbank AG from 1906 to 1909, a member of the
supervisory of the MG board since 1913, second deputy head of the supervisory board of the
Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG since 1910; and second deputy head of the
supervisory board of the MG since 1927 (Däbritz 1931).
Moritz vonMetzler. Director of thebankinghouse „Metzler” inFrankfurt/Main. Supported
the MG (Knetsch 1998).
AlfonsMummvon Schwarzenstein. Hewasdiplomatof theGermanEmpire (Ancestry.com15).
14Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/392, Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain - Depotbuch.
15Ancestry.com. Dresden, Deutschland, Heiratsregister, 1876-1922 [database on-line]. Provo, UT,
USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2015. Ursprüngliche Daten: 6.4.25 Eheaufgebote/Eheregister. Digital
images. Stadtarchiv der Landeshauptstadt Dresden, Dresden, Germany. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=9152&h=3376954&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw60&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
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Emma Mumm von Schwarzenstein. She was patron and honorary citizen of St. Petersburg.
She lived in Frankfurt/Main (Ancestry.com16).
Heinrich FritzMummvon Schwarzenstein. Hewasbanker inFrankfurt/Main (Ancestry.com17).
Noted as “Frau“ of Adolf Nall. She was the wife of Adolf Nall (HWA 119/39218).
Richard Nestle. He had been a member of the deputy board of the MG from 1889 to 1900
(Däbritz 1931).
Rudolf de Neufville. He had been a member of the executive board of the MG from 1897 to
1907, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG since 1908,
a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG
and a member of the supervisory board of the MG (Däbritz 1931, Ancestry.com19).
Albert de Neufville. He was the son of Rudolf de Neufville (Ancestry.com20).
Otto de Neufville. He was the son of Rudolf de Neufville (Ancestry.com21).
Robert de Neufville. He was the son of Rudolf de Neufville (Ancestry.com22).
16Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 903_8915.
Ancestry.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Geburtsregister 1851-1901 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?dbid=61117&h=300162699&indiv=try&o_vc=Record:OtherRecord&rhSource=9870, last
accessed 04.01.2019.
17Personenstandsregister Sterberegister; Bestand: 903; Signatur: 11132. Ancestry.com. Hes-
sen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Sterberegister, 1851-1958 [database on-line]. Provo, UT, USA: An-
cestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. Ursprüngliche Daten: Sterberegister und Namensverzeich-
nisse. Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden, Deutschland. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61119&h=1061968&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw56&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
18Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/392, Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain - Depotbuch.
19Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
20Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
21Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
22Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
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Wilhelm de Neufville. He was the brother of Rudolf de Neufville (Ancestry.com23).
Curt Netto (”Erbengemeinschaft”). Prof. CurtNetto had been amember of themanagement
board of the MG from 1897 to 1903 and a member of the supervisory board of the Metallur-
gische Gesellschaft AG from 1903 to 1909. He died in 1909 (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Emilie Netto. She was the wife of Curt Netto (Knetsch 1998).
Richard Ochs. He had been a member of the deputy board of the Berg- undMetallbank AG
from 1906 to 1907 and a member of the supervisory board of the MG since 1920. He died in
1921 (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Arthur Oppenheim. He started to work for the MG in 1890 (Däbritz 1931).
Paul Prior. He started towork for theMG in 1899. Hewas head of the office “zurVerfolgung
der Bücher undZeitschriftenliteratur über technischen Fortschritt“ at theMG (Däbritz 1931).
Paul Roediger. He started to work for the MG in 1888. He had been a member of the man-
agement board of the MG from 1889 to 1911 and a member of the supervisory board of the
MG since 1927. He retired in 1911 (Däbritz 1931).
Carl Schäfer. He started to work for the MG in 1893. He had been a member of the deputy
board of theMG from 1905 to 1912 and amember of themanagement board of theMG since
1927 (Däbritz 1931).
Georg Schwarz. He started towork for theMG in 1890. He had been amember of the deputy
board of theMG from 1905 to 1912 and amember of themanagement board of theMG since
1931. He retired in 1930 (Däbritz 1931).
Schweizerischer Bankverein. The banking house supported the MG and held shares of the
group of the MG (Knetsch 1998).
Schweizer Gesellschaft fürMetallwerte. It was an industrial participation of theMG (Däbritz
1931, Knetsch 1998).
23Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
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Carl Sussmann. He had been amember of the deputy board ofMetallbank undMetallurgis-
che Gesellschaft AG from 1919 to 1926 (Däbritz 1931).
JuliusWeber. Hehadbeen amemberof the supervisoryboardof theMetallurigscheGesellschaft
AG since 1897 and amember of the supervisory board of theMetallbank undMetallurgische
Gesellschaft AG until 1925 (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Noted as “Frau von Julius Weber”. She was the wife of Julius Weber (HWA 119/39224).
Hermann Winkler. He started to work for the MG in 1896. He had been a deputy member
of the management board of the MG from 1906 to 1912, a member of the supervisory board
of the Metallbank and Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG from 1917 to 1927 and a member of
the board of MG since 1927 (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Eduard Albert Zintgraff. He had been a member of theMG since 1910. He had a senior
position at theMetallurgischeGesellschaft andwas amember of the supervisory board of the
Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
A.3 Biographical informationofthe investorsoftheMetallbankundMet-
allurgische Gesellschaft AG
The following list gives an excerpt from the shareholder book of the Metallbank und Met-
allurgische Gesellschaft AG. Only these investors are listed for which there was biographical
information available. The other investors are not included. The list shall give an impres-
sion, that the shareholder book consists mostly members of the group of the MG, related
industrial holdings/participations and close friends of the MG.
Julius Amschel. He was an employee (merchant) of the MG. Later, he moved to London.
He stayed in close contact to the MG (Däbritz 1931).
Erich von Aswegen. Hewas amanager of the “Unterweser Reederei AG (URAG)”. TheMG
had equity interests at URAG (HWA 119/135025).
24Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/392, Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain - Depotbuch
25Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1350, Metallgesellschaft AG – Oberingenieur Wachter: Reise-
bericht.
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Dr. Siegfried Auerbach. He started to work for the MG in 1904 and was a director of the
MG (HWA 119/184326).
Dr. Barwasser. Hewas an engineer atMetallurgischeGesellschaftAG(Lurgi) (HWA119/136027).
Bieber & Co.. It was a corporate copper works (Däbritz 1931).
AmmyBiernbaum. Since 1909, shehadbeen amemberof themanagementboardof theBerg-
undMetallbankAG.Later, amember of the supervisory board ofMetallurgischeGesellschaft
AG (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
C. Bober. He was the director of the lead works Mazarrón in Spain (Däbritz 1931).
Wolf von Eichhorn. Since 1920, he had been an employee of the Metallbank und Metallur-
gische Gesellschaft AG. In 1923, he gained procuration and from 1927 to 1929 he had been
a manager at the Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke AG (VDM). Since 1932, he had been a
member of the management board of the MG (HWA 119/9 Band 828).
Wolfgang Ertel. Since 1927, he had been an employee of theMG. Later, he became a member
of the board of the MG (HWA 119/9 Band 829).
Fritz Euler. Since 1905, he had been a member of the supervisory board of the MG. He was
a representative of the MG in the U.S. (HWA 119/9 Band 830).
Rudolf Euler. Hewas the father of Fritz Euler. He started towork for theMG in 1891. He had
been a member of the management board of the Metallurigsche Gesellschaft AG from 1903
to 1908, a deputy board member of the MG from 1908 to 1912, a member of the supervisory
board of theMetallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG from 1916 to 1927, a member of
the supervisory board of theMG since 1927 and amember of the administrative board (”Ver-
26Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1843, Metallgesellschaft AG – W. Bröhmer und S. Auerbach: Per-
sonenbezogene Dokumentation.
27Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1360, Metallgesellschaft AG –Dr. Barwasser: Reisebericht.
28Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/9 Band 8, Metallgesellschaft AG – Fritz Euler: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
29Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/9 Band 8, Metallgesellschaft AG – Fritz Euler: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
30Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/9 Band 8, Metallgesellschaft AG – Fritz Euler: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
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waltungsrat”) of the Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Metallwerte since 1924 (HWA 119/928
Band 431, Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Henriette Euler. She was the wife of Rudolf Euler and the daughter of the co-founder of the
MG Zachary Hochschild (Knetsch 1998).
Dr. Otto Fellner. He had been a member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG since 1897, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank and Met-
allurgische Gesellschaft AG and amember of the supervisory board of theMG (Däbritz 1931,
Knetsch 1998, Ancestry.com32).
Dr. M. Frank. He was plant manager of the MG in Chile in 1918 (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Freiherr Conway von Girsewald. He was a member of the research department of the
MG. He was a chemist at the MG (Däbritz 1931).
Adolf Knipschild. He started to work for theMG in 1888. He was an authorized representa-
tive of theMG in Vienna and a member of the management board of theMG. He had been
a deputy board member of the MG from 1903 to 1912 (Däbritz 1931).
Emma Knipschild. She was the wife of Adolf Knipschild (Ancestry.com33).
Dr. Werner Kroll. Since 1917, he hadbeen an employee of theMetallbankundMetallurgische
Gesellschaft AG (Däbritz 1931).
Engelbert van de Loo. He was a lawyer and a manager of the legal department of the MG
(HWA 119/21 Band 2034).
31Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/928 Band 4, Metallgesellschaft AG – Rudolf Euler Nachlass.
32Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; Wiesbaden, Deutschland; Bestand: 903. Ances-
try.com. Hessen, Deutschland, ausgewählte Heiratsregister 1849-1930 [database on-line].
Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. URL: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=61118&h=664661&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw73&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
33Deutsche National Bibliothek; Leipzig, Deutschland; Herausgeber: Herold; Signatur: ZC 3187;
LaufendeNummer: 17, 25. Ancestry.com. Adressbücher aus Deutschland undUmgebung, 1815-1974 [database
on-line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016. ULR: https://search.ancestry.de/cgi-
bin/sse.dll?indiv=1&dbid=60778&h=91541063&tid=&pid=&usePUB=true&_phsrc=LBw48&_phstart=successSource,
last accessed 04.01.2019.
34Hessian EconomicArchive,HWA 119/21 Band 20,Nassau-SelterserMineralquellenAG,Oberselters (Nas-
sau)
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Oliver Lyttelton. Hewas amanager at the BritishMetal Corporation inLondon (corporation
with the MG). Since 1931, member of the supervisory board of the MG (HWA 2000/28335).
Heinrich Merk. Since 1923, he had been an employee in the banking department of theMG.
Since 1928, he had the power of attorney. In 1934, he gained procuration and in 1936 he be-
came a member of the management board of the MG (HWA 119/23, Band 2236).
Otto Müller. He was a commercial employee at the MG (HWA 119/39337).
Georg Nau. He was an accountant at the MG (HWA 119/4638).
HansOehmichen. Hewas amining engineer at theMetallbankundMetallurgischeGesellschaft
AG (Däbritz 1931).
F. A. Oetken. Since 1920, he had been an employee at theMG. From 1922 onwards, he was an
authorized representative at theMetallbank andMetallurgischeGesellschaftAG, department
“Wärme”. Since 1937, he had been a deputy board member of the MG (HWA 119/177239,
Däbritz 1931).
Rudolf de Neufville. He had been a member of the executive board of the MG from 1897 to
1907, a member of the supervisory board of the Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG since 1908,
a member of the supervisory board of the Metallbank und Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG
and a member of the supervisory board of the MG (Däbritz 1931, Ancestry.com40).
Dr. Rudolf Ochs. Since 1907, he had been a member of the management board of the MG
and head of the finance department. Since 1917, he had been a member of the supervisory
board of the MG (Däbritz 1931).
35Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 2000/283, Metallgesellschaft AG – Schriftwechsel mit Captain Oliver
Lyttelton.
36Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/23 Band 22, Metallgesellschaft AG – Heinrich Merk: Personenbe-
zogene Dokumentation.
37Hessian EconomicArchive,HWA 119/393,Metallbank undMetallurgischeGesellschaft AG, Frankfurt am
Main.
38Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/46, Metallgesellschaft AG – Georg Nau Nachlass.
39Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1772, Metallgesellschaft AG – F. A. Oetken: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
40Stammbuch der Familie de Neufville, Stammbuchnummer 402. URL: https://www.ancestry.de/family-
tree/person/tree/113185619/person/370108648141/facts?_phsrc =LBw19&_phstart=successSource, last accessed
04.01.2019.
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Georg Oswald. He was an employee at the MG (HWA 119/29, Band 2841).
Dr. Alfred Petersen. Since 1913, he had been an employee at the Metallbank und Metallur-
gische Gesellschaft AG and since 1917, a member of the management board (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Ludolf Plass. Since 1919, he had been amanager of the Lurgi-ApparatebauGmbH, from
1923 to 1928, a member of the board of the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG.
Since 1928, he had been a member of the board of the MG (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Paul Prior. He started towork for theMG in 1899. Hewas head of the office “zurVerfolgung
der Bücher undZeitschriftenliteratur über technischen Fortschritt” at theMG (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Karl Gustav Ratjen. He was a member of the administrative board of the Schweiz-
erischen Gesellschaft für Metallwerke (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Otto Reuleaux. He was an engineer and chemist at the MG (HWA 119/157642).
Richard Rupp. Hewas an employee in the accountant department of theMG in 1938 (HWA
119/230243).
Manfred Sachs. He was an engineer at the MG (HWA 119/161144).
Ernst Schäfer. He was an authorized representative of the Metallbank und Metallurgische
Gesellschaft AG (HWA 119/37, Band 3645).
Wilhelm Schmidt. He was an authorized representative of the Metallurgische Gesellschaft
AG (HWA 119/38, Band 3746).
Dr. Oskar Schober. He was an engineer at the MG (HWA 119/230247).
41Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/29 Band 28, Metallgesellschaft AG – Georg Oswald: Personenbe-
zogene Dokumentation.
42Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1576, Metallgesellschaft AG –Otto Reuleaux: Tätigkeitsbericht.
43Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/2302, Metallgesellschaft AG – Oskar Schober: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
44Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1611, Metallgesellschaft AG –Manfred Sachs: Bierzeitung.
45Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/37 Band 36, Metallgesellschaft AG – Ernst Schäfer: Personenbezo-
gene Dokumentation.
46Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/38 Band 37, Metallgesellschaft AG –Wilhelm Schmidt: Personen-
bezogene Dokumentation.
47Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/2302, Metallgesellschaft AG – Oskar Schober: Personenbezogene
Dokumentation.
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Julius Sommer. Since 1890, he had been an employee of the MG and a procurist of the Met-
allurgische Gesellschaft AG. Since 1903, he had been a member of the management board of
the Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG. Since 1928, he had been a member of the management
board of the MG (HWA 118/248, Knetsch 1998).
Hans Steuernagel. In 1919, he was a voluntary at the MG. Then he became an employee and
later a member of the management board of the MG (HWA 119/41, Band 4049).
Bernhard Unholtz. Since 1927, he had been a member of the MG and a member of the su-
pervisory board of the MG (Knetsch 1998).
H. Wachter. He was an engineer at the MG (HWA 119/135050).
Franz Wallach. He was a director of the AustralianMetal & Co. (Däbritz 1931).
Dr. Eduard Albert Zintgraff. Since 1910, he had been a member of theMG.He had a senior
position at the Metallurgische Gesellschaft AG and was a member of the supervisory board
of the Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG (Däbritz 1931, Knetsch 1998).
Dr. Magar Zöllner. He was a commercial director of the Oberschlesische Zinkhütten AG
(Däbritz 1931).
48Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 112/2, Verzeichnis des Aufsichtsrats der VDM AG und der Berg-
Heckmann-Selve AG.
49Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/41 Band 40, Metallgesellschaft AG – Hans Steuernagel: Personen-
bezogene Dokumentation.
50Hessian Economic Archive, HWA 119/1350, Metallgesellschaft AG – Oberingenieur Wachter: Reise-
bericht.
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B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Archive Sources and Signatures – Attendance list of general assem-
blies
Table B.1: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW)
Signature Name of the firm
B 26/50-67 Bleicherei, Färberei und Appreturanstalt GmbH, Uhingen
B 30/153 A. Stotz AG, Stuttgart
B 40/17, 226 Koehler AG, Oberkirch
B 40/228 W. Euler Maschinenpapierfabrik AG, Bensheim
B 49/228 Koehler AG, Oberkirch
B 150/1744-1749,
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Table B.4: Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG
Signature Name of the firm
HAC 1/143, 143I, 143II Commerz- und Privatbank AG, Berlin / Hamburg
HAC 1/468 Commerz- und Privatbank AG, Filiale Plauen
HAC 1/669 Buderus´sche Eisenwerke, Wetzlar
HAC 1/675 Georg Geiling und Co. AG, Bacharach am Rhein
HAC 3/56 Mitteldeutsche Kreditbank, Frankfurt amMain
HAC 4/23 Barmer Bank-Verein Hinsberg Fischer & Comp., Barmen
Table B.5: Historical Archive of the Deutsche Bank AG
Signature Name of the firm
F 038/0340 Zwirnerei & Nähfadenfabrik AG, Göggingen
K 1/949 Norddeutsche Bank, Hamburg
K 1/984 Albingia Versicherungs AG, Hamburg
K 9/6 Süddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, Mannheim
K 9/12 Deutsche Bank AG, Berlin
K 15/9-17 BergischMärkischen Bank, Elberfeld
K 19/48 Hildesheimer Bank, Hildesheim
P 00705 Bergbau AG Lothringen, Bochum
P 01178 Finow Kupfer &Messingwerke AG, Finow
P 02985 Gothaer Waggonfabrik AG, Gotha
P 03547 Zugtelefonie AG, Berlin
P 04500 Thüringische Glasinstrumentenfabrik Alt,
Eberhardt & Jäger AG, Ilmenau
P 04682 Vereinigte Brauereien AG,Meiningen
P 05299 Berliner Lombardkasse AG, Berlin
S 4020 Rheinische Creditbank, Mannheim
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B.2 Classification Industrial Sectors
Table B.6: Classification Scheme of the Industrial Sectors
Industry
Banking
Insurance
Mining
Heavy Industry
Light Industry
Food Processing
Transportation
Chemical Industry
Public Utility
Others
Source. Lehmann-Hasemeyer/Opitz 2019, p. 79.
194
B.3 Classification Occupations
Table B.7: Classification Scheme of Occupations
Occupational Groups
Administration
Military andMarine
Church
Trade and Industry
Lawyers
Medicine
Aristocracy and Property
Teaching
Rural Tenants
’Citizens’
Diverse
Source. Mathew 1978, p. 280.
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C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Archive Sources and Signatures: Attendance lists of general assem-
blies
Table C.1: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW)
Signature Name of the firm
B 26/50-67 Bleicherei, Färberei und Appreturanstalt GmbH, Uhingen
B 30/153 A. Stotz AG, Stuttgart
B 40/17, 226 Koehler AG, Oberkirch
B 40/228 W. Euler Maschinenpapierfabrik AG, Bensheim
B 49/228 Koehler AG, Oberkirch
B 150/1744-1749,
2347, 2371
Salamander AG, Kornwestheim
B 150/2371 J. Sigel & Cie. Schuhfabrik AG, Kornwestheim
B 2001/10, 136 Elektrizitätswerke Argen AG,Wangen im Allgäu
B 2007/263 Kraftwerke Untere Mindel AG, Burgau
B 2023/15-16 Württembergische Sammelschienen AG, Stuttgart
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Table C.4: Historical Archive of the Commerzbank AG
Signature Name of the firm
HAC 1/468 Commerz- und Privatbank AG, Filiale Plauen
HAC 1/675 Georg Geiling und Co. AG, Bacharach am Rhein
HAC 4/23 Barmer Bank-Verein Hinsberg Fischer & Comp., Barmen
Table C.5: Historical Archive of the Deutsche Bank AG
Signature Name of the firm
K 9/6 Süddeutsche Disconto-Gesellschaft, Mannheim
P 03547 Zugtelefonie AG, Berlin
P 04500 Thüringische Glasinstrumentenfabrik Alt, Eberhardt & Jäger AG, Ilmenau
P 04682 Vereinigte Brauereien AG,Meiningen
C.2 Archive Sources and Signatures: Shareholder books
Table C.6: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW)
Signature Name
B 2007/649 Depotbuch der Mittelschwäbischen Überlandzentrale AG in
Giengen an der Brenz
Table C.7: Hessian Economic Archive (HWA)
Signature Name
HWA 119/392 Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain
HWA 119/393 Metallbank undMetallurgische Gesellschaft AG, Frankfurt amMain
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C.3 Industrial holdings of theMG and theMetallbank undMetallurgis-
che Gesellschaft in 1931
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D
Appendices to Chapter 5
D.1 Archive Sources and Signatures
Table D.1: Baden-Wuerttemberg Economic Archive (WABW)
Signature Name
B 166/268 Depotbuch des Bankhauses Joseph Frisch und des
Bankhauses Joseph Frisch Nachfolger, 1923-1957
Table D.2: German Archive of Diaries (DTA)
Signature Name
DTA 3768 Bd. 1, 2, 3 Tagebuchaufzeichnung von Gustav Schlott
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